EU member states’ policies toward China have been hardening, but different national interests prevent a joint, coherent approach to Beijing. It may take a conflict over Taiwan to unify Europe
Europe is not united on China because the country’s rapidly rising power—technological, economic, and military—slowly eclipses Europe’s. This paralyzes the continent’s will to face the reality of its global decline.
To boot, many in Europe don’t feel threatened by China. The acquis that define the West—democracy, liberalism, and open markets—are the common values Europe benefits from but is reluctant to defend or pay for. Just look at Ukraine next door, which is militarily supported by the far-away United States to a greater extent than by EU’s taxpayers.
Many Europeans support internalizing the benefits of trade with China. They do not worry that this would strengthen its military and economic might. That’s because the continent’s security has long been outsourced to the United States. This keeps blunting the average Europeans’ perception that defending Taiwan, South Korea, or Australia is their direct concern. Emmanuel Macron’s recent statement that “the trap for Europe would be … to get caught up in crises that aren’t ours” is a crisp summary of this line of reasoning.
Some in the United States spoke almost exactly the same language in the 1930s, about a possible “crisis that wasn’t America’s” when Hitler threatened Europe. Every European should reflect upon the continent’s fate and place in the world when its citizens fail to rise up to evil.
Lizza Bomassideputy Director of Carnegie Europe
Europe, or at least the EU, has a common approach to China—one of treating China as either a competitor, partner, or rival depending on the circumstances. And while China is often bemoaned for dividing and conquering the union, the EU’s trifold tactic gives Europe a level of ambiguity that can be a strength when it comes to engagement with Beijing.
For one, it gives the EU the advantage of being nuanced toward more contentious policy issues, which will always be difficult to get collective agreement on. This may be interpreted as Europe being uncoordinated, even hubristic, but the silver lining of this collective ambiguity is it keeps all the options open—or at least doesn’t remove them from the table completely, something increasingly important given the transactionalist way in which the world works.
Of course, at some point, there needs to be a firm commitment from all twenty-seven member states and the EU has shown it can do that, at least on paper. This is what happened in 2020 when Germany managed to push through the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI) between the EU and China.
And even if the CAI was always going to have a difficult last mile, you cannot underplay the symbolism that if the twenty-seven want to get it done, there can be a political will to make that happen.
Reinhard Bütikoferforeign Affairs Coordinator of the Greens/European Free Alliance Group in the European Parliament
In one of his poems, Mao Zedong wrote: “Nothing is Hard in this World if you Dare to Scale the Heights.” Why then, exhorted by the Great Helmsman, would Europe not be able to forge a common China policy?
So far, Europeans have made quite some efforts, and not without success, as regards, for instance, the development of trade defense instruments like the Anti-Coercion Instrument, industrial policy tools like the Critical Raw Materials Act, or connectivity initiatives under the Global Gateway umbrella. However, we still fall short, riven by obvious differences as last highlighted on the occasion of French President Emmanuel Macron’s controversial remarks about China, Taiwan, and vassaldom.
Speaking with one voice will never be easy for an institution which prides itself on unity in diversity. Yet, before we allow ourselves to revel in gloom and doom, we can build hope on the basis of this obvious fact: getting China right together will determine Europe’s role and success in the twenty-first century.
We can forge a common China policy because we must—without it our European project would fail. Angry divergences like the one which the French President just brought to the fore are also a blessing in disguise as they force us to deal with what we haven’t resolved up until now. Let’s soldier on.
Shada Islammanaging Director of the New Horizons Project
Perhaps one day—but not in our lifetime. The search for that elusive “single” EU voice on China prompts breathless commentary, but don’t expect any quick miracles. The reason is simple: the EU is not a state; it is a collection of sovereign states which despite the institutional hype have not ceded control of their foreign and security policies to the EU, especially not when it comes to dealing with an economic giant like China.
The EU’s “China policy” is therefore an interesting and often contradictory mix of different national interests and priorities. Some Atlanticists follow the U.S. hawks on China, while others, including France, have been trying to craft a so-called “third way” for years—so far unsuccessfully. That means France’s Emmanuel Macron does not speak for “Europe.” Neither do European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen or EU High Representative Josep Borrell. They provide useful inputs and food for thought for EU debates on China. But they don’t control national initiatives and sometimes aren’t even informed of them.
This may be disappointing for those who panic about how China is “dividing Europe,” but these differences of opinion illustrate the strength of our democracy. All foreign governments, including China and the United States, are aware of—and work with—the EU’s complexities. They have embassies in all twenty-seven EU states and build so-called special relationships with specific countries. They also know that the highs and lows in their bilateral ties with individual EU states often impact on their relations with the EU. As we all know, the EU is complicated.
Sarah Kirchbergerhead of Asia-pacific Strategy and Security at Kiel University’s Institute for Security Policy
The EU as an organization is finally coming round to forging a more realistic China policy grounded in the aim to preserve European core interests that are being challenged by disruptive Chinese behavior.
But so far, some individual member states have had surprising difficulty in forging even a unified national China policy for their own country—Germany, where the long-awaited China strategy was recently stalled by Chancellor Scholz, being the prime example. I am therefore not too optimistic that Europe will be able to bridge the perception gaps between member states such as Spain, Germany, or France that overall pursue closer engagement, and China-skeptical member states such as Lithuania or Czechia, where the president-elect recently went so far to hold a phone call with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen.
As the Russian aggression against Ukraine shows, it has unfortunately taken a full-fledged war for some semblance of unity to appear in Europe’s Russia policy. Therefore, it may unfortunately be that unless conflict or crisis occurs, Europe will continue to remain disunited in the face of challenges posed by China, with the larger member states blocking initiatives from the smaller and more China-critical members, for fear that repercussions could hurt their exports and investments.
Alica Kizekovahead of the Asia-pacific Unit at the Institute of International Relations Prague
In the short-to-medium term, the EU is not going to be able to forge a common policy unless there is a change in the EU’s representation. There is not a single voice delivering messages to China because the main interlocutors have been the German chancellor, the French president, followed by the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission. China prefers dealing with states bilaterally unless the EU delivers a single spokesperson.
Reinforcing the 27+1 format as the main diplomatic forum would help to bring countries closer on topics of strategic importance. On the European level, the EU representation shares a similar approach to China with the UK, by engaging China while paying more attention to de-risking and protecting the EU’s strategic interests. The focus will be on the EU’s economic security strategy and pressuring China to take more a constructive stance on Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. The Central and Eastern European countries will drive more proactive engagement with Taiwan and with time, this trend might also influence the agenda in Brussels. All these activities should be coordinated at the European level.
Philippe Le Corresenior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute
One should never forget where the EU is coming from. Until 2019, Europeans were still treating China as a “normal country”; there was no word about “de-risking” and all governments officials without exception played the China market card which—in many cases—never materialized. Trade deficits have increased dramatically. Hardly a single EU member enjoys an export surplus with the PRC. Both the 2019 EU-China outlook and the Paris summit when French President Macron, former German chancellor Angela Merkel and former EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker met with Xi showed a new approach—and a turnaround.
Ursula von der Leyen’s March 30 speech is the continuation of this fairly recent defensive policy. “Our relationship is unbalanced and increasingly affected by distortions created by China’s state capitalist system,” she said. It is true that Macron misspoke on the Taiwan issue, but it is incorrect to describe the EU position on China as either naïve or disunited. What matters is the von der Leyen speech and the work EU officials have been doing for the past four years to assess the “new China” and address multiple issues, from unfair competition in its own market, to economic coercion and the mistreatment of minorities in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong—to name a few. With perhaps one or two exceptions within the EU, all twenty-seven states have agreed with this policy, which has been drafted in cooperation with national governments, including France.
Pol Morillasdirector of the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)
The recent visits of French President Emmanuel Macron, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to China have all shown that EU member states, albeit conscious of the growing impact of China in international (in)security, still perceive the second world power as an opportunity.
Threats that emanate from Beijing’s growing nationalism, assertiveness toward its neighbourhood, a cosy relation with Putin, and the confrontational stance with the United States are major aspects to be addressed, but not at the expense of reinforced bilateral relations.
Intense diplomatic activity has thus added substance to the EU’s multifaceted approach to China based on partnership, competition, and rivalry. That is likely to remain the EU’s policy for the time being, unless events force national capitals and Brussels to change course, as the war in Ukraine did for EU-Russia relations.
“Events, dear boy, events,” particularly in Taiwan, will be the basis of any major shift in the current EU’s partner-competitor-rival trilogy.
But foreign policy is about communication as much as substance. And in this regard, the French president may have fallen prey to the lavish treatment received by Xi Jinping during his official visit to China. Macron overshadowed Ursula von der Leyen, in what should have been a visit to demonstrate European unity. If the substance of EU foreign policy toward China cannot really change at this point, at least the format needs to be better orchestrated.
Tim Rühligsenior Research Fellow at the Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
At the EU level, Europe stays remarkably united. This is despite the fact that hardly any decision taken in Brussels is not controversial.
To this day, Europe remains united on issues from Xinjiang sanctions to the freezing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI). But member states are divided on two accounts. First, they pursue their particular economic interests: France wants to cooperate on nuclear, Germany wants to sell cars, Italy luxury consumer goods. China does not even need to employ divide-and-rule tactics to get its way.
Second, the United States is part of the picture. Tell me where a country stands on the United States and I know what it will say about China. CEE countries yearn for U.S. security guarantees because of Russia. In Spain, U.S. skepticism still seems to date back to the days of (limited) U.S. support for dictator Francisco Franco. The “Grand Nation”—meaning France—does not look for U.S. leadership. Germany is grateful to the democracy the United States brought to us but is also still stuck in a mindset that it needs to get along with its Eastern neighbor Russia.
What do we learn from this? Europe has to come to terms with itself! How much do we want to become an independent force in global affairs? Depending on our answer, we’ll be able—or not—to forge a common approach toward China.
Andrew Smallsenior Transatlantic Fellow With the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
The advanced industrial democracies have all been rebalancing their approaches to China, and while the pace varies, the direction of flow is clear, the policy adjustments are similar, and the levels of coordination have vastly increased. Any analysis that misses these deeper changes, and only focuses on the points of contention in Europe, fails to capture what is really going on.
The EU continues to forge common policies on China in areas that were once unthinkable. Whether it is the anti-coercion instrument, cutting back Chinese companies’ role in Europe’s digital infrastructure, or addressing critical raw materials dependencies, there is now a remarkable degree of common ground among European states with very different political and economic philosophies. France, it should be noted, has been well out ahead in areas ranging from de-risking to military operations in the Indo-Pacific.
Given the high stakes, it is understandable that there are sharp debates over Europe’s role in deterring an invasion of Taiwan, the right level of risk in the economic relationship with China, and what warnings and incentives are required to discourage Beijing from providing Russia with lethal aid. But the fundamental reorientation in Europe’s approach toward China will continue, and remains the more important story.
Tommy Steinerpolicy Director at the Sino-israel Global Network and Academic Leadership (Signal)
Yes, but at what price? Although analogies might mislead, Europe’s track record on reaching a (more or less) common position on Russia could be indicative: it would require a calamity. It took a full-fledged and brutal invasion of Ukraine to get all European leaders to understand that reasoning with Putin is simply not in the cards and present a common front.
Against this backdrop, one cannot but feel a sense of déjà vu as President Macron engages in a futile attempt to urge President Xi to “reason” with Putin and help end the war in Ukraine. After all, it was President Macron himself who maintained just a few years ago that Europe should seek rapprochement with Russia to prevent it from aligning with China. That worked so well.
This time around, Macron went the extra mile. Presumably to oil the Chinese wheels, Macron professed to distance Europe from the United States, which amounts to music to Chinese ears, only to yield nothing in return—if snubbing the Commission president doesn’t count. Macron, and Europe for that matter, appear to be vivid examples of what Karl Marx meant when he said, “History repeats itself, first as a tragedy, second as a farce”.
Justyna Szczudlikdeputy Head of Research and China Analyst at the Polish Institute of International a (PISM)
I do believe it can. We are witnessing an ongoing process of forging the EU’s China policy. However, it is not a smooth process. We should not be naïve to expect not a bumpy road to reach this goal, having 27 countries on board, and dealing with a more aggressive China that is aligned with Russia.
Macron’s visit to China did not serve as a show of the EU’s unity. There is no doubt about it. Nevertheless—let me play the role of the devil’s advocate—his unwise remarks on Taiwan and only one sentence in a joint statement about Ukraine pushed other member states to express their different stances about his comments and indeed underscored unity. They echoed Ursula von der Leyen’s points from her recent China speech. It clarified that a crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely detrimental to Europe, that the EU is against a unilateral change, especially by force, of the status quo, and warned China not to deliver arms to Russia. This is a positive contrary view of Macron’s red carpet visit.
Since the first idea to set up an investment screening in 2017, through the Strategic Outlook in 2019, and to this day, the EU has gone, at a very fast pace, from naivety and unconditional openness to a hardened stance and perceiving Beijing mostly as a systemic rival. Today, the union is equipped with a bunch of defensive and offensive measures and is working on others. It is a great achievement that we should not underestimate.
Paul Taylorsenior Fellow at Friends of Europe
Like Wagner’s music, the EU’s China policy is not as bad as it sounds.
The building blocks of a policy to reduce dependency risks and curb the leakage of strategic technology without decoupling economic ties are being put in place. The EU has adopted or is working on tools for inward investment screening, protecting critical infrastructure, diversifying supply chains, and stimulating indigenous production for critical minerals, microchips and batteries, and soon outward investment screening. It is legislating to hold EU companies to account if they use the product of forced labour.
Incremental progress toward a coherent China strategy may be hard to discern amid the cacophony of contradictory statements over Taiwan or the degree of Chinese support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. But EU countries are pursuing a common strategy—trying to deter Beijing from helping Russia militarily, warning Chinese leaders privately of the economic consequences of any attack on Taiwan, pushing back on Chinese claims in the South China Sea, building NATO’s ties with Asian democracies. It’s easy to blow loose talk by Emmanuel Macron into an EU crisis over China. No one in Europe wants to be dragged into a crisis over Taiwan. But the EU must discreetly prepare for what action it would take in the worst case, as it did when Russia invaded Ukraine.
Pierre Vimontsenior Fellow at Carnegie Europe
Factually Europe has a common policy on China. Adopted in 2019 around the triple ambition of partnership, competition, and systemic rivalry, this unprecedented act of political fortitude delivered limited results. As all too often, EU diplomacy soon showed its limitations for lack of any clear implementation map and for an underlying resistance from the union’s members to accept even a loose coordination of their own China agenda.
Today, despite Ursula von der Leyen’s efforts to shore up these weaknesses, it is becoming obvious that Europe’s current course of action does not hold out when facing an ever more heated competition between the United States and China. Moreover, the intensity of the conflict in Ukraine is imposing a clear-cut positioning for Europe between the Western allies, the coalition led by Russia and China, and the remaining non-aligned southern countries.
Indeed, China has become one part—even if the most formidable one—of a much more complex challenge for Europe as it struggles to find its place inside the ongoing transformation of the world order. For Europe, a revised China policy is but one brick in the wall while it attempts to reinvent its own multilateral vision and address the diversity of its foreign partners.
Source: Carnegie Europe
