BEIJING – Since March 2023, when China started to issue tourist visas again, business has picked up for Beijing tour guide Vivie Pan, who organises small group tours for English-speaking visitors.

But the numbers are nowhere near the levels of 2018 and 2019, before the Covid-19 pandemic. Back then, she received up to three or four bookings a day, and had to rope in other guides to help.

“For this year, I have enough bookings only for myself. I was quite busy from June until November almost every day, with three or four rest days per month, but still there’s no comparison to 2019,” said Ms Pan, who drove part-time for private car-hire company Didi to make ends meet during the pandemic.

“The overseas tourists are coming back, but their main purpose is not sightseeing or leisure – it’s usually business or visiting friends.”

In the first half of 2023, travel agencies received 477,800 inbound tourists, compared with more than 8.56 million for the same period in 2019, according to statistics released by the Chinese Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

The sluggish recovery has been on the government’s radar – it has implemented a series of measures to ease potential pain points of visitors. For instance, in August, the authorities did away with the need for travellers to have a negative Covid-19 test to enter the country.

The latest move came on Nov 24, when China unilaterally announced a year-long visa-free policy for visitors from France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Malaysia from Dec 1.

This saves them the hassle of filling up pages of forms that include planned itinerary and travel history.

On Dec 1, more than 2,000 people from these six countries entered China – an increase of 12.5 per cent over the previous day, said China’s immigration authorities.

Industry players have welcomed the move, but noted that difficulties remain in persuading tourists to come back. These include limited availability of flights and tightened purse strings, as well as geopolitical tensions that affect perceptions of China.

Veteran industry observer Oliver Sedlinger, who is chief executive of tourism consultancy Sedlinger & Associates, said a short-term challenge is flight availability, noting that China’s international flights have recovered to only about 57 per cent since the start of 2023.

“The recent new visa policies introduced by China are a very smart move and will make travelling there easier,” he said, adding that this would likely provide a strong boost to visitor numbers from these markets.

Dr Liu Simin, vice-president of the tourism branch of the China Society for Futures Studies research institute, likewise said the move would spur growth.

But he pointed out that the major source countries before the pandemic, such as the United States, Japan and South Korea, were not included in the visa-free policy.

“Although the pandemic is over, the negative effects of pandemic controls have yet to completely disappear. Foreigners may not yet be fully aware of the situation in China today,” he said.

Western countries have also, in general, experienced inflation after the pandemic and consequently a decrease in disposable incomes, with less to spend on travelling, he added.

Geopolitics is yet another factor.

Associate Professor Chong Ja Ian of the National University of Singapore said the squabbles China has with other countries are a dampener on tourist visits from there.

For one thing, China-Japan relations hit a rough patch after Beijing strongly criticised Tokyo for releasing treated radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear plant, starting from August 2023.

Adding to the problem are China’s exit bans and detentions of individuals associated with particular states, as well as raids on business, said Prof Chong, who specialises in Chinese foreign policy.

For example, Chinese investigations into US-related firms earlier in 2023 spooked the business community.

The authorities had visited the offices of Capvision, Bain & Company and Mintz Group, in what was seen as a crackdown on consulting and due diligence firms.

Memories of the sudden closure of borders and the zero-Covid policy are also relatively fresh, said Prof Chong, and this is reinforced by recent reports of an outbreak of an unidentified disease with flu-like symptoms in China.

“For leisure travellers, the world is a big place with many attractive sites, many of which offer better value and comfort than the PRC,” he said, referring to China’s official name, the People’s Republic of China.

Still, some industry players are already looking forward to 2024.

A spokeswoman for Trip.com Group, a major travel service conglomerate headquartered in Shanghai, said demand for travel to China is expected to rise in the near future. She said Trip.com data showed that global search results for inbound travel to China increased in the third quarter by nearly 40 per cent compared with the previous quarter. 

Some believe that more publicity could be the answer to raising tourist numbers.

Mr Tang Gang, president of Chongqing-based Century Cruises, said “vigorous promotion and publicity” is needed to further stimulate demand, adding that his Yangtze river cruise firm served tourists mainly from Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand in 2023.

Ms Pan, the tour guide, believes the outlook for 2024 will be better.

“I’ve already received a handful of clients for March, as well as a few inquiries. There are also a few coming from Malaysia and Singapore in December,” she said.

“But I’m sure it will not be as buoyant as before the end of 2019.” 

Source : The Straits Times

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When South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, entered office last year, the odds rose that a frostier bilateral relationship with China might take hold. After all, Yoon on the campaign trail talked tough on China, and conservative South Korean politicians typically deepen the US alliance and are suspicious of Chinese support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). Even despite the growing closeness of DPRK-China ties, Yoon has been able to effectively manage his government’s relationship with Beijing, potentially setting a template for how other small and medium-sized nations might do the same.

Yoon’s Carrots and Sticks ApproachIndeed, as I have previously argued, Yoon and his government, to some extent, have taken a harder line on China. For example, Yoon became the first South Korean leader to attend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, during which he criticized not only Russia, but China as well. In April, before his state visit to Washington for a summit at the White House with President Joe Biden, Yoon railed against any “attempt to change the status quo by force” in the Taiwan Strait. He further offered that South Korea would cooperate with the international community to prevent such an outcome. Yoon’s comments predictably angered China and sparked a monthslong diplomatic tit-for-tat that stretched into the summer.As part of that summit, Biden and Yoon jointly issued the “Washington Declaration,” which includes measures to enhance extended deterrence, such as the establishment of a nuclear consultative group, the exchange of nuclear-related information and visits by nuclear-powered military assets like the B-52 and submarines, which could be leveraged not only for a North Korea, but China-related contingency as well.But Yoon has simultaneously tried to keep an even hand in dealing with Beijing. For instance, when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited South Korea after her highly controversial visit to Taiwan to meet President Tsai Ing-wen, Yoon was nowhere to be found. The presidential office said he was on a five-day vacation and had no plans to meet with Pelosi, though he eventually did hold a last-minute phone call with her. His administration has also treaded softly in the country’s debut Indo-Pacific strategy statement in December, referring to China as a “key partner” with which Seoul “will nurture a sounder and more mature relationship as we pursue shared interests based on mutual respect and reciprocity, guided by international norms and rules.”Such moves have probably contributed to a gradually stabilizing and normalizing of the South Korea-China relationship. For example, this week, South Korea resumed trilateral talks with China and Japan, a mechanism that had been dormant since 2019. This foreign ministers-level meeting is paving the way for a trilateral summit soon. In a surprising new pact that goes into effect in May, Beijing relented to Seoul this month and will mandate that its fishing boat (and presumably fishing militia forces) keep their trackers on to help the South Korean coast guard combat illegal fishing within its exclusive economic zone.China’s Likely Considerations/CalculationsYoon’s foreign policy, however, is probably only one part of the story. Dismal Chinese economic numbers—including a collapse in exports, leveling off of inflation, rising unemployment, and slowing consumption, production, and investment—may be prompting Beijing to achieve a better partnership with Seoul. The same could be true for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision to meet with US President Joe Biden earlier this month at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in San Francisco.Another factor is probably Yoon’s push to open and strengthen ties with Japan, which has a strained relationship with China. Earlier this year, Yoon held a summit with his counterpart, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida—the first of its kind in over a decade. Since then, Seoul and Tokyo have agreed to resuscitate a military information-sharing agreement, and in August, Biden met with Yoon and Kishida at Camp David in the first-ever standalone trilateral summit between the three nations. Earlier this month, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin sat down in another unprecedented trilateral with South Korean and Japanese defense ministers to share information relevant to “severe security environments,” suggesting that North Korea isn’t the only target. Hence, Beijing probably seeks to undermine and ultimately end the strengthening South Korea-Japan partnership possibly aimed at it.Yet another factor may have more to do with China’s military modernization than anything South Korea is doing. When I visited Seoul earlier this month, I spoke with an interlocutor who believed that Beijing’s calculus is rapidly changing on the so-called “Three No’s” demanded of Seoul in 2017, including no new deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, no South Korean integration into US regional missile defenses, and no trilateral military alliance with Japan and the United States. His theory was that Beijing’s rapid progress in developing a credible nuclear triad (capable of nuclear attacks from land, air, and sea) reduces the salience of pressuring Seoul to follow the Three Nos—a commitment Seoul denies actually exists anyhow.ConclusionAlthough South Korea is arguably inching closer to a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan, now featuring, for example, joint military exercises, China can still rationalize that the partnership is still too new and possibly ephemeral, likely circumscribed and strained by lingering mistrust from World War II legacy issues, such as the comfort women.In the end, Yoon’s China policy has been unexpectedly successful thus far. He is also buoyed by the South Korean public’s increasingly negative views on China, with the nation now reportedly holding the most anti-China sentiment worldwide. Of course, Yoon is still a relatively new president—he is less than two years into his five-year term—and much could still go wrong, especially if he pursues the Taiwan issue more assertively. But for now, at least, Yoon and his government have successfully managed China, and perhaps offered a road map for how others can too.

Source : 38 North

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Heavy machinery and electronics manufacturers have seen a higher-than-expected surge in orders for defense equipment, such as missiles and radar systems, since the government shifted Japan’s security policy last year.

Under the plan of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s administration, Japan’s defense spending over the five years through fiscal 2027 will total 43 trillion yen ($290 billion), 1.5 times the previous level.

Some companies in the defense industry say the financial windfalls have already exceeded expectations.

“I had conservative prospects but, as it turned out, we received more orders than we ever imagined,” Seiji Izumisawa, president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., said Nov. 6 at a briefing on the company’s mid-term financial results.

Orders received by MHI’s aircraft, defense and space segment over the first half of fiscal 2023 reached a record 999.4 billion yen, a fivefold year-on-year increase.

The rise is due partly to MHI’s agreement signed with the Defense Ministry in April on development work related to long-range standoff missiles.

MHI raised its forecast for orders accepted by the segment by 800 billion yen for fiscal 2023, mainly because of growth in defense-related orders, company officials said.

Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. expects about 460 billion yen in orders for the company’s defense arm in fiscal 2023, up 200 billion yen year on year.

The forecast for the defense arm’s revenue is slightly more than 280 billion yen, up about 40 billion yen from last fiscal year.

NEC Corp. saw a year-on-year rise of 40 percent in orders taken by its “aerospace and national security” department in the first half of this fiscal year.

“We are receiving orders with considerably large sums,” Osamu Fujikawa, an NEC board director, said.

Contractors are increasing personnel and capital investment with the rise in orders for defense equipment.

Mitsubishi Electric Corp. said in May it was assigning 1,000 additional workers to its defense and space business and investing 70 billion yen in plant and equipment there.

The company also released a plan in October to build eight new manufacturing buildings at its three plants for radar and other equipment.

MHI said on Nov. 23 that it will increase personnel by 20-30 percent at its design and other departments to deal with the surge in orders.

The profit margins for defense contractors have averaged only 8 percent in Japan, compared with more than 10 percent for some companies in overseas nations.

One study said the corresponding profitability level in Japan was only 2 to 3 percent in real terms.

Many companies in Japan, including major manufacturers, have reduced their defense operations or even withdrawn from the business in recent years.

To change the situation, the Defense Ministry in October started setting contractors’ profit margins at a maximum of 15 percent in the order-placement stage, up from the previous level of around 8 percent.

The ministry adopted a new mechanism to increase profitability levels depending on the contractor’s business efforts, such as implementing quality control and meeting delivery deadlines.

“(Our profit margin levels) used to be low, but they are beginning to improve in our new projects,” NEC’s Fujikawa said. “I hope to ensure our company will win a near-maximum profitability level.”

Some Japanese contractors are beginning to engage in joint development work with overseas partners.

Mitsubishi Electric said in October that it will draw on its laser technology to jointly develop surveillance equipment with the Australian Department of Defense.

Source : The Asahi Shimbun

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A recent indictment from the United States Department of Justice has alleged an Indian security official was involved in attempting to assassinate a U.S. and Canadian citizen in New York. The alleged target, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, is a leader in the Sikh separatist movement and has been involved in organizing referendums for the establishment of Khalistan, a proposed independent Sikh state in northern India.

The indictment also states that there is a link between the foiled attempt to kill Pannun and the murder of Canadian Khalistani leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Surrey, B.C. earlier this year.

The Indian government said it was investigating the allegations, and had established a committee to “address the security concerns highlighted by the US government.”

This announcement by the U.S. could have potential ramifications for Indian politics, both at home and abroad. However, it is unlikely to have any significant impact on next year’s general elections, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be seeking his third term in office.

Bolstering Modi’s strongman image

Canadian allegations against India had handed Modi an excellent political platform for the next general elections.

It sent a clear message that India’s government would, under no circumstances, tolerate any threats to the country.

India’s foreign policy has become more muscular under Modi; and that’s a strategy that resonates with his supporters.

His landslide victory in 2019 had a lot to do with support for India’s “surgical strikes” in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir in 2016 in response to an attack that killed 19 Indian soldiers.

Following Canada’s allegations of Indian involvement in Nijjar’s killing, the Modi government was once again able to successfully generate a narrative against Canada in general and the Liberal party in particular.

India’s narrative consists of four parts:

• Canada is a safe haven for terrorists, extremism and organized crime, and there is a nexus between Indo-Canadian gangsters and Sikh separatists working with Pakistan’s intelligence agency.
• The Canadian government has consistently ignored repeated requests from India to take actions against Khalistani “terrorists” operating on Canadian soil.
• Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government is pandering to the large Sikh diaspora in Canada.
• The Liberal minority government is dependent on support from the New Democratic Party leader, Jagmeet Singh, a Sikh supposedly sympathetic to the Khalistani cause.

Indian news media and politicians have repeated the official discourse constantly for weeks.

While India was quick to dismiss Canadian allegations, it has adopted a much more cautious approach to the U.S. indictment. India has much to lose by alienating the Biden administration as both countries have invested a great deal in enhancing Indo-U.S. relations and making India a central ally in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

Meanwhile, Indo-Canadian relations have been chilly since 2015, largely due to Khalistan activity in Canada. Moreover, annual trade between India and Canada is worth about $12 billion while trade with the U.S. is worth $192 billion. In short, India has much more to lose by alienating the U.S than it does by taking a hard line with Canada.

Furthering authoritarianism

On the surface it might appear that news of the U.S. indictment could fracture India’s muscular foreign policy. However, this episode is unlikely to have much impact on India’s domestic politics. Modi remains popular with an approval rating of 78 per cent.

He is credited, among other things, with India’s emergence as a global power, with his effective handling of border issues with China, for taking on Pakistan and with the success of the country’s space program.

The 26-party opposition coalition, Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), is unlikely to challenge Modi on this particular issue. The national defense narrative is a strong one, and India’s territorial integrity is a sacrosanct issue for all political parties.

However, among some minority communities, Muslims and Sikhs, both at home and abroad, revelations of assassination plots could raise serious concerns. The Modi government’s aggressive pursuit of a Hindu nationalist agenda, its repression of minorities and control over dissent have become more entrenched.

India’s parliament is in the process of amending its sedition laws. If the changes are passed, endangering the unity and integrity of the country could result in life-term imprisonment. These proposed changes to the already harsh and draconian penal code will only further criminalize dissent. The Modi government is ensuring that dissenting voices, particularly those of minority communities, completely disappear from Indian democracy.

Amplifying the Khalistan movement

India’s campaign of global repression of Sikh separatists could have the effect of unifying the Sikh diaspora. It was in 2018 that Pannun came up with the idea of holding a non-binding referendums to mobilize the global Sikh community.

That year, Sikh activists announced their campaign for holding referendums starting in 2021 across multiple cities. The first referendum took place in London on Oct. 31, 2021, followed by eight more referendums during 2022 and 2023 in the cities of Leeds and Luton (United Kingdom), Geneva (Switzerland), Brampton, Mississauga and Surrey (Canada), Melbourne (Australia), and Brescia (Italy).

Pannun announced plans for referendums in Punjab and the U.S, and for another round of voting in Canadian cities. In October, following Trudeau’s announcement of credible allegations against the Indian government, thousands of voters turned out to participate in a referendum in Surrey, B.C., some coming from as far as the cities of Edmonton and Calgary.

While only a small minority of the Sikh diaspora is thought to support creating a separate Sikh state, the majority were likely registering their disapproval of India and its repression of minorities. Memory of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in the wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassination which left thousands dead remains very much alive within the entire Sikh community to this day.

But Khalistani referendum politics relies heavily on images depicting so-called “martyrs” (separatists killed by India) and Indian diplomats as the assassins of Sikh activists. The desecration of Hindu temples also has the potential to create division within the Indian Hindu and Sikh diasporas. Canadian Liberal MP Chandra Arya has accused Khalistan supporters of targetting Hindu temples.

As more information comes out, the Canadian government will need to carefully manage its relations with India and the relationship between diasporic communities here.

Source : The Conversation

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The yen suffered its biggest daily fall against the dollar since April on Tuesday after the Bank of Japan made only modest changes to its policy of holding down government bond yields.

The Japanese currency fell 1.7 per cent against the dollar to ¥151.60, its weakest level since October last year, and close to the point at which the central bank last intervened by spending a record ¥6.35tn ($43bn) to push the yen back up.

Some investors had suspected the BoJ would take a more definitive step towards closing the gap between borrowing costs in the US and Japan by abandoning its yield curve control altogether, as the yen tests multi-decade lows and inflation has persisted above the central bank’s target for the past 18 months.

Instead, officials changed the 1 per cent limit on 10-year Japanese bond yields from a hard cap to a “reference point”. “The fact that the yen weakened by more than a percentage point is the market telling you that they still think the Bank of Japan is behind the curve,” said Ella Hoxha, head of fixed income at Newton Investment Management. “That’s fair because inflation is much higher than their 2 per cent target and they are the last central bank standing in terms of very loose policy.”

Analysts predict Japanese officials are poised to intervene and support the currency again if the currency continues to weaken to a 32-year low, estimating it might step in at levels between ¥152 and ¥155. “They are probably quite comfortable with where Japanese government bond yields are and relying on intervention to prevent the yen getting out of control,” said Chris Turner, head of global markets at ING.

The central bank maintained its policy rate at minus 0.1 per cent, the world’s only negative interest rate. But it significantly increased its inflation forecast, saying it expected 2.8 per cent core inflation in the 2024 fiscal year, instead of its previous forecast of 1.9 per cent. 

Analysts say the fall in the currency puts the BoJ in a bind, as it pushes up the cost of imported goods, when officials are focused on achieving domestically driven inflation for maintaining a 2 per cent target rate.

The yen has been the worst performing major currency this year, falling by over 13 per cent against the dollar, fuelled by the yawning gap between US and Japanese borrowing costs.  Intervention on its own would be unlikely durably to support the sliding yen — that would depend more on a switch in US monetary policy that pulls down the dollar or on a push higher in Japanese interest rates.

But that too brings potential risks. “They are trying to support the currency while not being seen as tightening,” said Eva Sun-Wai, fund manager at M&G Investments. “If they let yields run much higher when they have so much debt they run the risk of not being able to refinance at higher levels of interest.”  However, investors think it is inevitable that the BoJ will normalise policy as the economy remains buoyant and inflation remains persistently above target. Sun-Wai said that her worry is that the longer policymakers leave it to tighten, the tougher they will have to be. 

The normalisation of policy in Japan could have major ramifications for international bond markets, as Japanese investors own trillions of dollars of overseas debt following years of hunting for higher yields elsewhere.  

“Under Governor [Kazuo] Ueda’s leadership, the BoJ is moving to a more pragmatic approach,” said Iain Stealey, international CIO for fixed income at J.P. Morgan Asset Management. “We expect the BoJ to take a more active approach from here, potentially ending negative interest rates . . . as early as spring next year.”

Source : Financial Times

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The first meeting of Karnataka’s newly formed State Education Policy (SEP) commission set the foundation for an ambitious project that aims to overhaul the state’s education system.

Sukhdev Thorat, former UGC Chairman and current SEP Chairman, has promised a comprehensive and forward-thinking approach that will address short and long-term challenges in the education landscape of the state.

CREATION OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS MANDATE

The formation of a 15-member committee in charge of drafting the state education policy was directed by the government’s October 11 order, which calls for the inclusion of retired ICS officers, professors, and writers.

The team at this helm has been tasked with a thorough examination of the current status of both the school and higher education institutions in Karnataka, and to outline a comprehensive report by February 28, 2024.

NINE WORKING GROUPS TO REVIEW EDUCATION SECTORS

In an all-encompassing approach, the commission has instituted nine working groups to focus on distinct aspects of education.

These include the dissection of quality and accessibility, financing, governance, student enrolment, professional education, and issues surrounding online and distance education, alongside an evaluation of the role of value education in the curriculum.

Sukhdev Thorat emphasised the commission’s intent to include the perspectives of former vice-chancellors, education experts, retired professors, civil society groups, student forums, and other relevant stakeholders from across states in their fact-based report.

A POLICY DRAFTED ON FACTS AND DATA

“The report will be based on facts, not presumptions. The policy will fix short and long-term challenges for Karnataka’s education system. It will be comprehensive and futuristic, in line with the Radhakrishnan Commission and Kothari Commission reports.” Thorat said.

EXTENSION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND FUTURE PLANS

While under a directive to submit the policy within a stipulated timeframe, Thorat said that an extension may be requested if required. “As for implementation, it is up to the government to decide,” Thorat added.

The formation of the commission aligns with a proposal made in August, whereby the state government gave an in-principle nod for the formulation of SEP ready for the next academic year.

Source : India Today

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During a recent speech, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida outlined his primary policy priority in simple terms — ‘economy, economy, economy’. Notably absent was any mention of foreign workers and their role in sustaining Japan’s future economic development. This is surprising, given the well-documented need to further increase the foreign workforce, which has already reached record highs in 2023.

In 2022, the Japan International Cooperation Agency outlined that Japan would need over 6.7 million foreign workers by 2040 to maintain an economic output aligned with the government’s GDP growth targets. This represents a roughly four-fold increase from current levels. Kishida re-started the large-scale admission of foreign workers in Spring 2022, following a relaxation of pandemic-related border restrictions. Yet, he has been hesitant to outline a broader vision for the long-term admittance and potential integration of migrant workers.

The reluctance to implement a formal immigration policy has long precedence among Japanese policymakers. For example, when presenting the 2018 amendment to the Immigration Control Act, the late former prime minister Shinzo Abe stated that ‘Japan would not adopt a so-called immigration policy’. Instead, the amendments established the Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) system, which aims to boost foreign worker admittance within 12 economic sectors suffering from acute labour shortages.

Japan has long relied on immigration ‘side doors’ — pathways to admit primarily lower skilled foreign workers while legally denying their presence. These channels have historically included the generous admittance of people of Japanese descent, with the Abe years seeing a rapid increase in the numbers of working international students and participants in the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). But these ‘side doors’ have also been subject to criticism for placing foreign workers in vulnerable labour environments.

While the SSW system requires that workers pass an industry aptitude test and imposes some language requirements, the industries which the system serves and the institutions which govern it strongly overlap with the TITP. Unsurprisingly, the SSW system essentially functions as a way for employers to retain technical interns, with roughly 70 per cent of specified skilled workers coming from the TITP.

As it pertains to foreign workers, Kishida has so far opted to maintain the status quo set by Abe, preferring to adjust Japan’s primary admittance policies instead of implementing major reform. In June 2023, his cabinet passed an expansion of the SSW Residence Status Two, which allows for unlimited renewals and family reunification. While this provides an effective path to long-term settlement for lower skilled workers, the expansion has been essentially non-functional, with only 12 SSW Two status holders as of June 2023.

While the Kishida government expanded the acceptable industries that foreign students graduating from vocational schools can find employment in, one of the most significant changes may lie in the future of the TITP, which is being reviewed by a Ministry of Justice appointed panel. Currently, the TITP works under the pretext of facilitating ‘skills transfer’ to developing countries, though analysts argue that it more closely resembles a rotational migrant worker system.

The TITP has also been criticised on human rights grounds, with many ‘interns’ incurring debt to access the program and facing heavy restrictions in changing employers. The panel has suggested that the TITP be renamed and formalised as an entry point to the SSW system, abandoning the pretext of ‘skills transfer’ and making it easier for workers to change employers. This proposal is yet to be adopted into policy.

The Kishida administration has opted for incrementalism on immigration. While Kishida has mentioned the need to ‘consider a society featuring co-existence with foreigners’, he has generally avoided the topic in major policy speeches, as there is simply no political necessity for him to do otherwise. If current systems are sufficient for Japan to address its labour shortages, it is unnecessary to open the potential can of worms that a national conversation on immigration would represent. Still, the absence of a formal immigration policy means that foreign workers will continue to suffer from subpar policy outcomes.

Japan has a structural demand for foreign workers, but one major question going forward is whether there is sufficient supply. The countries from which foreign workers migrate, such as Vietnam, have experienced strong post-pandemic economic growth while the Japanese yen has weakened and wages have stagnated. As such, Japan’s attractiveness as a destination country for foreign workers has diminished.

Broader regional trends suggest that foreign labour migration to Japan will not continue to increase indefinitely and the potential effects of this will be felt by a future administration. One way to address a potential bottleneck in foreign labour supply is to boost Japan’s attractiveness by improving labour conditions, expanding pathways to permanent residence and family reunification and integrating foreigners into Japanese society — considerations that a formal immigration policy could address. But despite recent calls to pass a national ‘Immigration Act’, it is unlikely that the Kishida administration will do so. Until such a time, Kishida’s incrementalism looks set to continue.

Source : East Asia Forum

The post Why Won’t Kishida Adopt a Formal Immigration Policy? appeared first on Policy Print.

The State government has constituted a committee to frame the Karnataka State Education Policy, which will be a model for the entire country, said Madhu Bangarappa, Minister for School Education and Literacy.

In an interview with The Hindu in Shivamogga, the Minister said the policy would not favour any particular political party or be against any party. “Our motto is to focus on what is essential for providing quality education for our children. The committee has been told to interact with all stakeholders, including those who oppose the SEP,” he said.

Excerpts:

Why did the State go for SEP, in place of the new National Education Policy-2020, proposed by the Union government?

There are many reasons. For one, the Centre tried to infuse saffronisation through the policy. Such a policy and syllabus end up communalising children. They will be encouraged to hate somebody. How can we accept that?

Moreover, the BJP government introduced it without holding a discussion with anybody. They were in a hurry to implement it because of the pressure from the party high command. It showed they were more committed to the party high command than quality education for children.

On the other hand, we are not bringing any agenda of Congress in the name of policy. It will remain unbiased.

Besides that, the simple reason for SEP is that we want the schools to be under the State government’s control. Here, for example, we teach children about our great poet Kuvempu, our rulers Krishnadevaraya, Rani Chennamma, warrior Onake Obavva, social reformers Basavanna, Narayana Guru or the rivers like the Cauvery of our land. These are all part of our culture.

In the name of NEP, our children will be forced to study something not connected to our culture. Hence, we want a policy that talks about our culture and nativity.

Do you anticipate the Union government’s non-cooperation to implement the SEP by stopping funds for Centrally sponsored schemes?

I don’t think they will be so cruel… Anyhow, we are providing food for children in Classes 9 and 10. They (the Centre) are providing for children only up to Class 8. We are providing uniform, eggs, and books. We will manage. Already, they are not giving us our due share of taxes. Let them clear our dues first.

The committee headed by Dr. Sukhdev Thorat has only six months time. When you are planning to implement SEP?

Chief Minister Siddaramaiah has said it will be implemented by next academic year.

I feel the time we have is short. The committee has six months. It has begun the work just two days ago. By April 2024, they may submit the report. Later, we may have to go for textbook revision. It may require more time. Then, we will convey this to the CM.

However, the transition from the NEP to the SEP will be smooth. NEP was implemented only in higher education. The changes will be made so that the students do not feel disturbed.

Will the SEP be applied to ICSE, CBSE, and Central Syllabus schools as well?

The SEP committee will deliberate on this issue. At the end of the day, the idea is to give good education. There are a lot of similarities in the syllabus. SEP aims to do away with any agenda that infuses hatred among children through their textbooks…. We will not saffronise or Congressise our SEP.

Are there any specific instructions to the SEP committee on teaching of Kannada and the medium of instruction?

Kannada will have primacy. Students will have the option to learn other languages. English will be taught too.

With regard to the medium of instruction, the students will have a choice of both Kannada and English medium. Many parents are opting for English medium in our Karnataka Public Schools (KPS). Even those who initially chose Kannada as their medium of instruction are gradually transitioning to English. We respect their choice.

Recently, NCERT panel recommended replacing India with Bharath in textbooks. How do you see it?

All these years, we accepted both Bharath and India. When we introduce ourselves in English, we call ourselves Indian, and in Kannada, we identify ourselves as Bharathiya. But the Centre is trying to divide between Bharath and India.

Moreover, they are bringing up the issue of India and Bharat at the very end of their term. It shows they have no other issue to go before the public. They want to whip up emotions for political gains. Our policy will be clear on this. We will retain both names.

Source : The Hindu

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The rise of security-driven economic policy in industrial countries gives licence to atavistic inward-looking policy thinking, infecting the framing of development strategies at a critical time in countries on the cusp of major developmental breakthroughs like India and Indonesia.

Geopolitics is changing the global economic policy landscape. Today’s backdrop of strategic competition and conflict has seen the return of industrial policy in advanced countries, driven by a security-based logic mixed with a second-best approach to the energy transition without a price on carbon. There has been an explosion of trade interventions, industrial policies and subsidies, exacerbating the threat to the world economy posed by the widespread derogation from the global trade rules.

How should developing economies like India and Indonesia navigate this policy environment, where self-sufficiency and import-substituting strategies are finding potent new favour?

East Asian economies have effected the only significant transformation from economic backwardness to advanced economy status in modern times. It’s thus wise to understand the lessons from the East Asian growth miracle, which still hold true today. And developing economies, constrained by their fiscal capacity, should recall the waste and futility of past industrial policies that picked industry champions rather than creating public goods to lay the base for broad-based industrial growth.

Successful East Asian development, based on the historical experience of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Southeast Asia and China, was founded on trade-oriented growth (anchored in the disciplines of participation in international markets) and deeper integration into the international economy, not retreat from it or reliance on import-substitution. The rapid trade growth enjoyed by these economies was supply-driven, built on the expansion of market share in old, established industries, not expansion of trade in new, high-growth sectors of the global economy. Government investments were directed towards social and economic infrastructure in public goods such as roads and schools, with withdrawal from state involvement in enterprise.

Today, policymakers seem to live in a different age. Domestic events and geopolitical circumstances are visiting the prospect of stagnating growth upon established industrial economies, globalisation appears to have peaked, the international economy is becoming fragmented, and a policy pathology that favours self-sufficiency and import-substituting industrial policy is sweeping around the world.

The trope that a less optimistic outlook for global market growth now recommends that emerging economies turn to inward-looking import-substitution does not square with the experience of successful industrial growth in Asia.

In an international economic context, development is about drawing abundant labour into more and more productive employment, lifting productivity and national incomes.

Pro-development strategies are thus those that favour export-specialisation in labour-intensive products, drawing large amounts of labour into internationally competitive production and higher productivity employment. With the accumulation of capital, dynamic comparative advantage drives a more technology intensive export trade structure over time. The beneficent corollary of export-oriented development strategies has been a distribution of income that commonly favours labour.

The recent trend towards self-reliance and security has seen countries emphasise the production of high-tech capital-intensive goods from the start. Focusing on these sectors requires skilled labour, in short supply relative to abundant unskilled labour, and expensive government outlays, which come at the cost of providing essential government infrastructure. Failing to create jobs risks an entrenchment of inequality and an unsustainable stretching of public resources if a country grows old before it gets rich.

Successful trade-oriented growth comes from absorbing labour into industries that can capitalise on its abundance and establish international competitiveness. Doing this allows countries to take over others’ market shares as comparative advantages evolve, a process underwritten by a policy regime based on the principles of non-discrimination and open markets.

Even in a period of slow growth, the logic of comparative advantage still holds. Import-substituting policies undermine this transition by restricting access to low-cost and high-quality capital and technological inputs, preventing firms from achieving international competitiveness.

The East Asian economic miracle was certainly a messier and more complex story than has sometimes been portrayed in the narrative that describes its main features. In Japan, Northeast Asia, Singapore, China and Southeast Asia, the policy strategies that drove success were fashioned in different institutional and political settings and each had their own distinctive national character. Policy idiosyncrasies, technological context, geographic size and location have all shaped particular national paths and patterns of development across the region.

But some factors were ubiquitous throughout the East Asian experience. Opening up to competition from foreign markets and embracing international investment were central to rapid growth by enabling access to inputs that facilitated the absorption of abundant domestic labour into productive manufacturing employment. In addition to domestic reforms to support openness, increased mobilisation of state investment in education, health, transportation, communications networks and supportive industrial infrastructure, and reduced state shares in economic enterprise and the allocation of capital, typified successful industrial policy across the region.

China was no exception to these principles or to this experience. It has been a central element of it, at scale.

India and Indonesia, two of Asia’s most promising candidates for transformative industrialisation over the coming few decades, stand at a critical juncture in their development trajectories. Their youthful populations and recent strong economic performance put them in a demographic sweet spot.

Yet both countries are in danger of being caught in the undertow of industrial policy 2.0. The attunement of their development strategies to the principles derived from the East Asian experience would position them better both to fulfil their economic potential and avoid the danger that both now face of jobless growth.

Source : East Asia Forum

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Estonia will allow Taiwan to open a nondiplomatic representative office of Taipei in the Baltic country to boost economic and cultural ties with the self-governing island but pledged to stick with the “One China” policy in political relations.

The government of Estonia, a member of the European Union and NATO, revised its approach to Taiwan at a Cabinet meeting on Nov. 2 while discussing the country’s China policy, Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna told local media outlets on Friday.

China claims Taiwan, an island about 160 kilometers (100 miles) off its east coast, as its territory. Beijing considers Taiwan as a rebel province to be brought under its control by force if necessary.

“Just like many other countries of the European Union, Estonia is also ready to accept the establishment of a nondiplomatic economic or cultural representation of Taipei in order to promote the respective relations,” Tsahkna said in remarks first published by Estonia’s foreign ministry after Thursday’s Cabinet meeting. He didn’t provide any details about when such an office would be established in Estonia.

Under the “One China” principle, Beijing holds a position that there is only one sovereign state under the name of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

Nevertheless, some countries, like the United States, maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan or allow its economic or cultural representative office — under Taipei’s name — on their territory.

“Estonia does not recognize Taiwan as a country. As part of the One China policy, we will not develop political relations with Taiwan,” Tsahkna said. “At the same time, we consider it important to revive relations with Taiwan in economy, education, culture, communication between civil society organizations and other such fields,” he said.

He said that Estonia, which has a population of 1.3 million people, wants to align its current China policy with that of the 27-member EU, which similarly to the Baltic nation sees Beijing as “a partner, a competitor, and a rival.”

“All these aspects must be taken into account in (Estonia’s) China policy,” he said.

Tsahkna’s comments came just days before Joseph Wu, Taiwan’s foreign minister, is set to visit Estonia. Wu will deliver a speech on Taiwan’s foreign policy and attend a discussion panel by a local think tank in the capital, Tallinn, on Nov. 8.

Wu isn’t arriving to Tallinn at the invitation of the Estonia’s government and won’t officially meet with Cabinet members during his visit, Tsahkna stressed but added that “we see nothing wrong with Mr. Wu visiting Estonia.”

In 2021, Estonia’s Baltic neighbor Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open an unofficial diplomatic representative office — a de facto embassy — in its capital, Vilnius, despite Beijing’s strong opposition. The move triggered Beijing to launch an unprecedented economic coercion campaign against EU and NATO member Lithuania.

Source : AP News

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