The European Commission published its proposal for an EU raw materials initiative (Critical Raw Materials Act, CRMA) in March 2023. The proposal contains plans to open new mines in Europe and to utilize minerals found in the waste materials of closed mines. Permitting procedures for new mines are additionally proposed to be shortened, and mining companies will be required to report their environmental footprints to the EU. The European Parliament approved the Act last September. To scrutinize the proposed Act, along with its implications to mining practices and our planetary boundaries, we held a seminar series with invited experts during autumn 2023.

The seminar series revolved around crucial questions that are expected to fundamentally shape our future: do we have enough minerals in the world for a green transition? What will be the environmental impact of increasing the number of mines? Is circular economy the solution, or should we reduce our consumption?

Europe depends on imported critical raw materials for its green transition

The autumn seminars were kicked off with a thoroughly informative presentation by Henna Virkkunen, Member of The European Parliament (MEP), working on the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). MEP Virkkunen laid out the facts: the EU is currently dependent on China when it comes to critical raw materials. While Europeans consume around 20% of the world’s critical raw materials, only approximately 2% are produced in Europe. The proposed Act supports the plan to shift this balance towards a more self-sufficient and supply-secure future. The audience raised concerns about environmental safety and environmental degradation due to the increasing volume of mining, especially considering the simplified permitting process for critical raw material projects.

Tackling biodiversity loss while increasing mining is a conundrum

Transitioning from a fossil fuel-based economy is argued to be dependent on mining more (critical) raw materials. But how to do it sustainably with minimal environmental damage, and how well are natural values considered in the short and long term when decisions are made regarding new mines? The Chairman of the Finnish Nature Panel Professor Janne Kotiaho, from the University of Jyväskylä, and environmental activist Riikka Karppinen from Sodankylä further reflected on these questions.

Professor Kotiaho’s message was grimly realistic: biodiversity loss continues at an accelerated rate in both Europe and Finland, and we are all responsible for it. He argued that at the current state of affairs, to truly halt biodiversity and nature loss, we need to implement restorative, nature-positive solutions instead of solutions based on the principle of no net loss. Karppinen expressed shock and discontent regarding the aims to facilitate the opening of new mines in currently protected areas in the name of a green transition. Karppinen has frequently spoken out against a global mining company that is planning on opening a new nickel mine near her home in an area protected by Finnish law and the EU Natura framework. During her presentation, she kindly shared her experiences regarding the residents’ struggles.

The critical raw materials are not renewable

The green transition’s burden on the natural environment may indeed be enormous. But do we have enough materials to fully shift to renewables, or are we about to reach the limits of the planet’s boundaries? Research Professor Simon Michaux, from the Finnish Geological Survey, provided astounding figures on the amounts of minerals actually required for the green transition. According to his estimates, at current energy use rates, we simply do not have enough minerals in the world to fully shift to renewables, and in fact, minerals are “the new oil”. Professor Michaux’s presentation left us thinking: if we do not have enough materials in the world to substitute fossil fuels with renewables, are our current consumption patterns simply doomed?

To better understand how the new Critical Raw Materials Act may look like in Finland, we listened to a presentation by Jarkko Vesa, Special Advisor at the Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. He provided a thorough overview on how the implementation process began. As the Director of Sustainable Development of the mining company Terrafame, Veli-Matti Hilla further underscored: it is clear that mining has received a substantial boost from the EU institutes.

A mix of solutions is needed for a sustainable future

Director Lasse Miettinen from Sitra gave the closing presentation to our seminar series, and it ended on a rather optimistic note. He argued – in line with most of our presenters, along with our own concerns – that we are currently exceeding the limits of our planet. To imagine a more sustainable future, we need to learn to think about ecosystems in a more nuanced and interconnected way. The climate crisis, biodiversity loss, and natural resource depletion cannot be solved separately. Both biotic and abiotic resources are part of nature and managing them should be reframed accordingly. Director Miettinen argued that transitioning to a circular economy is a crucial part and precondition of the solution to our multiple crises. To reduce supply risks and ensure positive environmental outcomes, we need circular solutions, diversified supplies, and more local production beside aiming for sustainable lifestyles and biodiversity offsets. He encouraged us to think that building a more sustainable future is indeed possible.

Professor of Practice in Environmental Responsibility and Chair of the seminar series, Hannele Pokka further noted that while observing how mining in Finland has developed over the years, ordinary people tend to support mining but under no circumstances do they want a mine near their homes. Finland is an old mining country, and minerals have been extracted from the land for hundreds of years. Public opinion in Finland has taken a more critical stance on mining in recent years, which has been reinforced by the Talvivaara mine environmental disaster. It has been difficult for new mining projects to gain social acceptance, and several mining projects, especially in Northern Finland are pending. If mining companies want to seek approval for their projects, mining should be reformed to incorporate a more comprehensive notion of sustainability, including new approaches and technological solutions in water management.

The seminar series, above all, taught us that what used to be possible in mining is not so any longer, and we need drastic changes to remain within our planetary boundaries.

Seminar recordings and further reading materials are available via the links embedded in the text.

Source: Mirage News

The post Probing EU Mineral Policy: Can Mining Become Sustainable? appeared first on Policy Print.

Robert Jeszke is the CEO of the Centre for Climate and Energy Analyses (CAKE). Sebastian Lizak is an expert with the Centre for Climate and Energy Analyses (CAKE). 

As the urgency of addressing climate change becomes more evident, the European Union (EU) is at a critical juncture in its climate and energy policy. Having set the ambitious target of reducing emissions by 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, and aiming to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, the European Climate Law mandates the European Commission (EC) to propose an intermediate climate target for 2040. The recently concluded 12-week public consultation on this matter emphasises the need for advanced climate neutrality strategies. An impact assessment supporting this initiative is expected to be published in 2024. 

While some advocate for an extremely ambitious reduction target for 2040 – such as 90%-95% recommended by the EU’s Advisory Board on Climate Change – others argue that the focus should be on climate governance, policy instruments, and public support, rather than solely on emission target levels. Given the current challenges and difficulties in implementing climate policy, this could generate even more opposition to it.

For years, the EU has been mired in negotiations on ever-more ambitious reduction targets that divide its Member States. What is needed now, is a comprehensive vision of governance to achieve the overarching goal of climate neutrality by 2050, a task fraught with challenges.

Apart from social issues like just transition, distributional aspects of rising carbon prices and costs, a central challenge in achieving net-zero emissions is the removal of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere. The EU acknowledges that net-zero by 2050 is an ambitious goal that requires robust carbon removal strategies. The CAKE/KOBiZE reports have also highlighted the indispensability of carbon removals technologies, including Carbon Capture and Storage and Utilisation (CCS/CCU), negative emissions from Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and natural Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU).

A key component of this strategy is the support for emerging technologies like Direct Air Capture with Carbon Storage (DACCS). By directly capturing emissions from the air, DACCS can effectively reduce CO2 levels and complement emission reductions in sectors with very high marginal costs. Therefore, we will need to introduce the carbon removals to cover residual emissions and to ensure credibility and stability in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).

Simultaneously, the EU ETS, a cornerstone of the EU’s climate policy, is approaching a pivotal moment. Considering the new Linear Reduction Factor (LRF) in the EU ETS, as set forth in the ‘Fit for 55’ package, the depletion of emission allowances in the primary market is expected around 2040. This, followed by a subsequent reliance on the secondary market for their acquisition, raises concerns about market stability and liquidity.

A potential solution lies in recently initiated discussions on establishing a European Central Carbon Bank (ECCB). This concept is highly interesting as it could potentially play a dual role in managing carbon removals and regulating the EU ETS. It is essential to carefully consider the types and volumes of carbon removals that could be available for participants in the EU ETS.

Similar to the role of central banks in monetary policy, the European Central Carbon Bank could influence carbon market dynamics. Acting as a regulatory body, it would control the supply and demand of EUA allowances or CO2 removal units and intervene to stabilise prices when necessary.

Such a mechanism could mitigate instances of market speculation and sudden price spikes, ensuring a stable and credible market environment. The European Carbon Bank’s decisions could be made collectively by the Council of Member States, mirroring the principles of central bank governance, thereby enhancing transparency in the decision-making process.

The proposed European Central Carbon Bank could potentially replace existing mechanisms within the EU ETS, such as the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) and a ‘safety valve’ in Article 29a of the EU ETS directive. The MSR’s ability to stabilise prices has been questioned, as it seems to maintain prices at relatively high levels without effectively addressing extreme price fluctuations. Similarly, Article 29a’s effectiveness is undermined by stringent activation conditions. Despite reforms in the Fit for 55 package, doubts remain about these instruments’ ability to ensure market stability.

By consolidating the key stabilising functions within the EU ETS, the European Central Carbon Bank could provide a comprehensive solution. Its regulatory oversight could effectively address the challenges of speculative behaviour and abrupt price changes. Additionally, its management of carbon removals would align with the broader goal of achieving net-zero emissions. This integration of carbon removal strategies and market stability measures could streamline the EU’s climate policy, ensuring coherence and efficiency.

The establishment of a European Central Carbon Bank also presents a strategic opportunity when picking its location. While Western Europe is traditionally the hub for such institutions, placing the bank in Central-Eastern Europe, such as Poland, would ensure a more balanced distribution of power and influence within the EU. This move would give Central-Eastern Europe a stronger voice in shaping EU climate policies, ensuring they are more inclusive and considerate of regional differences.

The psychological impact of this decision could alleviate resistance to EU climate policy within certain regions, fostering a sense of ownership and participation in overall transformation into climate neutrality. Moreover, it could foster collaborations with neighbouring countries, such as Ukraine and the Western Balkans, thereby extending the reach of climate initiatives. This move would not only reduce resistance but also strengthen EU cohesion, ensuring that climate policies are shaped by diverse perspectives, crucial for creating robust and adaptable strategies.

As the EU progresses towards reaching its climate targets, the establishment of a European Central Carbon Bank emerges as an important factor. By harmonising the imperatives of carbon removals and market stability, the ECCB has the potential to stabilise and safeguard the EU’s climate policy trajectory. The prospect of a resilient and adaptive carbon market, supported by innovative institutions, holds promise for both achieving ambitious emission reduction goals and promoting sustainable economic growth.

As the world closely watches the EU’s climate actions including initiatives like the CBAM, establishing a well-structured governance system within the EU could signify a major step toward a more stable climate policy.

Source: EURA CTIV

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The pan-European STOXX 600 index slipped 0.3%. The benchmark index closed at its highest levels in nearly 1-1/2 years on Thursday after the European Central Bank hiked interest rates as expected but raised the possibility of a pause in September.

Rattling investor nerves, the BoJ made its yield curve control policy more flexible and loosened its defence of a long-term interest rate cap, in moves seen as a prelude to an eventual shift away from the massive monetary stimulus.

European government bond yields rose, mirroring gains in Japanese yields and putting pressure on stocks.

“Japanese investors will now have a large incentive to repatriate cash that is currently parked in USTs (U.S. Treasuries) and buy JGBs (Japanese government bonds) instead. That obviously goes for euro zone bonds too,” said Stuart Cole, chief macro economist at Equiti.

“This effectively means we could see upward pressure on yields globally and that is not great news for stocks. We also need to take into account that the past couple of days have been quite good for equity markets in general.”

Despite Friday’s weakness, the benchmark STOXX 600 looked set to notch its third straight week of gains, driven by hopes that the Federal Reserve and the ECB are nearly done hiking interest rates.

Spanish consumer prices rose by a more than anticipated 2.3% in the 12 months through July.

Separate sets of data showed the German economy stagnated in the second quarter of 2023, while the French and Spanish economies

grew at a sustained pace on the back of stronger exports and tourism.

In earnings-driven moves, Capgemini tumbled 7.0% after the French IT consulting group’s second-quarter growth slowed more than expected.

French drugmaker Sanofi slipped 2.7% as quarterly sales fell short of estimates.

Shares of Austrian sensor maker AMS Osram advanced 9.2% after the company presented a strategic re-alignment of the group and reported second-quarter results in line with its expectations.

Hermes gained 2.1% as sales at the Birkin bag maker accelerated in the second quarter, while Pan-European stock and derivatives exchange Euronext climbed 6.6% as it announced the launch of a 200-million-euro ($219.88 million) share buyback programme. 

Source: Zaywa

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Dr. Morrison studies the cellular and molecular mechanisms that regulate stem cell function and the role these mechanisms play in cancer. His laboratory pioneered methods to purify stem cells from multiple tissues and discovered mechanisms that allow stem cells to persist throughout life to regenerate tissues after injury. His laboratory discovered key mechanisms that regulate stem cell self-renewal as well as the location and cellular composition of specialized microenvironments that promote the maintenance of hematopoietic stem cells (HSC) in adult blood-forming tissues.

Fiona Watt, EMBO Director, said of the newly elected members who reside in more than 20 countries: “These remarkable scientists have unraveled molecular secrets of life, deepened our understanding of health and disease, and are paving the way for further discoveries and innovations. Their achievements reinforce the critical role that life science research plays in the lives of citizens across Europe and the world.”

Dr. Morrison, one of 26 members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and one of 19 members of the U.S. National Academy of Medicine at UT Southwestern Medical Center, joins the EMBO community of more than 2,000 leading life science experts, including 91 Nobel laureates who have been elected to EMBO Membership. New EMBO members are elected by existing EMBO members. The new members will be formally welcomed to EMBO at the annual Members’ Meeting in Heidelberg, Germany, on October 25-27, 2023.

The Morrison Lab studies the intrinsic and extrinsic mechanisms that regulate stem cell self-renewal and the role these mechanisms play in cancer. Self-renewal is the process by which stem cells divide to make more stem cells, perpetuating stem cells throughout life to regenerate tissues.

Dr. Morrison’s team discovered a series of key regulators that distinguish stem cell self-renewal from the proliferation of restricted progenitors in the same tissues. He also identified ways in which self-renewal mechanisms change with age, conferring temporal changes in stem cell properties that match the changing growth and regeneration demands of tissues.

In terms of cell-extrinsic mechanisms, Dr. Morrison identified the location and cellular composition of HSC niches in adult bone marrow and spleen and discovered the Leptin Receptor+ perivascular stromal cells that are the major source of factors required for HSC maintenance in the bone marrow. Researchers demonstrated that HSCs are metabolically distinct from restricted progenitors in vivo and depend upon metabolic regulation for epigenetic control and leukemia suppression.

His lab further discovered that distant metastasis by melanoma cells is limited by oxidative stress and that successfully metastasizing melanoma cells undergo reversible metabolic changes to cope with oxidative stress. They are working to test whether “pro-oxidant” therapies that exacerbate oxidative stress in cancer cells can be used to inhibit cancer progression.

Dr. Morrison served as president of the International Society for Stem Cell Research (2015-2016) and has been active in public policy issues surrounding stem cell research. He is also a Cancer Prevention and Research Institute of Texas (CPRIT) Scholar in Cancer Research and a member of the Harold C. Simmons Comprehensive Cancer Center. Dr. Morrison holds the Kathryne and Gene Bishop Distinguished Chair in Pediatric Research at Children’s Research Institute at UT Southwestern at CRI and the Mary McDermott Cook Chair in Pediatric Genetics. Born in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Dr. Morrison completed a B.Sc. in biology and chemistry at Dalhousie University in 1991, a Ph.D. in immunology at Stanford University in 1996, and a postdoctoral fellowship in neurobiology at Caltech in 1999.

About CRI

Children’s Medical Center Research Institute at UT Southwestern (CRI) is a joint venture of UT Southwestern Medical Center and Children’s Medical Center Dallas, the flagship hospital of Children’s Health. CRI’s mission is to perform transformative biomedical research to better understand the biological basis of disease. Located in Dallas, Texas, CRI is home to interdisciplinary groups of scientists and physicians pursuing research at the interface of regenerative medicine, cancer biology and metabolism. For more information, visit: cri.utsw.edu. To support CRI, visit: give.childrens.com/about-us/why-help/cri/.

Source: UT South Western

The post CRI’s Sean Morrison Elected to European Molecular Biology Organization appeared first on Policy Print.

The EU-US Trade and Technology Council continues to be a valuable initiative for transatlantic cooperation – even if the outcomes of the negotiations will not always make the news

On 5 December, the leadership of the European Commission and US cabinet officials met in Washington, DC for the third ministerial summit of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The TTC initiative, launched in September last year, aims to facilitate continuous transatlantic cooperation on key technology and trade issues. Recently, however, disagreements between the European Union and the United States have overshadowed that cooperation – and threatened to disrupt the summit.

The “Buy American” provisions in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) have frustrated EU leaders, who fear that massive subsidies for American industry will result in companies fleeing Europe. The Biden administration, meanwhile, is dissatisfied with the EU’s hesitance to leverage the TTC more aggressively against China. These disputes, an apparent lack of concrete new outcomes, and the exclusion from TTC negotiations of some of the biggest transatlantic tech and trade issues – such as the IRA or the legal conundrum of transatlantic data flows – have led many observers to conclude that the TTC’s days are numbered.

But, just as the TTC summit in May involved some exaggeration of the initiative’s success stories, the doomsday judgments on the current state of play are also misled. These dire prognoses largely stem from unrealistic expectations, as well as an incomplete understanding of the TTC’s scope and the functioning of the EU – which are closely linked.

Understanding the TTC

The European Commission and the Biden administration established the TTC as a non-binding instrument. In doing so, they took lessons from the failed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership initiative and the damage the Trump era caused to relations between the EU and the US. The TTC’s non-binding setup puts the European Commission in the driving seat, with limited roles for member states and the European Parliament. This simplifies negotiations and facilitates an agile approach to addressing common evolving challenges. However, it also means that the scope and applicability of TTC decisions are inherently limited.

At the inaugural TTC summit, the EU and the US made the modest commitment to “coordinate approaches to key global technology, economic and trade issues … and to base policies on shared democratic values”. Crucially, both sides emphasised that TTC cooperation would not interfere with the regulatory autonomy of the EU and the US. So, grand expectations that the TTC would permit swift regulatory alignment, for example in the governance of digital platforms, were naive at best.

Similarly, the desire in the US to mould the TTC into a geopolitical vehicle aimed at China is mostly incompatible with EU reality. Ursula von der Leyen’s “geopolitical Commission” may, at least partially, share the United States’ ambitions and have a somewhat solidified position on China. But that is not the case for the 27 member states and for the union as a whole. European foreign and security policy continues to be shaped predominantly in EU capitals – not in Brussels – and is often insufficiently aligned between member states.

The issue of export controls in the TTC context illustrates this. At the Paris summit, leaders – and accordingly the media – hailed the coordinated and unprecedented EU and US technology export controls against Russia and Belarus as one of the TTC’s greatest success stories. Certainly, TTC engagement between the European Commission and White House officials played a role in facilitating the swift coordination of those controls. But, in the end, it was member states that negotiated and decided upon the measures in the Foreign Affairs Council, outside the auspices of the TTC. Importantly, it was the imminent security threat of a war in the EU’s neighbourhood that forced member states to swiftly align.

This is fundamentally different from leveraging the TTC to get the EU on board the United States’ new approach to strategic technology export controls against China, through which it aims to limit the country’s military and technology development. Although the EU acknowledged the geostrategic significance of broader allied export controls at the TTC’s inaugural summit, the bloc’s reality means the power to implement such controls largely lies with member states, not the European Commission. And, crucially, threat perception and economic dependencies with regards to China differ between EU member states, as well as between the EU and the US.

It should therefore be no surprise that the US has as yet failed to convince key member states to follow its export control approach against China. And it would be unreasonable to expect the TTC, a commission-led tech and trade initiative, to deliver concrete outcomes on this security policy issue. The TTC’s configuration and the realities of EU foreign policy mean the initiative simply cannot become the immediate geopolitical tool the US envisages.

The value of the TTC

Nevertheless, the TTC can make valuable contributions to nudging the geopolitical needle; it can facilitate coordination, foster mutual understanding, enshrine common policy principles, and aid in the development of compelling narratives – thereby setting the tone and baseline for further actions. But these small steps are difficult to sell as the grand milestones political leaders and the media like to see.

One such small step is this week’s announcement of two TTC initiatives for secure digital infrastructure projects in Jamaica and Kenya. The projects themselves will have limited impact and will hardly be headline grabbing. But they are a clear EU-US response to China’s assertive global infrastructure investments. This new transatlantic cooperation on connectivity investments in third countries, involving a variety of important stakeholders – including development and financing institutions – can have lasting and meaningful effects. Therefore, a proposed memorandum of understanding between the US Development Finance Corporation and the European Investment Bank to increase cooperation in connectivity financing, if followed through, will be of geopolitical significance.

Moreover, although the TTC cannot facilitate full regulatory alignment in technology policy between the EU and US, the initiative can help advance a common understanding on underlying principles – which can have far-reaching effects. The release of a joint roadmap towards common terminologies and metrics to assess the trustworthiness and risk of artificial intelligence (AI) is a case in point. An agreement on a common taxonomy and approach to risk management could pave the way for joint AI standards. This, in turn, would strengthen the positioning of the EU and the US in international standards bodies and help disseminate transatlantic standards across the globe. But, much like a memorandum of understanding on digital development cooperation, a shared repository of metrics to measure AI trustworthiness is unlikely to make the news.

TTC-facilitated convergence in these and other areas may fall short of full regulatory alignment, but it can advance common principles and reduce barriers to trade and research cooperation – with small steps working towards broader, long-term goals.

Room for improvement

This is not to say that the TTC has been an all-out success. Indeed, it is frustrating to see transatlantic friction result in the neglect of some areas in which more cooperation is urgently needed. For example, if the EU and the US do not find a way to collaborate more closely on 6G development, there is a real risk that China’s Huawei will dominate global markets. The issue featured prominently in previous summits, but it now appears to have been pushed down the TTC agenda. This is likely because the US administration, under pressure from US industry lobbyists, continues to pursue premature promises of Open RAN as a way of diversifying the market in favour of new American competitors. But this comes at the cost of cooperation with the EU in building Western 6G technology champions that can compete against Chinese giants.

Such disagreements, alongside the tensions over “Buy America” and the EU’s geopolitical immaturity, endanger continued TTC cooperation. Yet, the initiative has not exacerbated these issues; instead, it provides additional incentives to resolve them. It is vital for EU and US officials – despite misconceptions about and frustration with the TTC – to defend and push the initiative, which remains a valuable vehicle to achieve positive long-term impact.

It seems a reminder is necessary that the TTC is primarily a mechanism “to coordinate approaches to key global technology, economic and trade issues … and to base policies on shared democratic values”. The TTC will not resolve all transatlantic trade and tech issues. The EU will not become a US-like geostrategic force overnight. The US will not become an EU-like digital regulation frontrunner any time soon. And TTC summits will not always create big (positive) headlines. Once that is clear on both sides of the Atlantic, the TTC can continue to make valuable contributions towards a transatlantic market for emerging technologies and digital transformation based on common values.

Source: ECFR.EU

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