At this point in its term of office, the Biden Administration had hoped for a markedly different Middle East.

Under American tutelage, the Trump-era Abraham Accords would have ideally widened the circle of peace among Arab states and Israel, effectively ending the Arab-Israeli conflict and purportedly bringing stability and prosperity to a region sorely in need of it. As regional rivals reconciled their differences, Washington could refocus its attention on the Indo-Pacific region, shifting military and diplomatic assets to counter China.

In this new, more united Middle East, the threat of Iran would be contained by a formidable array of Arab and Israeli military power, and the Palestinian issue (regrettably resistant to any lasting solution, in the jaded view of government officials and pundits alike) would be safely contained. The Palestinians themselves would be mollified by new aid and investments from the wealthy Arab countries, an ample consolation prize in place of their own state. The threat of terrorism and conflict would have been reduced to manageable terms.

The war in Gaza has changed the entire diplomatic and military landscape into the one that Washington had hoped to avoid. Current conditions present daunting new challenges for the Biden administration, including the fearsome threat of wider regional confrontation.

Of course, the reality today is depressingly different. The war in Gaza has changed the entire diplomatic and military landscape into the one that Washington had hoped to avoid. Current conditions present daunting new challenges for the Biden administration, including the fearsome threat of wider regional confrontation.

As they say in the Pentagon, “No plan ever survived first contact with the enemy,” a wise maxim the Biden administration is currently relearning.

Things Fall Apart; the Center Cannot Hold

In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attack in southern Israel on October 7, President Joe Biden took a safe, traditional position, completely within a longstanding Washington consensus —full support of Israel’s “right to defend itself,’ bolstered by pledges of substantial military aid, and backed in this instance by the dispatch of two aircraft carrier strike groups, the USS Gerald R. Ford and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, to positions off Israel’s Mediterranean coast and in the Red Sea, respectively. But this supposedly safe position rapidly deteriorated into domestic and international political controversy as Biden discovered that fully backing Israel came with substantial political costs he hadn’t, apparently, anticipated.

With Biden’s poll standing eroding, due in no small part to his stance on the conflict, Washington’s diplomatic position has been evolving rapidly. During his tour of the region in early November, Secretary of State Antony Blinken called for “humanitarian pauses”—not to be confused with a “ceasefire”—to allow humanitarian aid shipments to arrive in Gaza. In Tokyo a few days later for a meeting of G-7 foreign ministers, Blinken went significantly further, specifying American terms for an immediate post-war future. He said that there must be “no forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza. Not now, not after the war…No use of Gaza as a platform for terrorism or other violent attacks. No reoccupation of Gaza after the conflict ends. No attempt to blockade or besiege Gaza. No reduction in the territory of Gaza…It is imperative that the Palestinian people be central to governance in Gaza and in the West Bank as well, and that, again, we don’t see a reoccupation.”

With Biden’s poll standing eroding, due in no small part to his stance on the conflict, Washington’s diplomatic position has been evolving rapidly.

This is not only aimed at discouraging Israel’s possible imposition of a security zone in Gaza such as that enforced by Tel Aviv in southern Lebanon for 15 years, but also to suggest a new political horizon going forward. In Tokyo, Blinken hinted at that horizon, albeit in vague terms, saying that “it’s vitally important that Palestinian aspirations for governing themselves, for being the ones to decide their own futures, are realized.” This may fall short of a commitment to doing the long, hard work of bringing about a two-state solution, but it may be a start.

US Politics and Rising Pressure on Israel

Meanwhile, domestic political pressures almost unheard of in Washington are continuing to build: popular opinion in the United States, particularly among Democrats, is breaking sharply against Israel. On November 8, 26 Senate Democrats and Independents signed a letter to President Biden asking pointedly whether his administration can ensure that Israeli military operations in Gaza are being “carried out in accordance with international humanitarian law.” While the pro-Israel foundation in Congress remains generally solid, it seems cracks have begun to appear.

The administration is also faced with almost unprecedented dissent in the ranks of the federal bureaucracy. Foreign Service officers have in recent days signed onto three different dissent channel cables, a mechanism established during the Vietnam War to enable the rank-and-file to speak their minds without going messily public. The cables proposed some form of ceasefire to end the Israeli onslaught. Blinken himself felt compelled to meet with at least some of the signatories. And just this week, around 500 career officials and political appointees from about 40 government agencies signed a letter to President Biden also endorsing a ceasefire, citing polling data showing about two-thirds of Americans in favor of it and a de-escalation of violence.

The increasingly desperate situation in Gaza, including 1.5 million internally displaced persons as well as a death toll now exceeding 11,000, has fueled this rising controversy. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, for one, has taken notice, worrying that Israel has limited time to achieve its stated objective of eliminating Hamas in the Gaza Strip before it is forced to bow to pressure, primarily from the United States, to halt its military operations. It is a message that has been re-enforced this month by senior administration officials in contacts with their Israeli counterparts.

Israel’s Reaction

To complicate matters, the Israeli government does not necessarily seem to share the same playbook from which the United States is currently working. On November 7, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced  that Israel will maintain “overall security responsibility” in Gaza for an indefinite period, with no apparent plans for a transition to a diplomatic process to follow. While this falls a bit short of reoccupation, and certainly of the re-establishment of settlements of which some on the far Israeli right dream, it nevertheless opens the door to an untenable political situation that Washington clearly finds undesirable.

Meanwhile, the situation in Gaza continues to deteriorate. November 10 brought news that Israel has besieged several hospitals in Gaza, alleging that they are being used as storage facilities by Hamas, and demanding they be evacuated. A particular focus of Israel’s ire is Gaza’s largest medical complex, Al-Shifa Hospital, under which Israel claims Hamas maintains a system of military bunkers. Early on November 15, Israeli troops entered the complex and alleged that weapons were found inside; but Hamas denied the claim. The increasing number of casualties, ongoing military strikes, and lack of fuel has brought the medical system in Gaza to the point of total collapse.

Israel has agreed to White House demands for short operational pauses in northern Gaza to permit humanitarian aid to enter, but these will not substantially alleviate the suffering of Palestinians throughout the Gaza Strip, and do not necessarily betoken any willingness to consider a broader ceasefire.

Israel has agreed to White House demands for short operational pauses in northern Gaza to permit humanitarian aid to enter, but these will not substantially alleviate the suffering of Palestinians throughout the Gaza Strip, and do not necessarily betoken any willingness to consider a broader ceasefire. Netanyahu has in fact resisted American requests for a longer pause, even to facilitate the release of hostages. Intensive US diplomacy to persuade Israel to commit to more on the humanitarian front continues.

For the future, Netanyahu has steadfastly refused to consider a meaningful peace process after the conflict ends. Indeed, violent West Bank settlers seemingly backed by the Israeli Army have embarked on what can only be described as a campaign of ethnic cleansing in the occupied West Bank, a development that may prove even more incendiary than the ongoing violence in Gaza.

Regional Context Evolving

The Biden administration is now reduced to trying to stave off a slow-motion wreck of a once hopeful Middle East policy. A formal diplomatic rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia may still take place—despite the Gaza war, both countries have an interest it making it happen—but it is by no means certain and in any case has suffered a real setback. Saudi Arabia has increased its criticism of Israel and reportedly paused any consideration of a deal to normalize relations. Instead, Riyadh hosted an Arab-Islamic summit meeting that included President Ibrahim Raisi of Iran, a diplomatic breakthrough of a very different kind that may not have been possible absent the Gaza crisis. The assembled leaders called for UN Security Council action to adopt a resolution under its binding Chapter 7 authority to halt Israel’s “aggression,” essentially a call for an indefinite ceasefire, cutting against American policy and adding to the international pressure on Washington.

Other Arab states are likewise backing away from Israel. Egypt, which has only ever enjoyed a cold peace with Israel, has made clear that it will not accept a mass transfer of refugees from Gaza to northern Sinai, for fear that they will not be allowed to return, a worry that is by no means unfounded. Cairo has also indicated that it will not participate in defeating Hamas, as it needs the group to help enforce border security. Jordan has declared Israel’s ambassador persona non grata and announced that “all options are on the table” in terms of a response. The United Arab Emirates has adopted a somewhat more measured response, favoring a ceasefire and warning that the United States will lose influence if a solution is not reached soon. Worried about their own domestic politics, several Arab states have individually importuned Washington to do more to pressure Israel to end its military campaign.

The one regional power that seems comfortable with Biden’s policy so far is Iran, apparently seeing it as an opportunity to rally popular and regional leadership opinion to its anti-US and Israel stance.

The one regional power that seems comfortable with Biden’s policy so far is Iran, apparently seeing it as an opportunity to rally popular and regional leadership opinion to its anti-US and Israel stance. The immediate danger of a broader conflict involving Iran and its allies versus the United States and Israel seems not to be imminent, but that does not mean it has gone away. Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has escalated significantly in recent days, and the party’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah warned in separate speeches earlier this month that while the group did not intend to enter the war as a full combatant, it would respond in kind to Israeli attacks on Gaza or Lebanon.

For an administration that staked its regional policy on an expansion of the Abraham Accords, these developments are concerning. They do not necessarily mean an end to the administration’s hopes for further regional integration once the Gaza conflict ends, but they do illustrate the many difficulties and fresh complications ahead—probably quite a few more than US officials anticipated just a few weeks ago. And if a broader conflict should erupt, possibly with the direct involvement of US forces, all bets are off.

Is There an Endgame?

As with any crisis in the Middle East, there is an undeniable but limited opportunity to effect fundamental change in the region’s dynamics. Previous conflagrations have led to major, if incomplete, peacemaking efforts spearheaded by Washington. This moment may be no different. Blinken spoke in Tokyo of “setting the conditions for durable peace and security and to frame our diplomatic efforts now with that in mind.” To be sure, there is, reportedly, discussion of the details of a future peace process at lower levels in the State Department.

But still, at the moment there is little obvious appetite in the White House for either a ceasefire, a peace process, or the political heavy lifting involved in bringing about either. Biden himself has talked in general terms about the need for a two-state solution “when this crisis is over,” but if he’s serious, much more needs to be done, and now.

The Biden administration must act quickly and offer specific plans and timelines to shape post-conflict expectations and establish its priorities with the parties. If it doesn’t, the most radical elements on all sides will set the agenda. Above all, Biden himself has to be willing to recommit his presidency to a major diplomatic push, probably one that will involve both pressure and inducements to raise the stakes for all parties if they fail to cooperate. This seems unlikely at the moment, but intense crises have made potent peacemakers of presidents before.

Source : Arab Center Washington DC

The post Gaza, the Ruin of US Policy, and a Transformed Middle East appeared first on Policy Print.

“The Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades,” asserted US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on 29 September.

“Now challenges remain, but the amount of time that I have to spend on crisis and conflict in the Middle East today compared to any of my predecessors going back to 9/11 is significantly reduced.”

Sullivan’s comments have aged horribly. Just eight days later, Hamas waged its incursion into southern Israel, triggering a brutal Israeli campaign of bombardment of Gaza. The fighting since 7 October has thus far killed more than 8,000 Palestinians in Gaza and 1,400 Israelis.

The violence has spilled into Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and Egypt. At this point, the escalating crisis risks spreading to other parts of the Middle East, possibly entailing direct US and Iranian involvement.

Now a full-scale Israeli ground invasion of Gaza looms and Palestinians are concerned about a ‘Nakba 2.0’. Considering rhetoric coming from high-ranking Israeli officials and Tel Aviv’s plans and actions this month, such concerns are entirely valid. As usual, the US has not put any real pressure on Israel to change its destructive and destabilising behaviour.

“Looking ahead, it will be increasingly difficult to imagine the Global South taking the Biden administration’s rhetoric about human rights with anything more than a grain of salt. The hypocrisy from America is just too great”

The timing of this crisis is also particularly horrible given that President Joe Biden, who is seeking re-election next year, doesn’t want to appear to be giving Israel anything less than ironclad support.

As the world witnesses Israel’s war crimes in Gaza carried out with Washington’s blessing, the US’s capacity to be taken seriously when criticising Russia’s rogue behaviour in Ukraine has been severely, and most likely permanently, damaged.

Looking ahead, it will be increasingly difficult to imagine the Global South taking the Biden administration’s rhetoric about human rights with anything more than a grain of salt. The hypocrisy from America is just too great.

“It’s been an unseemly spectacle to see Washington and its European allies support Israel as it cuts off aid, water, and food to besieged civilians in Gaza,” Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International and a Middle East analyst, told The New Arab.

“It is exactly what these same nations denounced the Syrian regime for doing in Homs, Ghouta, Aleppo, and other places. They didn’t mince words when Russia stepped up to support Damascus and vetoed UN condemnations. Now when their own ally blocked aid and food in the same way, they couldn’t muster even mild criticism,” added Lund.

A foreign policy blunder

It is increasingly difficult to deny the major failures of Washington’s foreign policy in the Middle East. While continuing many aspects of the Trump administration’s approach to the region, the Biden administration has made expanding the scope of the Abraham Accords central to its agenda in the Arab world.

The White House naively believed it could bring Libya into a normalisation deal with Israel, which backfired disastrously.

The Biden administration has also invested massive amounts of diplomatic energy into trying to pull Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords – something that no expert can imagine happening any time soon given ongoing developments in Israel and Palestine.

“The recent events have punched a giant hole into the paper-thin superficial Biden administration policy on the Middle East, which has deluded itself into believing that establishing close ties with apartheid Israel and dictatorships in the Middle East is some kind of recipe for stability,” Sarah Leah Whitson, the Executive Director of Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), told TNA.

What is being painfully demonstrated is that lasting peace and security for Israel will not come from diplomatic deals with Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which were arguably never confrontational toward Israel.

It can only come from a lasting solution to the unresolved Palestinian question. Attempts to bury the Palestinian issue based on the assumption that the Palestinian cause stopped mattering to the Arab world have proven extremely misguided.

“As with Israel, one of the assumptions of US foreign policy in the Middle East has been annihilated in the past three weeks: that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be contained, and that the region could move on,” said Dr Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, in an interview with TNA.

“This was predictably an unsustainable assumption, but it was one of the premises of American foreign policy under Biden (and Trump) nevertheless. There are still some positive elements to the Abraham Accords – the stabilisation of relations among Israel and key Arab states – but to be sustainable, it needs to be accompanied by genuine, not fictitious, progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front,” added Dr Juneau.

“Recent events have punched a giant hole into the paper-thin superficial Biden administration policy on the Middle East”

Arab backlash

Anger at the US is growing in the Middle East. Large scale protests in capitals from Amman to Manama, Sana‘a to Baghdad, and Rabat to Beirut speak to the widespread support that the Palestinians are receiving across the Arab world.

In response to public opinion in their own countries, Arab leaders and policymakers have had no choice but to strongly condemn Israel and express support for the Palestinian cause.

Each Arab government faces slightly different circumstances given differences in these countries’ relationships with the US and Israel. Yet, the dynamics across the region are putting pressure on all of them to speak up in defence of the Palestinians and, at least in the case of most Arab states, refrain from directly criticising Hamas.

It was notable that Saudi Arabia, which only several weeks ago was flirting with normalisation with Israel, referred to Israelis as “occupation forces” in its response to Hamas’ Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October.

Despite the Abraham Accords, the UAE, in its capacity as the only Arab state currently on the UN Security Council, has been highly critical of Israel and condemned various aspects of its response to Hamas’ surprise attack. As the humanitarian suffering in Gaza worsens, it’s safe to assume that such criticisms from the UAE will increase.

However, this appears to be about safeguarding regimes from internal legitimacy crises rather than a true commitment to the well-being of the Palestinians.

“It is heartening to see that kind of a pretty united Arab response, but I think it probably has more to do with their concerns about popular unrest in their own countries and wanting to temper that than any pure or genuine concern for Palestinians,” Whitson said.

“All Arab states want Washington to be more mindful of Palestinian and Arab interests, but they’re not equally vocal about it,” explained Lund.

The failure of Biden’s Middle East foreign policy threatens to undermine US standing in the region as well as the US president’s position in the upcoming election. [Getty]

“Governments like that in Syria, which is already hostile to the United States, delight in the opportunity to denounce Washington’s support for Israeli policies,” Lund added.

“Some Arab states, including US-allied nations in the Gulf and states that normalised their ties with Israel, mainly seem to be turning up the volume on Palestine for domestic reasons, or to avoid exposing themselves to criticism from rivals.”

Lund explained how many of these Washington-friendly Arab states are not comfortable confronting the Biden administration about their problems with blind support for Israel.

“You see them criticising Israel in harsher terms than on a normal day, but they haven’t said much about the US support that enables Israel’s actions,” noted Lund.

“On the other hand, I think most realise that if this situation is going to be de-escalated somehow in the future, it’ll have to be the United States that leads the way.”

A time to reassess US foreign policy

When it comes to the White House’s approach to the Middle East, the Biden administration would be wise to change course and ask some tough questions about how we arrived here. But this is unlikely for two principal reasons, said Whitson.

First, Team Biden, “continues to calculate based on short-term interests – namely the upcoming elections – and continues to believe that [Biden’s] victory in the polls is tied to demonstrating extreme support for Israel,” which Whitson sees as a “growing miscalculation”.

Second, the “deeply held personal biases of the Biden administration, of people in the State Department who are not approaching this conflict with clear eyes, with independent thinking, with thinking that prioritises the interests of the American people,” explained Whitson.

“Rather, as Secretary Blinken amply demonstrated during his visit to Israel, their approach to Israel is driven by their own personal, familial feelings of affinity for Israel.”

Source : New Arab

The post Biden’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East appeared first on Policy Print.

Israel was not founded by religious Jews. The early Zionists were secular, rational, and uniquely unsentimental about the Jewish condition in late 19^th-century Europe and beyond. They believed that if Jews were to end their tragic two-thousand-year exile, their reliance on God and the fatalism it bred needed to be expunged.

The early Zionists’ focus on secularism seems to have been vindicated by recent events. 

How could the catastrophe on 7 October, which claimed the lives of at least 1,400 Israelis and has left 220 as hostages of Hamas, have happened? How could Israel lose control, over the course of a few hours, of an entire swath of its sovereign territory, including twenty-two kibbutzim and other villages? Beyond the obvious intelligence failure, one reason is that a good portion of the troops in the enlarged division that was meant to be guarding the Gaza border had been redeployed to keep order and protect an ever-expanding archipelago of tiny, often unauthorized West Bank settlements and roads leading to them. The sole purpose of these outposts was to establish a de facto Jewish presence in the West Bank and hence restrict the actions available to future Israeli governments. Objections and warnings by the defence establishment that the military and security services were overstretched, that the army no longer had the requisite forces or the time to train soldiers properly, were dismissed as the defeatism of an old and tired secular elite, by a growing chorus of hyper-patriotic, right-wing zealots, people often with little or no practical military experience. 

For more than a generation, defence policy and much else has been increasingly determined by the dictates of Israel’s religious settler lobby and its Messianic visions. Though not numerous, parties representing the settlers exploited Israel’s system of proportional representation, which magnifies the influence of small, well-organized pressure groups, to effectively capture an entire state. A careful programme of entryism allowed the Likud, too, to become heavily influenced by MKs and party members from the settlements that in no way reflected the party’s broader voter base. 

It is not just the tactical decision-making power of this group over troop deployments that has now collapsed, but their larger strategic vision. This was a belief that by dispersing a population of Jews around the West Bank we could gradually annex it, all the while pretending that we could ignore the presence of three million hostile Palestinians, and the demographic consequences their incorporation would entail. It is in this context that the settlers, and their secular avatar Benyamin Netanyahu, came to view Hamas as a strategic asset, because its radicalism made any efforts to find a compromise, or even merely to contain the conflict, impossible. Suitcases of cash, supplied by Hamas’ Qatari allies no less, could be relied upon to keep Hamas in power but restrained. What better proof was needed that God was on our side?

Yet beyond the failure of both tactics and strategy, it is the cultural effects of this way of thinking—which bred arrogance, complacency, and above all wishful thinking—that has created the greatest threat to Israel in at least fifty years. Religious obscurantists with government portfolios declared that Yeshiva study was as important as military service in protecting Israel from its enemies. Study Torah and God would not forsake us.

God did not intervene to save families like mine in 1939; and in 1973, the small number of surviving tank crews who ultimately stopped the columns of Syrian armour on the Golan Heights knew that only their heroism and sacrifice would protect their families from a similar fate. The kibbutzniks who fought and died trying to protect their communities against the Hamas terrorists on 7 October understood the same thing. One hopeful sign of change is that hundreds of ultraorthodox men, in defiance of their Rabbis and politicians, have now contacted the IDF and asked to be inducted into the reserves.

Netanyahu and his cabinet of Twitter warriors, sycophants and fixers need to go. Now. It is hard to see any of them being able to offer effective leadership during what may be a lengthy conflict, all the while knowing what future official inquiries are likely to reveal about their behaviour these last few months. Even if we exclude the ministers who were serving in the cabinet on the morning of the attack, there are enough people in the Knesset from both the coalition and opposition with serious defence credentials to form an emergency government, including two lieutenant generals (former chiefs of staff), a major general, two brigadier generals, two former chiefs of police, and the former deputy head of the Mossad. There are also people with executive experience in the civilian realm, particularly several former mayors.

And that is just the beginning. Long term, Israel is too vulnerable to be governed by feckless people in the grip of childish fantasies. For nine months, the government has been fixated on replacing Israel’s ill-designed, highly centralised democracy with a new model that would magnify its worst flaws, and passing a series of laws that would exempt it from judicial oversight. 

In the days that followed the attack, survivors and the families of the hostages were left to their own devices. Israelis discovered just how hollowed out and incompetent state institutions had become—hobbled by years of corruption and patronage, proving how badly we need more, not less, accountability and external scrutiny. What did prove robust and filled the vacuum were Israel’s civil society organisations and volunteer networks—precisely the types of institutions that are incompatible with the overbearing system of centralized power the government wished to impose. Indeed, among the most effective have been the movements that brought hundreds of thousands onto the streets in recent months to protest the government’s constitutional machinations. And no one more than the military reservists and retirees of Brothers and Sisters in Arms, who have been at the forefront of the protests to preserve Israel’s liberal democracy from the beginning. 

It was through this network that several retired senior military officers were alerted that morning that Hamas’ terrorists had crossed the first line of defence and were killing people in communities close to the border and the music festival nearby. Men of this type, aged sixty and over, whose first instinct was to grab a gun and drive toward the slaughter to kill terrorists and save random strangers, are not produced in societies governed by strongmen. In Israel, as in Ukraine, democracies foster initiative, improvisation, courage, and resilience rather than conformity and passivity.

The goal of eradicating Hamas as an organisation may prove infeasible. Ensuring it never again governs the Gaza Strip may prove difficult as well, particularly given that the Palestinian Authority that governs much of the West Bank will not wish to be seen to be collaborating with Israel. They will be reluctant to resume control of the territory from which its officials were chased out or killed by Hamas thirteen years ago. Nonetheless, eliminating the physical infrastructure Hamas uses to manufacture rockets that target Israeli cities is achievable. So is killing or capturing some part of Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s terror armies, which together constitute 40,000 individuals. 

The Western press these days is full of warnings about the dangers of any such operation and is essentially lobbying Israel to stand down and agree to an unconditional ceasefire. One hears one commentator after another solemnly affirming Israel’s right to defend itself before asserting that any possible offensive action it might take will constitute a war crime. Though Israel uses precision guided bombs, Gaza’s packed population means that civilians will indeed inevitably be hurt, particularly if Hamas does not let them leave their homes. Cutting off food, water, or even just the electricity Hamas uses to manufacture fresh rockets to launch at Israel, will create a humanitarian disaster. Even the targeting of Hamas officials is deemed to be illegal extra-judicial killing. Needless to say, a ground invasion is treated as out of the question, as civilians will again be in the way. Yet even more nuanced commentators do, rightly, raise valid questions about how much that option will achieve.

Historically, fighting a guerrilla army in a densely populated urban setting exacts a heavy toll on regular troops. Hamas has spent years planning for this type of war. Every house along the plausible invasion routes will be filled with booby traps. Beneath the surface of every road, they will have buried special mines designed to take out tanks and other armoured vehicles. These will be stacked to increase their lethality and make removing them difficult. If all else fails, some fighters can escape capture by changing into civilian clothes and blending in with the civilian population. Warnings that Hamas may be deliberately luring the IDF into a long, bloody, and ultimately unwinnable campaign cannot be completely dismissed. The fate of the hostages and the possibility that Hezbollah, a far more powerful force, might open a second front makes all this more difficult still. Yet the successful fight by the US against Al Qaeda in Fallujah, and the combined efforts by the West and its local allies against ISIS in Mosul and Rakah, teach us that it is possible to defeat the Jihadis.

Furthermore, while many commentators have carefully elaborated the dangers of a ground invasion, they have generally failed to consider the broader implications for Israel should it choose not to invade. First, if Hamas emerges with its forces largely intact, there is nothing to stop it from launching further attacks in the years to come at a moment of its choosing. Others, too, will be emboldened by this Hamas victory. Far from garnering the world’s respect, restraint will be interpreted as weakness. Allies, including the United States, will gradually abandon Israel—no one needs a weak ally. The Arab states may publicly denounce Israel’s aggression, but privately they have much to fear from a Hamas victory and the resurgence of its ideology around the region. Yet Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE have no reason to cooperate with an Israeli state that is unable or unwilling to protect itself, and that has lost the confidence of its own citizens. 

There are also wider implications for the core nations of the West in Europe and North America. In the last two years, Russia and now Iran—through its proxies in Gaza and Lebanon—have each gone to war against members of the West’s democratic alliance. With stocks of ammunition and arms running short, how soon before China and North Korea each do the same against Taiwan and South Korea? Who is to say which parts of the core Western alliance will come under pressure after that? 

In the West, some people on the left complain bitterly about the hyper-individualism and social atomization of modern market-driven societies. But when such people talk about “community” and the “collective good,” some of them seem to mean only such things as safe bike lanes and free yoga classes—not protection from an invading army coming to kill your family. Because we wish to believe that we live in a world where such atrocities can never, ever happen. That blind spot reflects a different sort of religious dogma, equally unmoored from reality. 

As for Israel, the drift towards religious nationalism and the magical thinking it encourages led us to underestimate our enemies and overextend our forces. In 2015 a previous hard-right government led by Netanyahu reduced the period of required military service for men from 36 to 32 months and announced plans to lower it to 30 in the future. The military was forced to condense training schedules to accommodate these changes. In retrospect, militaristic rhetoric was no substitute for more and better trained soldiers. Because despite all our hopes and prayers, there is so far no sign the Messiah is on his way. We are on our own.

Source : Quillette

The post A Generation of Misguided Policy in Israel appeared first on Policy Print.

While Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s decision to reengage triggered this regional shift, its roots lie a little deeper. The United Arab Emirates began restoring relations with Assad’s regime in 2018, and it has pushed hard for others to follow suit ever since. More recently, Jordan and its king, Abdullah II—long a close and reliable U.S. ally—have emerged as a key architect of the plan to normalize Assad, drafting secretive white papers for dissemination across the region as well as in Moscow and Washington. Underpinning Jordan’s vision was the idea that only by reengaging the Assad regime could diplomacy achieve meaningful concessions from Assad and, in doing so, Syria would be oriented back onto a path toward stability and recovery.

With more than half a million people dead, after nearly 340 chemical weapons attacks, 82,000 barrel bombs, dozens of medieval-style sieges, and much more, the region’s decision to reembrace Assad was no insignificant thing. It has also not been a unanimous decision, with Qatar a strong opponent, followed closely behind by Kuwait and Morocco. But the Middle East works by consensus, not unanimity, and Mohammed bin Salman’s decision to pivot has changed everything.

Beyond the region, the prospect of normalizing Assad remains a deeply distasteful proposition. Europe shows no sign of following suit, nor does the United States, although some senior White House officials have privately greenlighted the region’s pivot. For some within the administration, Middle Eastern crises such as Syria’s are viewed as essentially unresolvable, peripheral to U.S. interests, and not worth the effort. At the same time, according to two regional and two European officials who recently conducted separate meetings in Washington, all of whom spoke to me on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic conversations, one senior Biden administration official has taken to lauding the U.S. role in achieving “the most stable Middle East in 25 years.”

Notwithstanding the factual issues with such a claim, it is likely based in large part on the recent wave of so-called de-escalation across the region, as adversarial and rival governments have reengaged and papered over their differences. The durability of these developments remains unclear, but for many in the region, the normalization of Assad’s regime is part and parcel of this de-escalation. As such, it came as no surprise when one Biden appointee, Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Leaf, called on regional states in March to “get something” in return for their efforts. In retrospect, there can be no doubting how consequential that statement was in triggering concerted regional normalization and significantly weakening Washington’s claimed posture toward Assad.

It has now been three months since the Saudi visit to Damascus set in motion the region’s reembrace of Assad. In mid-August, regional states plan to convene a follow-up summit to discuss progress and next steps. According to officials from three regional states, the entire summit is up in the air. Why? Because every problem in Syria has significantly worsened since April. If regional states were issued a report card, it would barely deserve an F.

Aid Access

A core goal underpinning the region’s normalization of Assad was a desire to see Syria stabilize. For more than a decade, the international community has supported a humanitarian aid effort across Syria worth tens of billions of dollars, meeting the needs of millions of people. The most vulnerable 4.5 million live in a small corner of Syria’s northwest, which is home to the world’s most acute humanitarian crisis. On July 11, Russia vetoed an extension of the United Nations’ 9-year-old mechanism for cross-border aid provision into the northwest, severing a vital lifeline and plunging the area into a profound and unprecedented state of uncertainty.

Days after Russia’s veto, the Assad regime announced an offer to open aid access to the region but added a set of conditions that made the offer practically impossible to implement. Even if the regime’s scheme were somehow implemented, the flow of aid would be a fraction of what was possible under the previous arrangement. For two years, the regime has sought to prioritize cross-line aid delivered from Damascus, and in that time, 152 trucks have been sent. In the same two-year period, more than 24,000 trucks arrived cross-border. As things stand, there is now no mechanism to provide unhindered aid to northwestern Syria and no serious effort to create one. So much for the idea that engaging Assad would bring forth concessions.

Captagon

One issue that Saudi Arabia and Jordan had been most concerned about emanating from Syria was the trade in captagon, an illegal amphetamine produced on an industrial scale by prominent Assad regime figures. Between 2016 and 2022, more than a billion Syrian-made captagon pills were seized around the world, most in the Persian Gulf. In engagements with Assad’s regime, regional states have sought to convince Assad to put an end to the trade.

Given the regime’s central role as well as the stunning profit margins involved—one pill can cost several cents to produce but sells in the Gulf for $20—Damascus’s promise in May to regional governments that it would curb the captagon trade was at best a laughable claim. Nevertheless, Jordan just welcomed two of the most notorious and internationally sanctioned regime officials—Assad’s defense minister and intelligence chief—to Amman to discuss combating drug trafficking, only to be forced to shoot down a drone carrying drugs from Syria just a day later.

Meanwhile, data I’ve collected monitoring regional seizures shows that a massive $1 billion worth of Syrian-made captagon has been confiscated across the region in the last three months, in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan. Even more significantly, German authorities just discovered a Syrian-run captagon production facility in southern Germany along with approximately $20 million worth of pills and 2.5 tons of precursor chemicals.

| CHARLES LISTER

Refugees

Regional states also hoped that reengaging with Assad’s regime would open a path for refugee returns to Syria. After all, the presence of large numbers of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries—3.6 million in Turkey, 1.5 million in Lebanon, and 700,000 in Jordan—is placing an increasingly untenable strain on host countries.

Yet the logic behind regional hopes is inexplicable. All of the most significant reasons why Syrian refugees refuse to return are associated with regime rule. Indeed, new U.N. polling of Syrian refugees released just days after Assad’s participation in the Arab League summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, revealed that just 1 percent were considering returning in the next year.

By so actively normalizing Assad’s rule, regional states have given many among that 1 percent reason to reconsider. What’s more, refugees are now voting with their feet, taking perilous journeys toward Europe at an exponential rate—with the rate of Syrian migration north now at least 150 percent higher than in 2021. Now faced with this bleak reality, host states are enacting policies to coerce refugees to leave, with Lebanon’s U.S.-funded armed forces resorting to forcible expulsions and Jordan declaring that financial support for Syrian refugees will soon end.

Economic Collapse and Violent Escalation

In the past three months, Syria’s economy has precipitously collapsed, with the Syrian pound having lost 77 percent of its value. When the Saudi foreign minister visited Damascus in April, the Syrian pound was worth 7,500 to $1, but today, that number is 13,300.

Having been welcomed back into the regional fold while simultaneously benefiting from U.S. and European sanctions waivers in the wake of the February earthquake, Assad’s economy should not look like this. The fault here lies with the regime itself, which has proved systematically corrupt, incompetent, and driven by greed rather than the public good. Fiscal mismanagement and the prioritization of the illegal drugs trade have killed the Syrian economy, potentially for good.

As the region yearns for a stable Syria, ruled by a strong but reformed regime that welcomes refugees back home, the past three months have told a starkly different picture—one of escalation. Nearly 150 people have been killed in the southern governorate of Daraa since April, furthering the area’s status as the most consistently unstable region of the country since 2020.

In mid-July, regime forces besieged villages south of the town of Tafas that it accused of harboring opponents, before demolishing 18 homes as punishment. Since its violent submission to the regime five years ago, Daraa was meant to exemplify Assad’s self-described plans to “reconcile” areas formerly controlled by his opponents. But reconciliation in Daraa has been anything but, and the region is now rife with insurgency, terrorism, organized crime, and a chaotic mess of political infighting.

Meanwhile, the regime has also escalated its attacks on the opposition-controlled northwest. Not long after Assad walked the red carpet into the Arab League summit in Jeddah, Russia resumed airstrikes in northwestern Syria for the first time since November 2022—launching nearly 35 in June alone. Along with Russian jets, pro-regime artillery fire also surged from May into June, resulting in a 560 percent increase in fatalities in the northwest in June, from five in April to three in May to 33 in June. That marked escalation included the resumption of mass casualty regime bombings of civilian targets, including one attack that destroyed a market on June 25, leaving at least 13 dead. Civilian rescue workers also returned to being explicit targets, including the “double-tap” attack that targeted White Helmet personnel on July 11.

Terrorism

Regional normalization of Assad’s regime has also dealt a deep and likely irreversible blow to nearly a decade of international efforts to counter the Islamic State. For years, the United States has relied on the cover provided by regional partners such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia to sustain the vital U.S. military deployment in northeastern Syria, but those partners are now declaring their support for the expansion of Assad’s rule nationwide, including via the removal of foreign forces.

Worse still, having long been among the most generous donors to counter-Islamic State operations, Saudi Arabia failed to donate anything in the recent annual ministerial conference—which was hosted in Saudi Arabia itself. Assad’s normalization has also gravely undercut the leverage of the U.S.-partnered Syrian Democratic Forces to determine or negotiate their long-term survival. Russia and Iran have also been empowered, with reports of Iranian attack plotting and daily Russian violations of a long-standing deconfliction arrangement in order to challenge and threaten U.S. aircraft.

While the U.S.-led coalition’s ability to sustain the only meaningful counter to the Islamic State in Syria has been shoved into a tight and uncomfortable corner, the terrorist group also appears to be benefiting directly from Assad’s new status. As Assad was taking his seat in the Arab League in May, the Islamic State was in the midst of its most aggressive and deadly month of operations in regime-controlled areas of Syria since 2018.

Between April 1 and July 1, the group conducted 61 attacks and killed 159 people in regime-run central Syria—amounting to 50 percent of all attacks and 90 percent of fatalities achieved in 2022. The Islamic State has returned to controlling populated territory (albeit temporarily) in regime areas of Syria, and it defeated a six-week offensive in March and April by Syrian regime forces that was backed by the Russian air force and Iranian proxies. In late July, the Islamic State expanded its reach into Damascus, killing at least six people and wounding 23 others in a bomb attack in the Shiite district of Sayida Zeinab.

Assad’s Diplomatic Veto

Finally, the regional normalization of Assad—which the Arab League said was supposed to be “conditional” on securing regime concessions—appears to have wrecked any hope for meaningful diplomacy aimed at genuinely resolving Syria’s crisis. According to senior U.N. officials who spoke to me on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive conversations, Assad himself has conveyed to U.N. leaders in recent weeks that he has no intention to reengage with the U.N.-run Constitutional Committee or in any step-for-step negotiation process, whether coordinated by the U.N. or regional states. The prospect for a diplomatic resolution to Syria’s crisis may have looked bleak six months ago, but regional engagements with the regime since April appear to have killed things altogether.

The regime’s stance toward cross-border aid should serve as a clear indicator of the extent to which Assad feels irreversibly empowered since being welcomed back by much of the region. Even convincing Assad to issue a small prisoner amnesty as a show of goodwill appears to be a non-starter.

The picture here is stark and irrefutable. The chorus of warnings that reengagement with Assad would backfire were ignored, and the consequences are now clear for all to see. That regional states’ plans for a follow-up summit are up in the air speaks for itself. To meet amid such calamitous developments would be folly. Syria is now entering a deeply dark period of uncertainty, with a crashing economy, rising levels of violence, heightening geopolitical tensions, and a poisoned diplomatic environment. The fault here lies in many different corners, but as usual, it will be Syrians who suffer the costs.

Source: Foreign Policy

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Nasser Kanaani made the remarks in a post on his Twitter page in response to a Saturday statement by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry, in which it said Azerbaijani citizens “are strongly recommended” not to visit Iran without necessity.

Kanaani emphasized that pursuing a neighbor-oriented policy based on mutual respect and good-neighborliness manners is Iran’s priority and on its agenda.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said in its statement that “citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan are strongly recommended not to visit the Islamic Republic of Iran without necessity, and those entering this country should remain as vigilant as possible.”

It also advised that Azerbaijani citizens currently in Iran should observe “the safety rules.”

The statement was issued after Azerbaijan sent on Friday a note of protest to the Iranian side in relation to the arrest of Azerbaijani citizen Farid Safarli, whom the Iranian authorities accuse of espionage.

Safarli, a university student based in Germany, arrived in Iran in early March. Since then, the contact with him has been lost.

Azerbaijan has demanded Iranian authorities determine his fate. 

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The economic cost of the Ukrainian conflict, failure to find a solution to the Palestinian issue, support for the so-called Arab Spring and domestic polarization have further undermined U.S. credibility in the region, according to the article, which was written by Mohammed Al-Sulami, director of the International Institute for Iranian Studies in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

The writer said “both the neoconservative failure to change the region through wars and the Democratic approach of promoting U.S. influence while not prioritizing its allies and partners in the region” have contributed to its decline in the Middle East.

In contrast, the Chinese investments in different countries have laid the groundwork for Beijing to “shift from soft power to geoeconomics and geopolitics,” Al-Sulami wrote.

China’s rising influence in the Middle East has to be understood through the perspective of its economic ties with countries in the region, the article said, adding that such an economic approach is “very different from the U.S. policy of projecting military power against weak regional adversaries, such as the Taliban in 2001 and the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003.”

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