Source: France 24

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The possible lapse comes after U.S. Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., led a congressional group warning the U.S. State Department in July 2023 to beware of cooperation with China. This group recommended to let the agreement expire without renewal, claiming China has gained a military advantage through its scientific and technological ties with the U.S.

The State Department has dragged its feet on renewing the agreement, only requesting an extension at the last moment to “amend and strengthen” the agreement.

The U.S. is an active international research collaborator, and since 2011 China has been its top scientific partner, displacing the United Kingdom, which had been the U.S.‘s most frequent collaborator for decades. China’s domestic research and development spending is closing in on parity with that of the United States. Its scholastic output is growing in both number and quality. According to recent studies, China’s science is becoming increasingly creative, breaking new ground.

As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public policy. Relations between countries are often enhanced by negotiating and signing agreements, and this agreement is no different. The U.S.’s science and technology agreement with China successfully built joint research projects and shared research centers between the two nations.

U.S. scientists can typically work with foreign counterparts without a political agreement. Most aren’t even aware of diplomatic agreements, which are signed long after researchers have worked together. But this is not the case with China, where the 1979 agreement became a prerequisite for and the initiator of cooperation.

A 40-year diplomatic investment

The U.S.-China science and technology agreement was part of a historic opening of relations between the two countries, following decades of antagonism and estrangement. U.S. President Richard Nixon set in motion the process of normalizing relations with China in the early 1970s. President Jimmy Carter continued to seek an improved relationship with China.

China had announced reforms, modernizations and a global opening after an intense period of isolation from the time of the Cultural Revolution from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. Among its “four modernizations” was science and technology, in addition to agriculture, defense and industry.

While China is historically known for inventing gunpowder, paper and the compass, China was not a scientific power in the 1970s. American and Chinese diplomats viewed science as a low-conflict activity, comparable to cultural exchange. They figured starting with a nonthreatening scientific agreement could pave the way for later discussions on more politically sensitive issues.

On July 28, 1979, Carter and Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping signed an “umbrella agreement” that contained a general statement of intent to cooperate in science and technology, with specifics to be worked out later.

In the years that followed, China’s economy flourished, as did its scientific output. As China’s economy expanded, so did its investment in domestic research and development. This all boosted China’s ability to collaborate in science – aiding their own economy.

Early collaboration under the 1979 umbrella agreement was mostly symbolic and based upon information exchange, but substantive collaborations grew over time.

A major early achievement came when the two countries published research showing mothers could ingest folic acid to prevent birth defects like spina bifida in developing embryos. Other successful partnerships developed renewable energy, rapid diagnostic tests for the SARS virus and a solar-driven method for producing hydrogen fuel.

Joint projects then began to emerge independent of government agreements or aid. Researchers linked up around common interests – this is how nation-to-nation scientific collaboration thrives.

Many of these projects were initiated by Chinese Americans or Chinese nationals working in the United States who cooperated with researchers back home. In the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic, these strong ties led to rapid, increased Chinese-U.S. cooperation in response to the crisis.

Time of conflict

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, scientific collaboration between the two countries increased dramatically – joint research projects expanded, visiting students in science and engineering skyrocketed in number and collaborative publications received more recognition.

As China’s economy and technological success grew, however, U.S. government agencies and Congress began to scrutinize the agreement and its output. Chinese know-how began to build military strength and, with China’s military and political influence growing, they worried about intellectual property theft, trade secret violations and national security vulnerabilities coming from connections with the U.S.

Recent U.S. legislation, such as the CHIPS and Science Act, is a direct response to China’s stunning expansion. Through the CHIPS and Science Act, the U.S. will boost its semiconductor industry, seen as the platform for building future industries, while seeking to limit China’s access to advances in AI and electronics.

A victim of success?

Some politicians believe this bilateral science and technology agreement, negotiated in the 1970s as the least contentious form of cooperation – and one renewed many times – may now threaten the United States’ dominance in science and technology. As political and military tensions grow, both countries are wary of renewal of the agreement, even as China has signed similar agreements with over 100 nations.

The United States is stuck in a world that no longer exists – one where it dominates science and technology. China now leads the world in research publications recognized as high quality work, and it produces many more engineers than the U.S. By all measures, China’s research spending is soaring.

Even if the recent extension results in a renegotiated agreement, the U.S. has signaled to China a reluctance to cooperate. Since 2018, joint publications have dropped in number. Chinese researchers are less willing to come to the U.S. Meanwhile, Chinese researchers who are in the U.S. are increasingly likely to return home taking valuable knowledge with them.

The U.S. risks being cut off from top know-how as China forges ahead. Perhaps looking at science as a globally shared resource could help both parties craft a truly “win-win” agreement.

Source: The Conversation

The post The US and China may be ending an agreement on science and technology cooperation appeared first on Policy Print.

A participant recounts the beginnings of women’s quest for career equity five decades ago.

It is helpful in moving forward to look back to see where we have come from as we seek a diplomatic service reflective of the American population and values. This article will briefly summarize what near ground zero looked like 50 years ago for women and their struggle to end the discriminatory policies and practices that had restricted their status and roles in the foreign affairs agencies. It is based on my own experience as a woman Foreign Service officer at the State Department, as well as interviews conducted at the time by others and held in Radcliffe College’s Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America.

The 1960s and 1970s were a time of ferment in America. The country was torn by conflicts over civil rights, the Vietnam War, and political issues, including the so-called “liberation” of women. The leadership and personnel systems at the Department of State and other federal agencies reflected some protective but outworn assumptions about “proper” gender roles. That put women’s rights and responsibilities on the reform agenda, as described by Barbara Good in her January 1981 FSJ article, “Women in the Foreign Service: A Quiet Revolution.”

Where We Were

Mary Olmsted, the first president of the Women’s Action Organization, receiving the Woman of Courage award in 2010. The National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC) presented the award in honor of Ms. Olmsted’s leadership of WAO. At right, NWPC President Lulu Flores; at left, the author, Marguerite Cooper, then NWPC vice president.
Courtesy of Marguerite Cooper

It seems ludicrous now, but when I joined the Foreign Service in 1956, women made up only 4.6 percent of FSOs and 1 percent of the senior ranks; most women FS employees were secretaries. Women FS employees of all ranks and positions were expected to resign upon marriage. They were not hired if they had dependents, and their allowances were lower than their married male colleagues. There was only one career woman ambassador. Many women Civil Service employees were in dead-end jobs. Discrimination on the basis of sex (as well as race, color, religion, and national origin) had been outlawed in federal employment in 1967 by President Lyndon B. Johnson, based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

For women FSOs, gender bias seriously harmed their hiring, assignments, performance evaluations, and promotions. At the time, the quota for women and Black people was one hired every other year, according to the transcript of Alison Palmer’s 1971 equal employment opportunity hearing. Their assignments were limited by the State Department due to the widely held beliefs that they would be looked down on in the Middle East and Asia and face machismo in Latin America, danger in Africa, and compromise behind the Iron Curtain. For more details, see my article, “Twenty Years After the ‘Women’s Revolution’: A Personal View,” in the February 1991 FSJ.

Women FSOs’ advancement was also severely limited by their assignment largely to the consular cone and some administrative functions, with few senior positions available. In the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), women were clustered in the cultural function, not information. At the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), women officers abroad, largely in nutrition and home economics functions, were the first to go when cuts were made. None were in policy or supervisory positions in Washington, D.C. Few, if any, women were chiefs of mission or in program direction in the three agencies, and their promotions were substantially slower than for men.

The Foreign Service Staff Corps (FSS) was largely made up of women secretaries and male communicators. Secretaries served everywhere, but the ban on marriage left few chances for professional advancement. They had to share their housing, work unpaid overtime, were often without diplomatic status, and were frequently excluded from official functions. They felt disrespected both as professionals and as people.

Adding to the discontent were the wives of FSOs, especially of younger and lower-ranking officers, who chafed at the barriers to their working overseas, the tradition of being subject to the demands and whims of the senior wives at post, and the fact they were evaluated as part of their husband’s efficiency reports.

Stirrings of Reform

The first shot across the bow in the fight for FS women’s equality was the grievance filed by FSO Alison Palmer in 1968 with the Civil Service Commission. Palmer charged discrimination when her assignments to three African posts were refused or abridged by the ambassadors. It took three years, but she won her case in 1971 on appeal.

In early 1970, State’s Deputy Under Secretary for Management William Macomber oversaw a program to craft a more flexible and responsive State Department, with parallel systems for sister agencies—USAID and USIA. Thirteen interagency task forces looked at a broad range of personnel and management issues, held large open hearings from April through June, and drafted recommendations for change.

The previously cited FSJ articles by Barbara Good and myself addressed the development of a group at this time intent on seeking redress of issues of concern to women employees and families. An Ad Hoc Committee on the Status of Women (later the Women’s Action Organization, or WAO) sought relief at first through the reform task forces.

At a critical Aug. 26, 1970, meeting of the ad hoc group with Macomber and his staff, we found him to be sympathetic to the career aspirations of women. Although the deputy under secretary denied our request for separate women-focused task force subcommittees, he invited the group to make recommendations for “serious consideration.” As Macomber said at the time: “It was stupid to require women employees to resign at marriage: if the woman employee intended to continue her service, the department would attempt to find appropriate assignments for both employees. If that was not possible, one could take leave without pay for the duration of the other’s assignment.”

The ad hoc group got to work to provide data-driven evidence of discrimination with 28 recommendations for policy changes. None of them appeared in the task forces’ final report, “Diplomacy for the 70s.”

Over the next year or two, WAO maneuvered within the system on some of their desired changes in personnel policy: for instance, an end to the ban on marriage and dependents for women; an end to discrimination in FSO assignments; and adjustments for the staff corps in their allowances, housing, and opportunities for upward mobility.

The Personal Dimension

State Department Deputy Under Secretary for Management William Macomber meeting with Women’s Action Organization members in 1972. Facing the camera are Macomber (next to podium); his assistant, Gladys Rogers (to his left); Barbara Good, from State; Elaine Fry, from USIA; Idris Russell, State WAO vice president; and Viessa Jackson, USAID WAO vice president.
FSJ, February 1991

The personal dimension in this progress was critical. Moving from statements of support from Macomber and his Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs Gladys Rogers, the group followed up to draft implementing policy statements. Because staff was busy with the task force–required changes, WAO drafted changes to the implementing regulations for review, editing, and publication. As Rogers said, the ad hoc committee provided “a coherent, timely, integrated approach.”

Macomber himself said that the WAO approach on these early issues was practical, and he appreciated our willingness to express thanks for work accomplished. WAO’s broad membership of men and women, Foreign Service and Civil Service, grew to 1,000 in all three agencies, led in the beginning by an FS-1, Mary Olmsted.

Much has been written about the discontent of employees’ wives. Briefly, it was taken up in 1971 as an issue in the Secretary’s Open Forum, then called the Open Forum Panel (OFP), following the backlash to a 1970 policy statement restricting the demands senior wives could make on others. That statement had been drafted at the Foreign Service Institute’s wives seminar chaired by Dorothy Stansbury.

Richard Williamson led an OFP committee that focused on the legal status of wives in negotiations with Macomber and other senior officers for a policy statement that included appreciation for spouses’ contributions through their representational and charitable activities. But dependent spouses were declared to be “independent persons,” not government employees, and thus unable to be ordered to take on duties or included in their employee spouses’ efficiency reports.

Other issues of concern to spouses abroad were the ability to work and family support. Tandem couples predominantly included a secretarial spouse who would be able to continue her career under the new guidelines. But others sought work abroad, some at missions on a part-time, intermittent, or temporary basis.

While I was president of WAO (1976-1978), a group of spouses sought WAO’s help with a host of family concerns they wanted to take to Director General Carol Laise. These early efforts led to creation of the Family Liaison Office (now the Global Community Liaison Office) and the spouses’ skills bank, led by Hope Meyers and Cynthia Chard, respectively. For more information, see Married to the Foreign Service: An Oral History of the American Diplomatic Spouse by Jewel Fenzi with Carl L. Nelson (1994).

A Turning Point

The fight for women in the Foreign Service took a serious turn in 1976 when Alison Palmer filed a class action lawsuit charging sex discrimination of FSOs and Foreign Service applicants.

In her March 2016 FSJ article, “Foreign Service Women Today: The Palmer Case and Beyond,” former FSO Andrea Strano credited the lawsuit with causing State to either cease the unfair practices or make progress on such problems as out-of-cone and initial cone assignments for women FSOs, the lack of stretch and deputy chief of mission assignments for women, the disproportionate promotion of men, discriminatory hiring practices and processes, and the reclassification of awards. But this remarkable progress took 34 years to accomplish, on appeal, bit by bit, as described in Palmer’s 475-page autobiography, Diplomat and Priest: One Woman’s Challenge to State and Church (2015).

At the time, WAO agonized over whether to join the suit. We believed that the agencies discriminated, and despite the advances made in 1971-1972, there was much left to be done to achieve an equitable system. A good deal of the problem with discrimination in initial grade and cone assignments, efficiency reports, and future potential was the result of subconscious attitudes. The lawsuit could document such discriminatory actions, based simply on statistical analysis, much of which WAO had collected.

A year later, in 1977, the WAO board and I, personally, filed a class-action lawsuit. It was, as Barbara Good has written, a controversial decision: WAO lost some members. The reasons for joining were several. Following Macomber’s reassignment, WAO had less access to senior ranks. Worried about “not lowering FS standards,” Director General Laise was much more skeptical of our mission, and her staffs were less responsive.

The State Department’s affirmative action program was focused on bringing in professional women from the outside to fill senior positions. A program to fast-track promotions or assignments of outstanding mid-level women career officers was perceived as “reverse discrimination” and never got off the ground. It appeared to us that management was counting on a “trickle-up” result so as more women FSOs were recruited at the bottom, over time more would make it to the senior grades. We were afraid that continued bias in efficiency reports, promotions, assignments, and the fewer senior positions in the consular and administrative cones would result in a continuation of women’s proportionally lower rank and status.

The class action lawsuit was certified, and a D.C. court consolidated the two cases but rejected WAO’s standing as a plaintiff. With the addition of up to seven other plaintiffs, we provided the basis for covering a broader range of personnel issues than would have been true for the Palmer case alone. The Palmer-Cooper lawsuit made a huge difference for women FSOs and probably also provided spillover effects benefiting both the Foreign Service staff corps and the Civil Service. WAO continued its educational programs to raise employees’ awareness of opportunities for upward mobility and improvement in job skills. In congressional hearings we testified for a more diverse, inclusive, equitable, and accessible Foreign Service, one that is more family friendly.

We have come a long way in 50 years but always with more work to be done to reach a diplomatic service that reflects the best in America’s population and values. What we know is that the initial breakthroughs for women in foreign affairs required the complementary efforts of management programs, pressure by employee groups, and court action. The department’s current modernization efforts will keep that search for equality going.

Source: Afsa News

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U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken just finished his three-day visit to Vietnam, a trip that Vietnam watchers considered vital to upgrading the U.S.-Vietnam relationship to the level of a “strategic partnership.” In a press statement, Blinken affirmed the U.S. respect for Vietnam’s political system and its multidirectional foreign policy. In Blinken’s words, a “free and open” Indo-Pacific meant “countries being free to choose their own path and their own partners.”

Shortly before Blinken’s Vietnam visit, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko went to Hanoi to foster bilateral ties, especially to help Russia expand its exports to Vietnam, amid Moscow’s growing isolation over the war in Ukraine. Vietnam’s diplomatic profile is definitely growing, and some scholars have suggested that its increasingly diverse array of diplomatic partnerships affords the country more freedom of action vis-à-vis China.

However, how much agency does Vietnam really have? Can we argue that Vietnam’s agency has increased because of its diplomatic partnerships? If we define agency as the “ability to make mistakes,” Vietnam has little agency when it comes to foreign policy. As a small country next to China, its margin of error is small because of the devastating consequences of Chinese coercive diplomacy on Vietnam’s economy and security. Vietnam cannot afford to make mistakes and it cannot stay on bad terms with China for eternity, a thousand-year-old lesson that past and present Vietnamese leaders well understand. Vietnam’s foreign policy is thus fundamentally about asserting its own autonomy in the shadow of a great power without upsetting said power. Scholars tend to forget the second part when analyzing Vietnam’s assertion of autonomy via its diplomatic partnerships, which gives a distorted impression that these partnerships are an indicator of Hanoi’s growing agency without accounting for the fact that China is the reason for Vietnam’s ability to foster those partnerships in the first place.

It is China, or the state of China-Vietnam relations, not the number of Vietnam’s diplomatic partnerships that ultimately determine how much agency Vietnam really has. When China-Vietnam relations have been good or stable, Vietnam’s agency increased because China tolerated Hanoi’s assertion of its autonomy by increasing diplomatic ties with other extra-regional great powers. China did not see those ties as threats to its security. When China-Vietnam relations have been bad, China has been determined to punish Hanoi in order to force its neutrality because China viewed Vietnam’s diplomatic ties with other powers as security threats. Chinese coercion decreased the number of diplomatic options available to Vietnam and hence undermined its autonomy.

A case in point is Hanoi’s desire for an independent foreign policy after 1975. Although Vietnam leaned to the Soviet side during the closing days of the Vietnam War, it was not inevitable that Vietnam would ally with the Soviet Union after unification, despite Moscow’s desire for an alliance. Vietnam wanted to reap the benefits of playing the Soviet Union and China off against each other to extract the maximum amount of aid for post-war reconstruction. Vietnam refused to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to avoid being dragged into the Sino-Soviet dispute, and it was also open to normalizing ties with the United States to diversify its foreign relations. Vietnam in general was able to explore different diplomatic options not confined to the communist bloc.

However, as China-Vietnam relations deteriorated due to Beijing’s support for Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge against Vietnam and the deadlock over economic aid, Hanoi’s freedom of action shrank. China successfully killed the U.S.-Vietnam normalization process by emphasizing the importance of U.S.-China diplomatic normalization in Washington’s efforts to contain the Soviet Union, thereby depriving Vietnam of a diplomatic option. Moreover, the Chinese military threat was so grave that Vietnam had little choice but to ally with the Soviet Union, which was against its initial wish to maintain its distance from Moscow.

China exploited Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union by framing Vietnam as an “aspiring small hegemon” next to the Soviet “big hegemon” in order to isolate Hanoi internationally. China’s improvements in relations with other Southeast Asian states in the late 1970s also hurt Vietnam’s engagement with the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is not an overstatement to say that the poor state of China-Vietnam relations from 1978 to 1991 was the most important factor behind Vietnam’s international pariah status and sacrifice of autonomy for protection in an alliance with Moscow. Vietnam’s few diplomatic options due to China’s containment strategy were an indicator of its declining agency.

When Vietnam gave in to Chinese coercion and announced its respect for China’s periphery policy by staying neutral and not militarily dominating Indochina, it was once again able to adopt an independent foreign policy, which gave it more freedom of action. After China and Vietnam normalized ties in 1991, Vietnam slowly emerged from international isolation and normalized diplomatic relations with several important countries, including the United States in 1995. In 1998, Hanoi formally adopted its “Three Nos” neutral foreign policy of no military alliances, no foreign bases, and no external alignments, in the defense white paper released that year. In 1999 and 2000, Vietnam and China resolved their land border and the Gulf of Tonkin disputes respectively, eliminating a major source of security tension.

In subsequent years, Hanoi has upgraded many of its normal diplomatic relations to partnerships, most notably the establishment of a strategic partnership with Russia in 2001, a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2008, and a comprehensive partnership with the United States in 2013. China has tolerated Vietnam’s ongoing defense modernization efforts and its growing security ties with members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue because China-Vietnam relations are in general stable and manageable.

The ongoing talks for an upgrade to a U.S.-Vietnam strategic partnership should be seen as an outcome of Vietnam’s successful management of its relations with China and China’s tolerance of Vietnam’s freedom of action in exchange, not simply a case of Vietnam enlisting U.S. help to increase its agency vis-à-vis China at China’s expense. Had Vietnam been so keen on the latter course, it rather than the U.S. would be the side pushing hardest for the upgrade, which is not the case. Some Vietnam watchers suggested that Communist Party of Vietnam chief Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to China last year created the necessary conditions for an upgrade in U.S.-Vietnam ties, and this conforms to the logic that a good China-Vietnam relationship is the greatest determinant of Vietnam’s agency. Former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ted Osius has also noted that Vietnam had to gauge Chinese reactions before considering U.S. security initiatives. This is due to one simple reason: Vietnam wants to assure China that its foreign policy choices are not against Chinese interests. Again, Vietnam cannot afford to make mistakes.

While welcoming a stable China-Vietnam relationship, China has not hesitated to warn Vietnam of its lack of agency if China-Vietnam relations again turn sour. In a phone conversation with Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son in April 2022, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “the United States tries to create regional tension and incite antagonism and confrontation by pushing ahead with the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’… We can’t let the Cold War mentality resurge in the region and the tragedy of Ukraine be repeated around us.” The moment Vietnam fails to assure China that its diplomatic partnerships are not against Chinese interests, it will suffer great consequences. Other extra-regional great powers may not protect Vietnam when Vietnam needs, but China will certainly punish Vietnam if it believes it must.

It is undeniable that Vietnam’s diplomatic partnerships have been vital to raising Hanoi’s international profile, but it is a bit too far to suggest that these partnerships have increased Vietnam’s agency. Instead, Vietnam’s growing number of partnerships is an indicator of the stability of the China-Vietnam relationship since the end of the Cold War. Vietnam does not have to take sides precisely because China has not forced it to, as was the case in 1978. So long as Vietnam cannot make mistakes without grave consequences from its northern neighbor, it does not enjoy much agency – no matter its number of comprehensive or strategic partners.

Source: The Diplomat

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