He noted that the events in Gaza revealed the ugly face of the US, suggesting that President Joe Biden can no longer think in a sound and correct manner as he is committing crimes against the people of Gaza and is doing everything in his power to continue the genocide in the enclave.

Al-Houthi stressed, “Force alone cannot achieve anything. The situation today is very different. This is the time of response,” noting that increasing American forces means increasing targets.

Earlier yesterday, the US Central Command announced that three soldiers had been killed and 25 others were injured in a drone attack targeting a base in northeastern Jordan, while the Pentagon called the attack a “dangerous escalation.”

The White House reported that Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin, National Security Advisor Sullivan and the Deputy National Security Advisor briefed Biden on the details of the attack against US service members in northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border.

The Jordanian government denied that the attack took place in the Kingdom, confirming that the Al-Tanf base in Syria was targeted near the Jordanian-Syrian-Iraqi border.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attack on the US Al-Tanf base between Syria and Jordan, resulting in the death of three American soldiers and the injury of 25 others.

Source: Middle East Monitor

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House GOP members and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) leaders attacked the Biden administration’s broadband policy at Thursday’s FCC oversight hearing.  

After two years without a fifth commissioner, FCC Democrats have started the process to reinstate Obama-era net neutrality rules. The 3-2 vote reinstated the policy that brings internet service providers under the jurisdiction of the FCC as telecommunications carriers. The FCC repealed net neutrality in 2017 under the Trump administration. 

“The Biden administration has chosen partisan ideology over smart policy,” Commissioner Brendan Carr (R) said. “Indeed, almost three years into this administration, a clear pattern has emerged. The Biden administration’s entire approach to the Internet — its broadband agenda, if you will — can be boiled down to one word: control.” 

House Republicans agreed, with Rep. Bob Latta (R-Ohio) saying, “Burdensome and expansive regulations like these will only discourage broadband buildout at a time when Americans need it most.” 

Carr continued to attack the Biden administration, saying the regulation is not about consumer safety or efficiency, but about reinstating government control. 

“In other words, utility-style regulation of the Internet was never about improving your online experience — that was just the sheep’s clothing,” Carr said. “It was always about government control.” 

Other lawmakers agreed and said media marketplace legislation should be handled by Congress, not the FCC.  

“Changes to laws that govern the media marketplace need to be made by Congress, not by the FCC,” Energy and Commerce Chair Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.) said. 

Congress members clashed with the FCC’s Democratic chairwoman, Jessica Rosenworcel, throughout the hearing. When Latta asked how the reinstatement of net neutrality rules could impact national security, Rosenworcel responded, “I would be happy to have [a] discussion with you about national security issues. You and I spoke about this already.” 

Before beginning his questioning, Rep. Buddy Carter (R-Ga.) addressed Rosenworcel, saying, “One of the main functions of Congress is oversight. So, we’re here for oversight, not confrontation. I want to be educated; I don’t want to be confrontational.” 

Other commissioners and House members encouraged their colleagues to refocus their attention on important issues at hand, such as consumer safety, rather than partisan finger-pointing. 

“Device security is just one of many other policy priorities that the FCC should instead focus on in lieu of partisan goals that do not further the public interest,” Republican Commissioner Nathan Simington said. “I am hopeful that my colleagues will embrace more bipartisan, commonsense policies going forward.” 

Recently confirmed fifth Commissioner Anna Gomez (D) agreed, saying, “We must be vigilant about protecting consumers. From spam calls and scam texts, to protecting victims of domestic violence, to ensuring the internet remains open, consumers’ interests must lead our policymaking.”    

Source : The Hill

The post Republicans Rip Biden’s Broadband Policy at FCC Hearing appeared first on Policy Print.

Conventional wisdom suggests Americans know little about foreign policy and care about it even less. Opinion polls regularly show that international issues take a back seat to topics more prosaic (economics, education) or provocative (culture wars, gun control).

Next year’s presidential election, however, might be a bit different. Continued international crises could focus attention on the benefits and burdens of American global leadership, and our polarized politics may turn on battles and events far from home. We might experience the rare phenomenon: a foreign policy election.

Israel’s war against Hamas has become a domestic political focal point, either praised as a righteous campaign of self-defense or criticized for bringing humanitarian catastrophe to Gaza. Some experts now believe Ukraine’s war aims are “out of reach,” and call on Washington to encourage Ukraine to pursue a cease-fire.

One might think a president with Joe Biden’s experience would perform well in a foreign policy election. So it’s surprising that his approach to the wars in Gaza and Ukraine — an approach he doubled down on in a recent op-ed that touted the U.S. as “the essential nation,” worried about Russian leader Vladimir “Putin’s drive for conquest” and reduced Hamas’ motives to “murderous nihilism” — instead appears to be endangering his reelection.

Hamas’ Oct. 7 attacks and the president’s nearly unconditional support for Israel’s response have brought to a boil the simmering divisions within the Democratic Party on the issue of Palestinians. Many young, diverse and progressive voters are critical of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the “open-air prison” of Gaza. They believe the Gaza war is unjust and disproportionate.

Fully 70% of U.S. voters under age 35 disapprove of Biden’s handling of the war, according to a Nov. 19 NBC News poll. Other polls show that a majority of young voters do not support sending weapons to Israel, and less than half of Gen Z and millennials even want the U.S. to publicly voice support for Israel as the president has so consistently done. The issue could tip the scale in the crucial swing states, such as Michigan, where razor-thin margins of victory are common.

Support for Israel has been uncontroversial for most of Biden’s political career. A decade ago, a pro-Israel lobbyist described his work to me as “pushing against an open door.” But as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has moved to the right and threatened Israel’s democratic institutions, he has infuriated many Israelis and tested the patience of otherwise sympathetic Americans — including many American Jews. Today, Washington’s pro-Israel lobby is dominated by evangelical Christians in the Republican Party base, borne by what one commentator called “solidarity with a particularly aggressive strain of Zionism.”

Democrats have sweated the electoral consequences of being seen as insufficiently pro-Israel since before it was even a country. In 1947, as the United Nations considered recognizing a Jewish state, President Truman’s general counsel, Clark Clifford, penned a private memo to his boss: “Unless the Palestine matter is boldly and favorably handled, there is bound to be some defection on [Jewish voters’] part to the alert [GOP nominee Thomas E.] Dewey.” Unlike Truman, Biden has to contend with a voting Middle Eastern diaspora, new human rights norms and mass media capable of relaying round-the-clock images of Palestinian suffering.

Apart from the Israel-Hamas war, a foreign policy election would present Biden with other fresh challenges. In broad terms, independent voters don’t seem to share Democrats’ — and the president’s — expansive view of the purpose of American power.

A survey released in October by the Institute for Global Affairs at the Eurasia Group found that Republicans and independents, when asked what the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy should be, chose “to protect America from foreign threats and stop other countries from taking advantage of the U.S.” Democrats, on the other hand, chose “to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law across the globe as the leader of the free world.”

When House Republicans recently cut Ukraine funding from a plan to keep the government running, they elicited howls from some Democrats about “abandoning” Ukraine. But independents aren’t howling. The survey shows that many share Republicans’ skepticism of alliances, concern over diminishing weapons stockpiles and desire to withdraw U.S. troops stationed in Europe.

In other words, independents echo the rhetoric of Donald Trump more than that of Joe Biden. The president has lately dialed down his trumpeting of a worldwide “battle between democracy and autocracy.” Perhaps his campaign realized this resonated with those inclined to vote for him anyway, and could fail to win over swing voters.

Historically, a foreign policy election benefits the incumbent. During the Cold War, politics were said to stop at the water’s edge, as Americans sought to show the world a united front. International crises often generated a “rally ’round the flag” effect for leaders seen as taking decisive action.

However, voters today don’t agree on the dangers the U.S. faces, let alone the best way to address them. Republicans’ greatest perceived threat — immigration threatens the country’s national identity — ranked last among Democrats on our survey. Climate -change-induced natural disasters were seen as the top threat among Democrats, but the second-to-last among Republicans.

Political leaders can usually be forgiven for not heeding the public’s foreign policy preferences. Voters can be capricious or ill-informed, and expertise is crucial for foreign policy decision-making. But if foreign crises continue to focus Americans’ attention next year, Biden ignores their views at his peril.

Source : Los Angeles Times

The post Opinion: Does Biden Benefit if Foreign Policy Dominates the 2024 Campaign? appeared first on Policy Print.

“The Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades,” asserted US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on 29 September.

“Now challenges remain, but the amount of time that I have to spend on crisis and conflict in the Middle East today compared to any of my predecessors going back to 9/11 is significantly reduced.”

Sullivan’s comments have aged horribly. Just eight days later, Hamas waged its incursion into southern Israel, triggering a brutal Israeli campaign of bombardment of Gaza. The fighting since 7 October has thus far killed more than 8,000 Palestinians in Gaza and 1,400 Israelis.

The violence has spilled into Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and Egypt. At this point, the escalating crisis risks spreading to other parts of the Middle East, possibly entailing direct US and Iranian involvement.

Now a full-scale Israeli ground invasion of Gaza looms and Palestinians are concerned about a ‘Nakba 2.0’. Considering rhetoric coming from high-ranking Israeli officials and Tel Aviv’s plans and actions this month, such concerns are entirely valid. As usual, the US has not put any real pressure on Israel to change its destructive and destabilising behaviour.

“Looking ahead, it will be increasingly difficult to imagine the Global South taking the Biden administration’s rhetoric about human rights with anything more than a grain of salt. The hypocrisy from America is just too great”

The timing of this crisis is also particularly horrible given that President Joe Biden, who is seeking re-election next year, doesn’t want to appear to be giving Israel anything less than ironclad support.

As the world witnesses Israel’s war crimes in Gaza carried out with Washington’s blessing, the US’s capacity to be taken seriously when criticising Russia’s rogue behaviour in Ukraine has been severely, and most likely permanently, damaged.

Looking ahead, it will be increasingly difficult to imagine the Global South taking the Biden administration’s rhetoric about human rights with anything more than a grain of salt. The hypocrisy from America is just too great.

“It’s been an unseemly spectacle to see Washington and its European allies support Israel as it cuts off aid, water, and food to besieged civilians in Gaza,” Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International and a Middle East analyst, told The New Arab.

“It is exactly what these same nations denounced the Syrian regime for doing in Homs, Ghouta, Aleppo, and other places. They didn’t mince words when Russia stepped up to support Damascus and vetoed UN condemnations. Now when their own ally blocked aid and food in the same way, they couldn’t muster even mild criticism,” added Lund.

A foreign policy blunder

It is increasingly difficult to deny the major failures of Washington’s foreign policy in the Middle East. While continuing many aspects of the Trump administration’s approach to the region, the Biden administration has made expanding the scope of the Abraham Accords central to its agenda in the Arab world.

The White House naively believed it could bring Libya into a normalisation deal with Israel, which backfired disastrously.

The Biden administration has also invested massive amounts of diplomatic energy into trying to pull Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords – something that no expert can imagine happening any time soon given ongoing developments in Israel and Palestine.

“The recent events have punched a giant hole into the paper-thin superficial Biden administration policy on the Middle East, which has deluded itself into believing that establishing close ties with apartheid Israel and dictatorships in the Middle East is some kind of recipe for stability,” Sarah Leah Whitson, the Executive Director of Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), told TNA.

What is being painfully demonstrated is that lasting peace and security for Israel will not come from diplomatic deals with Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which were arguably never confrontational toward Israel.

It can only come from a lasting solution to the unresolved Palestinian question. Attempts to bury the Palestinian issue based on the assumption that the Palestinian cause stopped mattering to the Arab world have proven extremely misguided.

“As with Israel, one of the assumptions of US foreign policy in the Middle East has been annihilated in the past three weeks: that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be contained, and that the region could move on,” said Dr Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, in an interview with TNA.

“This was predictably an unsustainable assumption, but it was one of the premises of American foreign policy under Biden (and Trump) nevertheless. There are still some positive elements to the Abraham Accords – the stabilisation of relations among Israel and key Arab states – but to be sustainable, it needs to be accompanied by genuine, not fictitious, progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front,” added Dr Juneau.

“Recent events have punched a giant hole into the paper-thin superficial Biden administration policy on the Middle East”

Arab backlash

Anger at the US is growing in the Middle East. Large scale protests in capitals from Amman to Manama, Sana‘a to Baghdad, and Rabat to Beirut speak to the widespread support that the Palestinians are receiving across the Arab world.

In response to public opinion in their own countries, Arab leaders and policymakers have had no choice but to strongly condemn Israel and express support for the Palestinian cause.

Each Arab government faces slightly different circumstances given differences in these countries’ relationships with the US and Israel. Yet, the dynamics across the region are putting pressure on all of them to speak up in defence of the Palestinians and, at least in the case of most Arab states, refrain from directly criticising Hamas.

It was notable that Saudi Arabia, which only several weeks ago was flirting with normalisation with Israel, referred to Israelis as “occupation forces” in its response to Hamas’ Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October.

Despite the Abraham Accords, the UAE, in its capacity as the only Arab state currently on the UN Security Council, has been highly critical of Israel and condemned various aspects of its response to Hamas’ surprise attack. As the humanitarian suffering in Gaza worsens, it’s safe to assume that such criticisms from the UAE will increase.

However, this appears to be about safeguarding regimes from internal legitimacy crises rather than a true commitment to the well-being of the Palestinians.

“It is heartening to see that kind of a pretty united Arab response, but I think it probably has more to do with their concerns about popular unrest in their own countries and wanting to temper that than any pure or genuine concern for Palestinians,” Whitson said.

“All Arab states want Washington to be more mindful of Palestinian and Arab interests, but they’re not equally vocal about it,” explained Lund.

The failure of Biden’s Middle East foreign policy threatens to undermine US standing in the region as well as the US president’s position in the upcoming election. [Getty]

“Governments like that in Syria, which is already hostile to the United States, delight in the opportunity to denounce Washington’s support for Israeli policies,” Lund added.

“Some Arab states, including US-allied nations in the Gulf and states that normalised their ties with Israel, mainly seem to be turning up the volume on Palestine for domestic reasons, or to avoid exposing themselves to criticism from rivals.”

Lund explained how many of these Washington-friendly Arab states are not comfortable confronting the Biden administration about their problems with blind support for Israel.

“You see them criticising Israel in harsher terms than on a normal day, but they haven’t said much about the US support that enables Israel’s actions,” noted Lund.

“On the other hand, I think most realise that if this situation is going to be de-escalated somehow in the future, it’ll have to be the United States that leads the way.”

A time to reassess US foreign policy

When it comes to the White House’s approach to the Middle East, the Biden administration would be wise to change course and ask some tough questions about how we arrived here. But this is unlikely for two principal reasons, said Whitson.

First, Team Biden, “continues to calculate based on short-term interests – namely the upcoming elections – and continues to believe that [Biden’s] victory in the polls is tied to demonstrating extreme support for Israel,” which Whitson sees as a “growing miscalculation”.

Second, the “deeply held personal biases of the Biden administration, of people in the State Department who are not approaching this conflict with clear eyes, with independent thinking, with thinking that prioritises the interests of the American people,” explained Whitson.

“Rather, as Secretary Blinken amply demonstrated during his visit to Israel, their approach to Israel is driven by their own personal, familial feelings of affinity for Israel.”

Source : New Arab

The post Biden’s Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East appeared first on Policy Print.

Time can make a huge difference. This is certainly true of the US’ stance on industrial policy. Just a few years ago, “industrial policy” was a derogatory term that Washington reserved almost exclusively for China as if it had forgotten that it was a pioneer of the practice.

In the 1980s, the Reagan administration set annual ceilings for Japan’s car exports to the US, and forced Tokyo to accept rules that limited Japanese chip exports while extracting improved US access to the Japanese market.

With the US emerging victorious from the Cold War, Washington saw a reduced need for industrial policy. Meanwhile, it frowned on the countries that adopted the practice, blasting China’s industrial policy as “non-market”.

Some 30 years on, industrial policy is back in fashion in the US. While continuing to censure China, Washington passed the Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips and Science Act in 2022.

Industrial policy is commonly defined as measures taken by a government to shape the economy by targeting specific industries, firms or economic activities through tax incentives, subsidies, protective regulations and research and development support.

China was a latecomer on the scene. Taking its cue from the East Asian countries that transformed their economies through industrial policy, Beijing put in place something of its own in 1986.

China’s industrial policy is similar to that of Japan, South Korea and the European Union, albeit more pervasive. For this reason, it has withstood challenges the US brought before the World Trade Organization.

In contrast, US industrial policy is one of a kind. What sets it apart from the pack is, first and foremost, its purpose. Conventional industrial policy is internally focused, aimed at developing national capacity. However, US industrial policy has, as well as investing in American workers and science, an important additional goal: suppressing competitors, especially those perceived to be narrowing the gap with the US.

The Reagan administration’s “managed trade”, since outlawed, was intended to clamp down on Japanese automobile and semiconductor industries. The exercise was hugely successful, and contributed in no small part to Japan’s three lost decades.

Washington’s industrial policy for semiconductors today is designed to cripple Chinese competition or to ensure the US maintains, as National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan put it, “as large of a lead as possible”.

US industry policy distinguishes itself in another important aspect: approach. The Biden administration says its industrial policy is rooted in national security concerns, and maintains that there is no room for compromise on such matters.

It is easy to see why Washington links its industrial policy with national security: to justify the measures it wishes to take. Consequently, US industrial policy includes extreme measures outside the realm of conventional industrial policy.

The US’ “high fence” around its semiconductor sector, for example, includes export bans, investment curbs and blacklists of competing companies.

On top of an arsenal already swollen with trade, the Swift global payments system and the dollar, Washington is now using industry policy as a weapon to achieve its geopolitical objectives – not unlike an unscrupulous sportsman tripping up a competitor to win a race.

While conventional industrial policy operates behind the border, America’s industrial policy extends its reach beyond US territory, adversely affecting foreign governments and companies. Foreign companies deemed to have violated US sanctions are subject to heavy fines, while foreign nationals on the wrong side of US rules face prison terms.

In an aberration from conventional industrial policy, the US calls for allies and like-minded economies to align against its competitors. The Biden administration has formed a “ Chip 4” alliance with South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, and seeks to set up a “critical minerals buyers club” with the European Union and the Group of 7.

It pressured Japan and the Netherlands into enforcing semiconductor export curbs against China, while prohibiting funding recipients under the Chips and Science Act from expanding capacity there. Moreover, the US is pushing “friend-shoring” to isolate China.

In addition, US industrial policy is likely to have contravened global trade rules. China has filed a suit with the WTO over the US’ chip export bans. Some in the EU have threatened WTO action against the US over an Inflation Reduction Act subsidy scheme that excludes electric vehicles made outside North America.

To allay similar Japanese concerns about the implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act, the Biden administration concluded an agreement with Tokyo on critical minerals for electric vehicle batteries, which was presented as a sort of free-trade agreement. But such narrow sectors “do not count as a free trade area”, according to Inu Manak, a trade policy expert at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Washington’s industrial policy has serious consequences for the world. It is creating new trade barriers. Market distortion at its worst, it threatens to dismantle the current global supply chains, which would lead to substantial inefficiency and loss of economic output.

Some of the effects of US industrial policy are already evident in the semiconductor sector, where it is no longer possible to freely source or sell raw materials, products, manufacturing machines or technology. As Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) founder Morris Chang put it, “in the chip sector, globalisation is dead”.

President Joe Biden has stressed on numerous occasions the necessity of US global leadership. However, on industrial policy at least, the world would be much better off without it.

Source : SCMP

The post How the US’ Exceptional Industrial Policy is Killing Globalisation appeared first on Policy Print.

Mayor Eric Adams thanked President Biden Wednesday for fast tracking work authorization and deportation protection for some 470,000 Venezuelan migrants, showing signs that their relationship may be thawing after the two Democrats seemingly snubbed each other in New York City this week. 

“More than 116,000 asylum seekers have come to New York City since last spring in search of the American Dream. Our administration and our partners across the city have led the calls to ‘Let Them Work,’ so I want to thank @POTUS for hearing our entire coalition, including our hard-working congressional delegation, and taking this important step that will bring hope to the thousands of Venezuelan asylum seekers currently in our care who will now be immediately eligible for Temporary Protected Status,” Adams wrote on X, formerly Twitter. 

Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas announced Wednesday the extension and redesignation of Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for 18 months, “due to extraordinary and temporary conditions in Venezuela that prevent individuals from safely returning.” 

“Temporary protected status provides individuals already present in the United States with protection from removal when the conditions in their home country prevent their safe return,” Mayorkas said in a statement. “That is the situation that Venezuelans who arrived here on or before July 31 of this year find themselves in. We are accordingly granting them the protection that the law provides. However, it is critical that Venezuelans understand that those who have arrived here after July 31, 2023, are not eligible for such protection, and instead will be removed when they are found to not have a legal basis to stay.”

Adams has commented in recent weeks that the migrant crisis was on track to “destroy this city,” as the massive influx of so-called asylum seekers had shifted from being primarily from Venezuela and Latin America to now more arriving across the border originally from African nations and even Russia. 

The mayor’s praise of Biden for clearing the way for 470,00 Venezuelans to work and stay in the country comes after Adams said last month that the Big Apple had “no more room” to house migrants. The mayor’s administration has received pushback from upstate counties, outer boroughs of the city like Staten Island and Queens, the governor’s office and even the Biden administration over his controversial “decompression strategy” to relocate migrants. 

Biden was in New York City earlier this week to speak before the United Nations General Assembly, and though he met with New York Gov. Kathy Hochul, and even praised her during the top of his remarks at a reception at the Metropolitan Museum of Art on Tuesday night, the president did not meet with Adams during the visit. 

“Everybody knows where I am,” Adams told reporters Tuesday when pressed on whether he’d meet with Biden while the president was in town. 

Adams admitted that the two had not spoken since earlier this year, as their relationship has soured amid the mayor’s harsher criticism toward the president on the migrant crisis. Adams was removed from Biden’s re-election team, yet Hochul remains a member of the presidential campaign’s team of surrogates. 

Source : Fox News

The post Adams Reacts to Biden Admin Legalizing Thousands of Migrants After Saying Crisis Will ‘Destroy’ NYC appeared first on Policy Print.

Mary Lou McDonald has said there is no ambiguity about Sinn Fein’s stance on US foreign policy, but she insisted Irish issues will be her “port of call” when speaking to Joe Biden.

It comes after a TD accused the US president of using the Dail chamber as a “soapbox” to air his foreign policy agenda as statements will not be taken from political parties following his remarks to parliamentarians.

Ms McDonald indicated that she shares concerns about America’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the country’s support for Israel, but said a boycott of the US president’s address to the Irish parliament is the “wrong choice”.

People Before Profit is boycotting the historic speech by Mr Biden to both houses of the Oireachtas over objections to his foreign policy.

The party said the move is due to Mr Biden’s record on Palestine, Iraq, Nato expansion and over climate pollution – as well as the “absence of opportunity for Dail parties to ask questions”.

People Before Profit TD Paul Murphy told the PA news agency it is possible to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement while also raising concerns about US foreign policy.

“We think it’s our duty to speak out about this and to draw attention to it… It’s treated as a visit by an interesting Irish-American celebrity, as opposed to a visit of the most powerful person in the world who needs to be asked hard questions about the kinds of policies that he is pursuing,” he said.

When asked about Sinn Fein’s position, he said there is “no indication” the party is going to raise the foreign policy criticisms it has.

“When Biden speaks in the Dail this afternoon – and I presume he will make allusions to Ukraine, hints towards Nato, the importance of the West standing together, etc – Sinn Fein TDs will, together with every other single TD and Senator in the Dail I presume, stand up and give a standing ovation.

“That is not raising necessary criticisms of Joe Biden, that is allowing him to present himself as something that he’s not.

“The problem is we are not being given an opportunity to give our position, nor is any other party in the Dail.”

This has been the policy previously for US presidents who address the Dail, Mr Murphy said the Oireachtas Business Committee heard this was due to “the prominence and stature of the position of US presidents”.

Mr Murphy added: “We do think that if you go to address a parliament, which is made up of representatives of people representing different viewpoints, you really should listen to the views of those people.

“This visit he’s just speaking, there’s no response by anybody, no questions, no nothing.

“All that Leinster House is being used for is a soapbox to push Biden’s agenda.”

He said that in the absence of statements, the best way to show opposition is “by not participating in the whole thing”.

Speaking earlier, Ms McDonald heaped praise on the US contribution to the peace process, but said Sinn Fein’s concerns about aspects of Washington’s foreign policy are well known.

Building peace in Ireland, the success of all of this, is very much an American foreign policy triumph

Mary Lou McDonald

The Sinn Fein leader also told RTE Radio 1’s Morning Ireland programme that “there wouldn’t have been a peace process without America”.

Asked directly if she shares left-wing criticisms of US foreign policy, she said: “Of course I do. And those are legitimate criticisms. I very much doubt that anybody in the American administration is unaware of the wide criticism of many of their foreign policy stances.”

Questioned whether she would raise concerns about Israel with the president, she added: “I’ll meet him today. I’m not sure what opportunity I will have to have any length of a conversation with him.

“My first port of call with the president is Ireland and Irish affairs, marking progress, marking their contribution, but my position as regards Palestine, the rights of the Palestinian people, and Israeli apartheid are well, well documented.

“There is nobody with any ambiguous or lack of clarity of my or Sinn Fein’s position on all of those matters. Today, this visit is about Ireland.

“This visit is about the political impasse that we have here.

“The political opportunities that I want us to grasp with both hands, and the United States of America is a partner in that, and for the criticism of their foreign policy, be very clear, Ireland, building peace in Ireland, the success of all of this, is very much an American foreign policy triumph, and is very, very much to their credit.”

Asked about the planned boycott, US National Security Council senior director for Europe Amanda Sloat told reporters on Thursday morning that Mr Biden was looking forward to meeting the leaders of the main political parties in Ireland.

“He has received an incredibly warm welcome here in Ireland.

“He is very much appreciative of the invitation to address the houses of parliament today.

She said it was a “historic opportunity” for Mr Biden to set out his views to the Irish people.

Source: The Independent

The post McDonald: Sinn Fein shares US foreign policy concerns but boycott ‘wrong choice’ appeared first on Policy Print.

President Joe Biden’s immigration problem isn’t just about policy. It’s that he’s not talking about the issue enough, voters say in a new survey from a Democratic polling firm.

Fifty-eight percent of voters in seven key Electoral College battleground states disapprove of how the president is handling immigration, compared with 32 percent who approve, according to a new swing-state poll from Global Strategy Group first shared with POLITICO. And a majority of voters surveyed, at 52 percent, believe Biden is ignoring problems at the border, while 50 percent said the president is ignoring the situation around undocumented immigrants.

Republicans talk more about immigration than Democrats, and they are trusted more to handle the issue, according to the poll. Both parties get low marks for how they are handling immigration, but Democrats face greater criticism because voters don’t know where the party falls on the issue. Thirty-nine percent of voters trust Biden and Democrats in Congress more on the immigration issue, while 47 percent said they trust Republican lawmakers more.

The new poll — conducted on behalf of immigrant advocacy group Immigration Hub and Voto Latino, a political organization focused on Latino voter turnout — comes three weeks before the administration plans to end Title 42, the Trump-era policy that has allowed border agents to immediately expel millions of migrants on public health grounds for the past three years. Biden administration officials fear a surge at the border upon the policy’s expiration next month and have turned to more restrictive measures to tamp down a record number of migrants fleeing political and economic turmoil.

The White House should seize on the opportunity to get ahead of Republicans’ growing chatter leading up to the May 11 end date, said Beatriz Lopez, Immigration Hub’s chief political and communications officer.

“It’s comms 101. Get ahead of the narrative. Talk about what you’re doing. Talk about what you plan to do,” Lopez said. “But it’s talking about both — not just the border but also what they’re planning to do to protect Dreamers and others who are every bit a part of the American community. That balanced approach is what works with voters.”

The shift in border policy is expected to be a major political test for the Biden White House, which has rolled out a patchwork of solutions to combat a growing humanitarian crisis at the southern border. The Biden administration is also dealing with a gridlocked Congress, although lawmakers have long been unable to compromise on how to fix an outdated immigration system.

“The fact is that in the 820 days since he sent Congress a comprehensive immigration reform bill, President Biden has taken unprecedented action to expand lawful immigration pathways, limit unlawful immigration, protect Dreamers and farmworkers, and increase border security. Because of this administration’s work, unlawful immigration is down, legal immigration is up, we’ve got record funds for border security, and thousands of smugglers are now off the streets,” White House spokesperson Abdullah Hasan said in a statement.

“Meanwhile, all that House Republicans have managed to ‘accomplish’ since taking their (slim) majority is voting to abruptly lift Title 42 overnight with no plan in place for what comes next, proposing draconian funding cuts to border security, and playing partisan political games that do nothing to actually fix our long-broken immigration system.”

House Republicans unveiled immigration legislation this week, with plans to further restrict asylum, expand family detention and crack down on the employment of undocumented workers. The House Judiciary Committee is scheduled to mark up the bill Wednesday, though the measure has little chance of making it through the Democratic-controlled Senate.

Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) also unveiled a plan on Tuesday that relies on the White House taking executive action to address immigration. He shared his plan with the White House and other federal agencies, with ideas for creating new pathways to citizenship, increasing humanitarian aid for certain countries, increasing border security funding and expanding efforts to target human traffickers.

Menendez’s suggestions come as the Biden administration prepares for a spike in border crossings come May, already the busiest time of year for migration. In addition to relying on more stringent immigration proposals to restrict entry to asylum-seeking migrants, the administration has discussed reinstating the detention of migrant families — drawing great backlash from immigration advocates, lawyers and Democrats.

More than eight-in-10 voters in the poll — 82 percent — believe the immigration system is broken, and they want to see both enhanced border security and policies that provide a pathway to citizenship, such as work permits for Dreamers, undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children, and Temporary Protected Status for other migrants.

Sixty-five percent of respondents have a positive view of “modernizing and improving the physical infrastructure at high-volume ports of entry to enhance screening and processing,” while 76 percent want Dreamers and other undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. to gain legal status if certain requirements are met, including background checks. Sixty-four percent of voters back the Biden administration using its TPS authority.

“Voters disapprove of the job both parties are doing on immigration because they see the system as deeply broken and in desperate need of a fix,” said Nick Gourevitch, partner and managing director at Global Strategy Group. “Recent polling shows voters clearly want Washington to act with solutions that are balanced — that include both border security and pathways to citizenship and legal status for Dreamers and other immigrants.”

The Biden administration announced plans last week to expand health care coverage to recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, but great concern remains about the fate of the popular Obama-era program, which has allowed hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as children to receive work permits and deportation relief. After a flurry of court challenges, advocates and legal experts warn the program is headed to the Supreme Court, where the conservative bench seems likely to rule it illegal.

The online poll surveyed 1,201 likely 2024 general election voters in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin between April 4-11. The margin of error was plus or minus 2.8 points.

Source: Politico

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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is in the last two years intensively pursuing a diversified foreign policy. This stems in part from disappointment with American reactions to the Houthi drone attacks on Abu Dhabi in February 2022, and to what they see as the debacle of the US retreat from Afghanistan.

However, on a broader level, de-escalation has developed into a foreign policy priority for Abu Dhabi, after a decade of activist, interventionist policy in Yemen, Libya, and Syria. The Emirati leadership wishes to carve out a non-aligned position, based predominantly on trade, energy, and technology. They also see themselves as well positioned to serve as international mediators, with contacts to everyone and shunning no one, and now afford diplomacy, engagement, and deconfliction a much more important role in government policy. In a recent exchange, one Abu-Dhabi-based expert noted to me that their eighteen-month stint in the UN Security Council also “taught them how global powers behave.” Their policy, as Narayanappa Janardhan of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi told me, revolves around the “five C’s: capital, commerce, collaboration, connectivity, and climate.” The Emirates, similar to their doppelganger and arch-rival Qatar and ahead of Saudi Arabia, is engrossed in efforts to retain a leading position in the world economy in the post-fossil fuels era, including through significant policy initiatives, investment in environment and sustainability issues, and strategic use of their sovereign wealth funds to invest worldwide in banks and key industries. 

An important aspect enabling nuance and nimbleness in policy is the compact and unitary structure of foreign policy-making, decided and implemented by Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Since May 2022, he has officially served as ruler of Abu Dhabi and as the UAE president (roles he filled de facto for eight years previously). Additionally, his brothers serve in key ministries: Abdullah, as foreign minister, and Tahnoon, as national security advisor. The latter was recently appointed deputy ruler of Abu Dhabi, as well as chair of Abu Dhabi’s main sovereign wealth fund, and has long been in control of other sovereign and private investment institutions. Abu Dhabi is dominant in the foreign policy and national security decision-making of the UAE, though there is reportedly dialogue with the leadership of the other Emirates.

On the global level, the UAE, like Saudi Arabia, has been irritated, but unmoved, by US attempts to enlist or coerce them into supporting the nation’s policies on Russia and China. They reject Western narratives regarding these powers and are simultaneously making efforts to insulate these relationships with them from that with the Americans. As a foreign diplomat in Abu Dhabi told me, the Emirati government is signaling at all levels that relations with Russia “are going to be kept normal.”

The UAE, and Dubai in particular, has gained enormously from the crisis between Russia and the West. Russian nationals (who do not need a visa) and Russian money have poured into the country, especially in Dubai. There, hundreds of thousands of Russians are estimated to have arrived in the past year, especially after the imposition of conscription in Russia, with over 50,000 since the beginning of 2023, according to a well-informed source in Dubai. Russians fill the shops, hotels, and restaurants, and have become the main foreign buyers of real estate in Dubai, where 10 percent of the GDP  is now from the real estate sector. Prices and rents have hit historic highs.

Non-oil trade between the the UAE and Russia increased 95 percent in 2022. The UAE  is also reported to have become a key storage and re-export hub for Russian oil, as well as a logistical center for the Russian energy industry, taking advantage of deeply discounted prices for Russian oil to more than triple its oil imports from Russia to a record 60 million barrels in 2022. Senior US delegations have reportedly visited the UAE to discuss the nation’s use in circumventing Western oil sanctions on Russia, financial and corporate structures, as well as trade in sanctioned and dual-use—including US-origin—goods. The US Treasury Department on April 12 announced sanctions against two UAE-based firms for allegedly assisting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The UAE is also continually improving ties with India, which holds largely the same position regarding Russia. Another driver is the Emirati belief, similar to that of India, in an increasingly economic-centric rather than a security-centric world. The Gulf states’ security interests are centered in the West—China and India are not yet in the business of providing security backing and guarantees—and their economic ones in the East. World trade, as well the natural markets for Gulf energy, are increasingly concentrated in the Indo-Pacific realm, and the Gulf states are a natural link between Asia, especially the subcontinent—with which it has substantial historical and human ties—and the European and Mediterranean markets.

Reorienting in the Region: Neutralizing Toxic Relationships

On the regional level, Emirati foreign policy shifts in the past two years have been massive: it normalized relations with four major competing states in the region—Iran, Turkey, Israel, and Qatar. As Moran Zaga of the University of Haifa and Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, told me, “the intensity and scope of the process, in such a short time, indicates a far-reaching strategic attempt to blur traditional fault lines and reshape the ‘axes’ in the region.”

The new emphases in foreign policy led the UAE to accelerate its re-engagement with Iran, which had already begun after disappointment with the American reaction to Iranian-linked attacks on Gulf shipping and Aramco facilities in September 2019. The Emirati ambassador, recalled in 2016, returned to Tehran in August 2022 (Saudi Arabia agreed to return their ambassador this month). The two countries are significant trading partners: the UAE was Iran’s primary link to the global economy under sanctions, and in 2020 was the largest exporter to Iran after China (much of it apparently re-sold Western goods). The two countries plan to increase bilateral trade from $15 billion in 2022 to $30 billion in 2025. Moreover, there are more than 400,000 Iranian expatriates living in the UAE (apart from the many Emiratis, especially in Dubai, of Iranian origin). Dubai has always been more oriented towards engagement with Iran and towards a soft power approach in general, since its heavily globalized service economy is much more exposed to negative externalities stemming from sanctions on Iran, Russia and Qatar. The Emiratis reportedly do not see any contradiction between their improved relations with Israel and with Iran, which are largely driven by a similar logic: reducing tension while opening economic possibilities. Western diplomats I met in the UAE estimate that Abu Dhabi is not interested in instability in Iran, which could adversely affect the Gulf.

Relations between Turkey and the UAE are also progressing rapidly: Many of my interlocutors were amazed at how quickly the relationship has changed. Abu Dhabi leader and the UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (MBZ) visited Ankara in November 2021, with Erdogan paying a return visit in February 2022. During MBZ’s visit, he announced a $10 billion investment fund in multiple sectors of the Turkish economy, including energy, climate change, and trade. This should help the Turkish economy, but the fact that the money will be for investments and not aid, should also provide UAE with significant influence in the Turkish economy, leading to political sway as well. In January 2022, the two countries announced a $4.7 billion currency swap, boosting Turkey’s foreign exchange holdings and propping up the lira. They signed a free trade agreement on March 3, 2023, hoping to expand bilateral trade from $8 to $25 billion in five years. Some aspects of defense cooperation reportedly never stopped, even during the period of tension between the two countries. Today, this cooperation appears to be burgeoning. Turkey is able to provide weapons without US. restrictions, an important lesson Abu Dhabi learned from the Yemen conflict; there is reportedly talk of the co-production of Turkish weapons in the UAE. In addition, the two countries see eye to eye on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and on American pressure to choose a side. However, this has not led the UAE to weaken its close ties with Greece and Cyprus, forged during the previous decade of trying to contain Turkish influence.

The UAE’s relations with Qatar seem to be rapidly developing. This is despite a slow start following the Saudi-led rapprochement at the al-Ula Summit in January 2021, and despite vestigial public hostility after six years of ceaseless negative messaging. This can be seen in the media prominence given to MBZ’s visit to Doha for the World Cup in December 2022, and Qatari Sheikh Tamim al-Thani’s participation in the Arab “mini-summit” in Abu Dhabi in January 2023. This meeting, convened at short notice by MBZ, included the heads of state of the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did not participate, the Saudis reportedly due to Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman’s displeasure with the Emirati initiative. The UAE recently unblocked Qatari news sites. The UAE in March withdrew its bid to host the 2026 World Bank and International Monetary Fund meeting, instead supporting Qatar as a potential host.

The relatively new formal relationship with Israel is engaging the Emirati leadership vigorously in recent months. The rhetoric and proposed policies of Israel’s new right-wing government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has created challenges to all the conservative Arab states whose relations with Israel had improved in recent years. Symbolic steps are delayed indefinitely: no date has been set for Netanyahu’s much-desired state visit to the Emirates; the date for the next summit of the “Negev Forum,” planned for March in Morocco, has not been set. The UAE (and Bahrain) has condemned Israeli behavior in the West Bank and Jerusalem numerous times in recent weeks.

However, the compelling strategic, economic, and geopolitical logic which caused the UAE and the other Abraham Accords states to formalize relations with Israel have not changed. The Emirati government wants to preserve the long-term relationship but also avoid being perceived as an enabler of the current government. Informed Gulf sources note that the Emirati government sees the Abraham Accords as “a strategic direction” and the current Israeli government as a “road bump.” A signal in this vein seems to have been given when MBZ, who as noted has not yet set a date for Netanyahu to visit the UAE (though the pair spoke by phone on April 4), met on March 27 with former prime minister Naftali Bennet.

Deals with Israel which are seen as serving Abu Dhabi’s strategic geoeconomic goal of linking to the Eastern Mediterranean subregion continue. This is especially true of those related to gas exploration and exploitation in Egypt and Israel, and to renewable energy projects throughout the region. On March 26, the two countries signed into effect their free trade agreement, reached last May; the profile given the signing was low in UAE, and the trade minister did not journey to Israel to sign the deal. Emirati investments in Israel’s energy sector, perceived in Abu Dhabi as a long range interest, continue, as seen in the recent offer by ADNOC (with BP) to buy half of Israel’s New Med gas company, which holds 45 percent of the Leviathan gas field. The Mubadala sovereign wealth fund already owns 11 percent of the smaller Tamar field.

Another bilateral relationship that has significantly developed in the past two years is with Syria. The UAE has been at the forefront of efforts to return the Assad regime to the Arab fold, arguing the need to accept the reality of its survival, and the need for Arab engagement with it to reduce the Iranian influence. Foreign Minister Abdallah bin Zayed visited Damascus in November 2021; Bashar al-Assad made a surprise visit to Dubai and Abu Dhabi in February 2022, ostensibly to visit the Syrian pavilion at the Dubai Expo 2020 on Syria’s national day. This was his first reception by an Arab country since the Syrian civil war began. He arrived, accompanied by his wife, on a second, formal state visit on March 19, 2023. The recent earthquake in Turkey and Syria has enabled interested countries in the region to reach out to both states and improve relations with them, for ostensibly humanitarian reasons. Moran Zaga sees the desire to achieve significant influence and room for maneuver in Syria as another of the major drivers of the UAE’s emollient policy towards Russia.

In the Gulf, tension is growing between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Several interlocutors noted that the close personal relationship between MBZ and Mohammad bin Salman, seen in the past even as a mentorship, has soured. The two countries have had severe disagreements regarding Yemen, where the Saudis saw themselves as blindsided and abandoned by the Emirati drawdown of forces in 2019 (the Emiratis are still heavily involved in protected geoeconomic interests in the South, through proxies, and Socotra Island). In addition, both are trying to position themselves as key mediators and as economic entrepots in the region, and are pursuing almost identical policies for economic diversification away from oil (a process in the implementation of which the UAE—like Qatar—preceded Saudi Arabia): the Emirati government claims that only 28 percent of GDP today is based on oil and gas.

Saudi Arabia hopes to rapidly draw a skilled expatriate workforce to become a services and transportation center, in addition to becoming a tourist destination; this would be at the expense of the UAE, especially Dubai. The two countries also disagree on OPEC+ production limits, with the UAE pressing to pump more oil; the UAE reportedly has been considering leaving OPEC. One recent indicator of the growing tension is Riyadh’s demand that multinational companies desiring contracts with the Saudi government must move their regional headquarters to Saudi Arabia by 2024, a demand widely perceived as directed against Dubai. Another is Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to create a global airline, Riyadh Air (whose CEO was until October the head of Etihad, Abu Dhabi’s flag carrier), which would compete with Emirates (Dubai) and Qatar Airways. On the political level, the Saudis feel that the Emiratis “have grown too big for their britches,” in the words of FPRI Senior Fellow Brandon Friedman, and are pursuing too independent a policy (including regarding a host of bilateral free trade agreements), without the consultation traditional among the Gulf monarchies.

Conclusion

In recent weeks, much attention has focused on Saudi Arabia’s shifting foreign policy orientation, towards a more multilateral approach, with stress on continued divergences from the United States. These include Xi Jinping’s visit to Riyadh in December 2022, close coordination with Russia on oil production (including the recent cut), and most recently, the Chinese-brokered agreement with Iran on restoring diplomatic relations. However, this (as in many other areas) was preceded by the UAE. 

The UAE boasts a global and regional weight far exceeding that which its size and location might dictate: it is one of the five or six most significant strategic players in the Middle East and North Africa. In creating and maintaining this status, it has used its economic heft, as a significant oil producer but more importantly, as the regional actor most advanced (along with Qatar) in translating its energy endowments into a powerful and diversified globalized economy, based on services, finance, trade and logistics, to serve geostrategic aims. For instance, its sovereign wealth funds are among the largest global investors today, with at least $46 billion in foreign investments in 2022, and Dubai World Ports is one of the world’s five top container terminal operators (with some 10 percent of world capacity). It has used these, in combination with its focused and deft decision-making and implementation apparatus, driven by a long-term strategy, to seize opportunities to become a leader of the conservative camp during the Arab uprisings and beyond.

After a decade of activist, even adventurist policies in the region, Emirati foreign policy shifts in the past two years have been massive. It normalized relations with four of the major, and competing, states in the region: Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Qatar (its relation with the Sisi regime in a fifth, Egypt, has long been good), as well as with Syria. However, the current new directions in Emirati policy could be viewed as a function of the lack of success in its previous, “little Sparta” policy. The UAE’s current “no problems with neighbors” approach is also not ensured complete success.

Source: Eurasia Review

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Growth in Latin America is projected to slow to 1.6 percent this year after a remarkable 4 percent in 2022. Price pressures that accompanied last year’s brisk economic activity appear to have peaked, but underlying inflation remains stubbornly high, disproportionally hurting low-income households who spend most of their earnings on food. To mitigate the risk that inflation becomes entrenched, fiscal policy can help monetary policy in reducing demand pressures.

After peaking at 10 percent in mid-2022, headline inflation in the largest Latin American economies has slowed to 7 percent in March. However, this drop mostly reflects the fall of commodity prices from their peaks. Progress in bringing down core inflation, which excludes food and energy, appears to have stalled. Labor markets are tight, with employment firmly above its pre-pandemic levels. At the same time, output is at or above potential, and short-term inflation expectations exceed central banks’ target ranges. Strong domestic demand, rapid wage increases, and broad-based price pressures all point to a risk that inflation in the region could remain unacceptably high.

Tempering demand to tame price pressures

While most countries in the region have made important strides in price stability in the last two decades, the region’s history is full of examples of how high inflation can destabilize the economy and fuel inequality by hurting vulnerable groups most.

Restoring price stability is paramount to a healthy economy and protecting the most vulnerable. In the current juncture, this requires slowing domestic demand. With inflation—and especially core inflation—running considerably above target and economies operating above potential, policymakers no longer face the macroeconomic trade-off of 2021 and early 2022, when fighting inflation was at odds with the need to support the recovery from the pandemic. Policies should be aimed at restraining demand to bring it back into line with potential output. This will inevitably require cooling the labor market.

Decisive central bank rate increases have already done the heavy lifting. Furthermore, the recent financial stresses in some advanced economies could lead to tighter global financial conditions, which will further help cool demand. Given the usual lags between interest rate increases and their effect on economic activity, the full impact of the tightening that has already been undertaken should be seen most clearly during the course of this year, contributing to slower growth this year.

However, with inflationary pressures proving persistent, central banks will need to remain resolute in their fight until there is an unambiguous downward path for prices. Interest rates will likely need to remain high for much of this year and, in some cases, even into next year. This will guide inflation back to target by late 2024 or early 2025.

A more balanced policy mix

To assist central banks in their battle against inflation, fiscal policy could play a bigger role through a more countercyclical stance this year. As recent IMF research shows, fiscal tightening makes it possible for central banks to increase rates by less to bring down inflation.

The fiscal stimulus of 2020, which was essential to support economies during the pandemic, has been mostly withdrawn, but fiscal policy this year is expected to be broadly neutral in most countries. A more contractionary fiscal stance would help slow domestic demand, allowing interest rates to start coming down sooner. This would reduce potential financial stability risks from keeping interest rates higher for longer and help to bring down public debt levels, creating more policy space to respond to the next economic shock. That is, a more balanced policy mix would improve the prospects of taming inflation and reducing the risks of a recession.

Rebalancing policy will not be easy. Demands for social spending in the region are high. There are serious distributional and social equity issues to contend with. Enacting tax policies that require the wealthy to pay their fair share should be part of the solution.

But policymakers will also need to find savings without cutting into key social programs or spending on health, education, and public infrastructure. There is important scope to reduce inefficiencies in public spending, and people are more likely to embrace more prudent public finances if services are provided with greater efficiency. Being good stewards of taxpayer resources could also help reverse the erosion of trust in government that many countries have suffered over the last several years.

This agenda is challenging, but restoring price stability is paramount to protecting the poor and durably addressing social demands. Relying more on fiscal policy in taming inflation makes sense from a macroeconomic perspective and, if policies are well-designed, can be achieved in a socially equitably way.

Source: International Monetary Fund

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