Germany and France are the most populous countries in the EU and also the bloc’s largest energy consumers. The neighbours therefore wield enormous influence over EU energy policy and are pivotal to implementing a sustainable transformation of the European energy system. This factsheet provides an overview of both’ countries’ national energy systems and their approaches to meet joint European policy landmarks.

Contents

1. Geography, Politics, Economy: Different Landscapes Along the Rhine River
2. How Energy Systems Compare: Primary Energy & Electricity Production
3. Energy Consumption Declines in Both Countries
4. Renewables set to grow fast across Europe
5. Heating
6. Electric mobility
7. Energy storage
8. Power grid
9. Nuclear power: Phase-Out for Germany, Renaissance for France 
10. Fossil fuels: Germany Leads Consumption with Gas as Key Driver

Germany and France are the two largest economies in the European Union and both play a key role in the bloc’s goal to become greenhouse gas neutral by 2050. France also aims to achieve net zero emissions in that year, while Germany plans to reach the target five years earlier, in 2045. Whether or not these ambitious goals can be met will for the most part rely on their governments’ policy decisions in various sectors, especially the most energy-intensive, and subsequently on their swift implementation. But with roughly 25 years left to radically change their energy systems, meeting those targets also depends on the current reality in energy policy prevailing in each country.

Highlighting the two countries’ structural similarities and discrepancies allows a better understanding of where both of them stand as of 2023 and where they are headed given current trends. A caveat is that an entirely accurate comparison of available  datasets is not always feasible between the two countries. This is due to the intrinsic complexities of counting emissions, investments and other developments in climate and energy policy, as well as the countries using different definitions, framings and accounting procedures to quantify their efforts. However, comparing available data can still offer an overview of the state of affairs in each country, where this can lead to contradictions, but also where synergies exist in the two approaches. 

Geography, Politics, Economy: Different Landscapes Along the Rhine River

Situated on either side of western Europe’s central waterway the Rhine River, France and Germany constitute the European Union’s core region – not only geographically and historically, but also in terms of population, economic size and diplomatic weight. The two EU founding members share a wide range of cultural, institutional and political characteristics, and superficially may look quite alike on many accounts. However, they often are further apart on policy issues  than their similarities suggest, in particular regarding organisational practices and ideological approaches.

France is the EU’s largest state by area. Its European territory (metropolitan France) covers some 544.000 km2. By contrast, Germany’s area is roughly 358.000 km2, only about two thirds the size of its neighbour. In terms of population, the picture is reversed: with about 83 million people registered in the country, Germany is the EU’s most populous member state. France comes second, with nearly 66 million inhabitants. Consequently, Germany has almost twice its population density.

France is a highly centralised state with the capital Paris as its unrivaled economic, cultural and political centre. Consequently, the French president is endowed with a high degree of direct decisional power that is compounded by the fact that coalition governments are uncommon in France. Germany, on the other hand, has a strong federal political structure for its 16 states. Several cultural and economic centres are scattered across the country and state governments enjoy relative autonomy vis-à-vis with the federal government Berlin. Moreover, coalition governments have been the norm for decades, meaning the German chancellor regularly has to rely on negotiating compromises before taking a decision.

Germany boasts the EU’s largest gross domestic product (GDP) ahead of France by a considerable margin – it is estimated at some 4.3 trillion dollars against 2.9 trillion dollars for its western neighbour (IMF, 2023). For income per capita, Germany leads France with about 51,000 to 44,000 dollars per year. Together, the two countries account for about one third of the EU population and for more than 42 percent of the bloc’s total GDP.

Regarding economic composition, the share of industry is much higher in Germany than it is in France: 23.5 percent (2021) and 13 percent (2022), respectively. This difference in part results from how both the countries navigated the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis, as well as the ensuing sovereign debt and Euro crisis, culminating in 2012. While French industrial production took a deep hit and remained significantly lower throughout the following decade, Germany’s economy emerged strengthened from the crisis not least thanks to its strong export-driven industrial sector.  

France had some 259,300 companies in the industry sector in 2020, with 1,1 trillion euros of total revenue. The sector employed more than 3 million people in 2021. In Germany, the around 217,100 industrial companies registered as of 2021 generated a turnover of about 2.1 trillion euros and employed roughly 7 million people. 

How Energy Systems Compare

Together, the two countries accounted for roughly 38 percent of total EU energy consumption in 2021. Of the roughly 1,300 million tons of oil equivalent used in the EU in 2021, Germany consumed 267 million tons and France some 224 million tons.

Apart from a heavy reliance on oil, the countries boast two rather different usage patterns with other energy carriers, especially regarding nuclear and coal power. Germany was the biggest coal producer in Europe in 2022 and accounted for 45 percent of its brown coal (lignite) and 25 percent of hard coal use. France, on the other hand, is by far the largest nuclear power producer in the bloc and accounted for 52 percent of total production in 2021.

Conversely, Germany opted to phase out nuclear power already in the year 2000 and completed its ‘nuclear exit‘ in April 2023, after a short delay caused by the energy crisis. In France, coal-fired power generation also has been reduced greatly in the past decades and as of 2023, only four plants were in operation in the country.

Primary Energy Production

In Germany, renewable energy accounted for some 17 percent of primary energy consumption in 2022. Total renewable energy use was 489 TWh, of which a little over half came in the form of electricity, some 40 percent in renewable heating and 7 percent in the transport sector, the Federal Environment Agency (UBA) said. The three last operating nuclear plants provided roughly 3 percent to the mix while the remaining 80 percent were mostly composed of fossil fuels, clearly led by oil (35%), followed by natural gas (24%), and coal (20%).

In France, the primary energy mix was composed mainly of nuclear power (40%) Primary production of renewable energies in 2022 in France amounted to 345 TWh, the ministry said, including biomass (38%), hydropower (17%), heat pumps (12%), wind power (11%) and biofuels (6%). Fossil fuels accounted for 46 percent of primary production, mainly with oil (28%) as well, followed by gas (15%) and a marginal share of coal (3%).

Electricity Production

Both countries covered roughly a quarter of their final 2021 energy consumption with electricity, which is supposed to replace the bulk of fossil fuel use: About 23 percent in Germany and 25 percent in France.

Regarding electricity generation, nuclear power dominated in France with a share of 63 percent, the highest share of any country in the world. Nuclear was followed by renewable power installations, with a combined share of about 26 percent. Hydro power accounted for the bulk of that share (11%) – followed by onshore wind power (8.5%), solar PV (4%), and biomass and waste (2.4%). Gas (10%) was far ahead of oil and coal (<1% each) in electricity production. Offshore wind still lurked at a share of 0.1 percent.

In Germany, renewables accounted for 44 percent of electricity production in 2022, dominated by onshore wind power (17.5%), followed by solar PV (10.5%), biomass (7.5%), offshore wind (4.5%) and hydro power (3%). The remainder was overwhelmingly composed of fossil fuels: Coal (hard coal & lignite) still accounted for over 31 percent and gas for nearly 14 percent, followed by nuclear (6%) and oil (<1%).

Energy Consumption Declines in Both Countries

Consumption has generally been declining in both France and Germany since 1990, at a somewhat faster pace than in the then re-unified Germany, where many industrial sites in the formerly communist eastern states were shuttered in the decade following reunification – while its strong recovery in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis delayed further cuts.

The German government has set itself the goal of reducing primary energy consumption by 30 percent by 2030 and by 50 percent by 2050 compared to 2008 levels. (Govt’ Energy Efficiency Strategy 2050). In 2022, it had achieved slightly over 18 percent reduction, less than the 20 percent-target envisaged already for 2020.

The latest addition to the French government’s sufficiency plan was announced in mid-2023, by the Ministry of Energy Transition. It called for a long-term sufficiency approach among the largest companies and across sectors. Alongside efficiency efforts, the current national low-carbon strategy calls for a 40 percent reduction in energy consumption by 2050.

While total energy demand is set to fall in each country, the demand for electricity will increase as industrial processes, heat generation and transport become more and more electrified. By 2030, Germany estimates a demand of 600 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity from renewable energies – based on higher gross electricity consumption of about 750 TWh.
French grid operator RTE estimates a demand of about 645 TWh of  decarbonised electricity demand in 2050, pointing out it already stood at some 500 TWh in 2021.

Renewables Set to Grow Fast Across Europe

On a European scale, EU states agreed to increase the share of renewables in the overall energy mix to 42.5 percent by 2030, leaving an option open to possibly reach 45 percent – which would almost double the 2023 share of renewable energy in the bloc.

In 2022, total renewable capacity in Germany stood at roughly 148 GW (139 GW in 2021). About 58 GW of onshore wind capacity was installed, roughly 8 GW of offshore turbines, about 67 GW of solar PV arrays, 5 GW renewable hydro power and nearly 10 GW bioenergy (IRENA 2023). Together they produced about 244 TWh of net electricity, some 7.4 percent more than in the previous year, according to research institute Fraunhofer ISE.

In order to achieve the national goal of 30 percent renewable energy in gross final energy consumption formulated in its energy concept (from 20.4% in 2022) – and of 80 percent in electricity production fixed in the latest reform of its Renewable Energy Act – the government in Berlin plans to implement an expansion of wind power to 115 GW by 2030. According to the government, this translates to a fast scale-up and ultimately the construction of four to five new onshore turbines per day. Offshore wind capacity is supposed to increase more than threefold to 30 GW by the end of the decade, while the projected 2030 capacity for solar PV is 215 GW.  

Total installed renewable power capacity in France was 65 GW in 2022 (60 GW in 2021), composed of 25 GW hydro power, roughly 21 GW onshore wind,  17 GW solar PV, 0.5 GW offshore wind (with a further  8 GW already projected). In total, they contributed about 136 TWh to gross power consumption, also around 7 percent more than in the previous year, the French Energy Transition Ministry informed.

Paris wishes to develop its capacity gradually to reach a 33 percent share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption until 2030  (it had reached 20.7% in gross final consumption in 2022), as fixed by the French Climate and Energy Law of November 2019. The long-term goal up to 2050 is to significantly increase installed renewable energy capacity, as set by French President Emmanuel Macron in his Belfort speech on energy policy in early 2022. He stated that solar PV production should be increased tenfold to over 100 gigawatts (GW), with 50 offshore wind farms to be deployed to reach a capacity of 40 GW, and that onshore wind power should be doubled to 40 GW.  

While electricity generation with renewable power installations in France thus lagged  behind that of its neighbours in 2021, the renewable energy share in energy consumption was closer to the European average.

Nuclear Power: Phase-Out for Germany, Renaissance for France

As far as nuclear power is concerned, Germany closed its last plant in April 2023, following a short delay caused by the energy crisis, while France plans to invest significantly in the sector. France and other European neighbours had appealed to Germany to further postpone the shutdown of its remaining three reactors to serve as a backup-capacity in the energy crisis. However, the German government ultimately completed the phase-out that had been prepared for more than 20 years, arguing the additional capacity provided by the reactors is of little use in stabilising the system. The shutdown did not impact power prices negatively in the immediate aftermath, as critics had warned. There is no agreement on building a nuclear waste repository for the radioactive legacy of Germany’s nuclear power era and the deadline for an ongoing search that was planned for 2031 was has been postponed in 2022. 

In France, by contrast, 61 GW of nuclear capacity was installed in the same year (SGPL) in 56 reactors, and one novel EPR (European Pressurised Reactor) was under construction (Flamanville). However, twenty-six of the 56 French nuclear reactors will reach the end of their fifty-year operating life in 2035. They then will have to pass an in-depth safety inspection in order to receive a runtime extension for another ten years. President Macron also announced his plan to not only extend the operation of existing plants but launch a “nucelar renaissance” with the construction of a series (at list six and possibly eight more by 2050) of new second-generation EPR. 

Even without a renaissance, France dominates the EU’s nuclear power industry, boasting 52 percent of the bloc’s total capacity in 2021, when Germany still had several reactors operating. France also boasts the second largest nuclear power capacity in the world, ranking behind the U.S. and slightly ahead of China af of 2023.

Different nuclear scenarios exist for France, with more or less renewable energy, considering that at least 20 to 60 percent more electricity (compared with 2020) shall have to be generated by 2050 to meet growing electrification needs, according to France’s Transmission System Operator (RTE) 2021 report.

Difficulties in the French reactor fleet led to a sharp reversal in Franco-German electricity trading. While France had been Germany’s most important foreign supplier in 2021, exports decreased 62 percent in the following year – marking the first year since 1990 when France had a negative export balance with its neighbour, according to Germany’s statistical office Destatis. 

Fossil Fuels: Germany Leads Consumption with Gas as Key Driver

As of 2022, fossil fuels still cover over three quarters of Germany’s gross energy consumption – with oil providing about 35 percent, coal 20 percent and gas nearly 24 percent. However despite redeploying some of its already retired coal plants during the energy crisis, so far the country seems prepared to achieve its 2038 deadline to complete the phase-out of coal – or perhaps even faster, if eastern coal regions can be made to follow their western counterpart’s example and attempt an exit as early as 2030. However, to replace gas, coal in 2022 fed almost 8.5 percent more electricity into the grid than in the previous year.

While the use of oil (-24%) and coal (lignite -63%, hard coal -50%) has shrunk between 1990 and 2022, that of natural gas has increased markedly. In 2022, due to the supply cut from Russia, consumption was only 21 percent higher than 1990 – while in 2021 it was 41 percent higher.  There currently is no exit date in Germany, although the 2045 climate neutrality target greatly limits the extent to which it can be used until then. The government currently plans to even expand gas-fired power production but aims to make new facilities ready to work on hydrogen as well, to supply industry processes and other sectors that are difficult to decarbonise otherwise.

Regarding oil consumption, mainly for transport and heating, there are no phase-out plans and neither any concrete proposals to exit combustion engines. However, a mix of carbon pricing in transport and heating and subsidies for electric cars and renewable heating are supposed to deliver a gradual transition away from oil.

Germany’s energy import dependency, mainly consisting of fossil fuels, was higher than the EU average in 2020, with 63.7 percent of all energy consumed, compared to 57.5 percent on average for member states. The figure for France was 44.5 percent. 

Since 1990 France’s consumption of coal and oil has decreased by 72 percent and 27 percent, respectively. Conversely, natural gas use increased by 44 percent. With nuclear and hydroelectric production declining in 2022, gas-fired power plants were also called upon at an unprecedented level (+34% in metropolitan France). 

France in 2021 affirmed that it would end all funding for oil projects by 2025 and gas projects by 2035. According to all the transition scenarios studied, fossil fuel investments will have to be halved before 2030, and disappear almost entirely by 2040, the I4CE think tank underlines.

Source: Clean Energy Wire

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Young people ages 18 to 29 in British, French and German focus groups have few positive things to say about the United States or China as major players on the world stage. The U.S. is seen as the “world’s policeman” with a self-interested history of interventionism that is disappointing to Western allies, while China is labeled the “world’s factory,” respected for its economic dominance but strongly criticized for its expansionism and record of human rights violations.

“China is stronger in industry; the U.S. is stronger militarily.”Man, France, 27

In November 2022, Pew Research Center conducted focus group sessions among four distinct ideological groups in the capital cities of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The groups, which were convened to better understand how young people want their countries to engage with the world, revealed a series of nuanced and conflicting opinions about international engagement, the nature of that engagement, history and foreign policy priorities. But, when groups were asked to discuss the roles the U.S. and China play in global affairs and the international impact of their actions, the young participants expressed strong critiques of both major powers, regardless of country or ideological group.

China has received increasingly negative ratings in Pew Research Center surveys in Europe over the past few years, and the focus groups shed light on the deep concerns young people have about Beijing’s human rights record, China’s growing economic might and its policies in Taiwan, Hong Kong and elsewhere. Focus group participants are largely pessimistic about future relations with China. But there is also a strong sense of pragmatism among these young adults who have largely resigned themselves to China’s economic power and see few, if any, ways to disentangle relations with China without collapsing their own economies. 

America’s image in Europe has, in contrast, improved markedly in recent years, following the election of President Joe Biden. He is much more popular than his predecessor, former President Donald Trump, and Biden’s more multilateralist approach to foreign policy is welcomed by most Europeans. And on a variety of survey questions we’ve asked in Europe over time – such as questions about human rights and which country should be the world’s leading power – the U.S. gets significantly higher marks than China.

However, the focus groups reveal ongoing concerns about the way America has used its power in world affairs, often discussing U.S. actions abroad as a point of comparison with their own countries. Focus group participants echo a criticism of the U.S. we’ve regularly seen in our surveys: Most believe the U.S. does not take allies’ interests into account when making foreign policy decisions. And participants are especially critical of U.S. military interventions, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, echoing themes from survey research, some participants also express concerns about the state of American politics and society. Many suggest the U.S. has been hypocritical in the past, arguing for human rights and democracy abroad without fixing its problems at home.

Regardless of these criticisms, however, young Europeans want to engage and cooperate with the U.S., and they remain cautiously optimistic about the future of trans-Atlantic relations because the U.S. and Europe share fundamental democratic values. And, in many ways, the criticisms they levy against the U.S. are similar to ones that people – especially those on the left – have of their own government, too.

Young Europeans do not approve of the United States’ role as the “world’s policeman”

Though surveys find that majorities in France, Germany and the UK have favorable views of the U.S., America’s role on the world stage is described in mostly negative terms by the focus group participants. Across all three countries and four ideological groupings, young Europeans are steadfast in the opinion that the U.S. acts as the world’s policeman to the detriment of the world community. One young Briton said clearly, “I think on balance, [they] probably hurt more than they help.”

One French man said, “They’ve started wars that were completely illegal, against the opinion of the UN even, without any mandate.” A German woman added that the U.S. generally “finds themselves too great” and “interferes wherever they want, just because of their military power.” For his part, one young man in Germany noted that “a lot is swept under the carpet. They’ve got their fingers everywhere in the world. It’s not so clean.”

The United States’ actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its consequent withdrawal, were often pointed to as examples of this behavior. Majorities in each country considered the U.S. withdrawal poorly executed, according to Spring 2022 data from the Center, and the young people in the focus groups described both the withdrawal and the entire 20-year U.S. history in the country in forceful terms. One Briton framed it as “short-term help, long-term hurt.” Another French man said, “We saw with Iraq, they came in and left the country in ruins.” And a German man called the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan “a huge failure of a [20]-year long project. They just went away and the country was taken overnight.”

There was some reflection on the fact that each of these countries played their own role in Iraq and Afghanistan and have their own histories of military intervention. Still, the sense is that the charge was led by the U.S., as exemplified by a young Briton who said, in reference to his country’s presence in Iraq, “I think we can get influenced by larger countries, that we’re supposedly allies with, into conflicts that we shouldn’t really have involvement with.” Across the board, young people want to avoid military interventions, even among those eager for their countries to engage on the world stage. A young German woman questioned the extent to which intervening is beneficial, even “in countries where terrorism is high.”

Still, a few French individuals did highlight some of the potential benefits of American interventionism, focusing more on America as a strong power that can take forceful action. For example, noting U.S. support for Taiwan’s security, one French man said, “I think the only time the U.S. did well to intervene was regarding Taiwan … I think that if the U.S. hadn’t shown their support, Taiwan would have been part of China by now.” And one French woman shared respect for the idea of an “America first” policy,” suggesting it “is something France should do and be more strategic about.”

Disapproval of American interventionism among the focus group participants is tied clearly to their sense that U.S. actions abroad are self-interested. Center surveys have long found that people do not think the U.S. takes other countries’ interests into account when making foreign policy decisions; this theme was on full display in the focus groups. One German woman said she has “the impression that the U.S. doesn’t cooperate with anybody.” A French woman added that American interventions “aren’t in cooperation, it’s just themselves” and a Briton called it “just a power thing.”

Critiques of U.S. interventionism are particularly strong among internationally engaged Europeans who called out hypocrisy in the United States’ practice of addressing issues around the world while failing to tackle social inequities at home. In recent years, Center surveys have shown that people from these countries do not see the U.S. as a positive actor or example on climate, health care or civil rights. Take, for example, a French woman who called the U.S. a bad example for “human rights, in general.” When asked why, she said “they’ve gone back on abortion rights.” Others called out the United States’ lack of climate action, high rates of gun violence, inequitable health care system or even the fact that schools in poor areas get less funding.

The focus groups’ discussions led to a common conclusion: Young people are eager to see their countries maintain a strong, more independent presence on the world stage without relying on policy cues from the U.S. When describing his wishes for the UK, one Briton said, “I guess it’s not being like America and trying to save everyone, but offering help to people in need and communicating, sharing intelligence and collaborating on things that are world issues, whether that’s climate change or something else.” For her part, a young German woman called cooperation with the U.S. “sometimes useless, except for defining how we definitely don’t want to act.”  

Still, most in these countries see the U.S. as at least a somewhat reliable and important partner to their country. And while there is a desire to disentangle their policies and reputations from the U.S., young people maintain the expectation of some trans-Atlantic partnership. One German suggested that “in foreign policy, we should keep a healthy closeness to them, because they have a lot of influence in the whole world.” Similarly, though few like the way the U.S. has utilized its military strength, there is a shared sense that it is “the most powerful” and is important to have as an ally. A young German internationalist called it “quite useful” to have “the biggest military force … within the Western community.”

One pain point in relations with the U.S. that came up in each country was leadership. Confidence in the U.S. president reached historic or near historic lows in Center surveys during Trump’s four-year term. In focus groups, one Briton said he thought it was a joke “when the U.S. elected Trump.” A French man cited Trump’s presidency as reasoning for France to have a strong presence on the world stage saying they “would suffer the consequences of the choices of other powers, such as the U.S., as we saw with Donald Trump, we had a lot of difficulty dealing with him, even though his decisions had a direct impact on Europe.”

And, while confidence in the U.S. president jumped dramatically when Biden took office in 2021, it has since tempered, especially among young people. In Germany and France, those ages 18 to 29 are much less likely than those 50 or older to be confident in Biden’s leadership. While young adults are at least 30 percentage points more confident in Biden than they were in Trump in 2020, when the groups mentioned Biden, they often qualified their generally warm feelings with disappointment, with some suggesting he has done little to counteract Trump’s course. As one French respondent shared that, at this point, “I don’t even think U.S. policy changes that much when leaders change. It’s more the approach that changes but Biden won’t necessarily shift every policy.”

Young Europeans concerned by China’s power as the “world’s factory”

Whereas focus group participants heavily focused on the United States’ role as “the world’s policeman,” they discussed China more often as “the world’s factory.” This is driven by both its dominance in manufacturing and exporting goods as well as its investment and infrastructure building around the world. When surveyed, pluralities in Germany, France and the UK called China the world’s leading economic power over the U.S., European Union and Japan. Put simply, one French woman said, “Everything is Chinese.” Another Briton referenced China as “producers of technology and clothes” saying that “they have these giant industrial cities where they churn stuff out at a rate and price which other countries basically see as a deal that’s too good to refuse.” Technology emerged as a common thread in discussions about China’s production power, and multiple participants mentioned the role China plays in the manufacturing of technology products from American and European companies such as Apple and Nokia.

Young Europeans are also wary of China’s investment around the world. A German man said he “finds it extremely dangerous that they try to buy or build up infrastructure in every country. In Africa they are building roads, in Greece they have bought harbors and have agreed to assume Greece’s debts. And they have also tried to buy harbors in Germany.” This sort of lending was also an issue for a French woman who noted that “because they have money, they allow long loans in exchange for ports or infrastructure,” continuing that “there’s nothing fair and honorable in the way the government is managed.”

Underpinning the wariness of China’s economic dominance are severe critiques of the country on two fronts: domestic human rights abuses and military action in the South China Sea. In a 2021 survey, more than eight-in-ten Germans, Britons and French say China does not respect the personal freedoms of its people. This view was espoused by one young British woman who said, “What they do to Muslim people there, concentration camps and invading Hong Kong … I think they’re great in terms of commodities but crap in terms of human rights.” In a similar vein, a French man said he thinks of China as “a dictatorship, which carried out a genocide on its own soil.”

The same man noted that China “wants to invade Taiwan …, contests the statue of Hong Kong [and] Macau” and that “it doesn’t have any legitimacy to intervene.” Unlike the U.S., China’s military was rarely mentioned. When participants did bring up the Chinese military, it was often in reference to Taiwan. A British man shared his view, saying that in “situations sort of like China and Taiwan, everyone’s too afraid to get involved … and Taiwan is this tiny little piece of land where China is doing ballistic missile tests every week now just to show their strength.”

There is agreement that these actions are bad but many young participants, particularly those on the ideological left, are clear that their own countries and the U.S. are not above the same criticisms. A French man said “we blame them for things we do ourselves, we blame [them] for their aggression towards certain countries, which is true, but we are also very aggressive, we wage war to many countries in the West more generally.”

When asked to look toward the future and consider their countries’ ongoing relationships with China, the young focus group participants acknowledge the struggle of balancing China’s human rights track record with their economic power. In fact, when asked to choose between promoting human rights in China regardless of economic consequence and prioritizing economic relations over addressing human rights issues in a recent survey, majorities in each of these countries chose the former. Some are optimistic that their country could, to some degree, achieve this through multilateralism and strengthening economic ties with other major actors, like the U.S. A French man noted that “facing against China could be complicated,” suggesting that his country “could get closer to key institutions, the EU for example, to try to have more power, among others, to try and change the balance a bit, because France alone wouldn’t have much impact against … the force of the Chinese economy.”

More commonly, participants feel that some morally driven stand against China would be nice, but when asked to describe how that would happen, they acknowledge that untying their countries and themselves from China economically is not a pragmatic goal. Put simply by a young British man: “It’s quite easy to point fingers but once again, what would we actually do without them?” Another Briton called the price of material goods coming from China “a deal that’s too good to refuse.” A German man posited that “if [China] were to sanction, then the German economy would crash from one day to the next and also many other countries, because a lot comes from China.” In that vein, some level of cooperation with China seems to be just as inevitable as partnership with the U.S. to young Europeans.

Source: Pew Research Center

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Pope Francis on Saturday updated rules on dealing with sexual abuse in the Roman Catholic Church, expanding their scope to include lay Catholic leaders and spelling out that both minors and adults can be victims.

The pope issued a landmark decree in 2019 making it obligatory for all priests and members of religious orders to report any suspicions of abuse, and holding bishops directly accountable for any abuse they commit themselves or cover-up.

The provisions were initially introduced on a temporary basis, but on Saturday the Vatican said they would become definitive from April 30 and include additional elements aimed at strengthening the fight against abuse within the Church.

Abuse scandals have shredded the Vatican’s reputation in many countries and have been a major challenge for Pope Francis, who has passed a series of measures over the past 10 years aimed at holding the Church hierarchy accountable.

Critics say the results have been mixed and have accused Francis of being reluctant to defrock abusive prelates.

The new norms now encompass leaders of Vatican-sanctioned organisations that are run by lay people, not just priests, following numerous allegations in recent years against lay leaders, who have been accused of abusing their positions to sexually exploit those in their charge.

Whereas the original rules covered sexual acts targeting “minors and vulnerable persons”, the new version provides a wider definition of victims, referring to crimes committed “with a minor or with a person who habitually has an imperfect use of reason or with a vulnerable adult”.

The Vatican said Church members had an obligation to report cases of violence against religious women by clerics, as well as cases of harassment of adult seminarians or novices.

BishopAccountability.org, a not-for-profit organisation looking to document the abuses within the Roman Catholic Church, said the revision was “a big disappointment” and fell short of the “extensive revamping” the policy against the abuses would have required.

The policy “remains self-policing packaged as accountability”, said Anne Barrett Doyle, co-director of BishopAccountability.org, adding bishops remained in charge of investigating allegations against fellow bishops.

The updated provisions have been unveiled a month after the Roman Catholic religious order of Jesuits said that accusations of sexual, psychological and spiritual abuse against one of its most prominent members were highly credible.

About 25 people, mostly former nuns, have accused Father Marko Ivan Rupnik, 69, a well-known religious artist of various forms of abuse, either when he was a spiritual director of a community of nuns in his native Slovenia about 30 years ago, or after he moved to Rome to pursue his career as an artist.

Rupnik has not spoken publicly of the accusations, which have rattled the worldwide order, of which the pope is a member.

Source : Reuters

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