Indonesia’s Presidential Election (PE) 2024 is just around the corner. On Valentine’s Day, the first round of voting will take place. A second round – which will happen if no candidate pair wins at least 50 per cent of the national vote plus one and at least 20 per cent in half of Indonesia’s 38 provinces – will be on 26 June.

From a national development perspective, the three pairs: Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar (Team AMIN), Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka, and Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD, each have their ways to shape the future of Indonesia. What would the policy possibilities post-PE2024 look like? What are the potential impacts on Indonesia’s development trajectory?

As policy (content) cannot be separated from politics (process) and polity (culture), it is important to start answering the question by examining what the presidential nominees’ campaigns reveal about the state of the Indonesian political elite.

In terms of coalition building, there have been shifting alliances and power dynamics among the elite. The coalition that supported President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in his 2014 and 2019 campaigns has now split. Most have gone to Prabowo-Gibran, who have a more populist agenda, some to Ganjar-Mahfud, seen as representing the nationalists, and the remainder to Team AMIN, who claim to be reformist. Thus, their campaign narratives: Team AMIN offer “change”, Prabowo-Gibran “continuity”, and Ganjar-Mahfud “improvement”. These keywords also capture their main policy approaches for key issues in development.

Despite their promise to bring about significant change, Team AMIN surprisingly set quite a conservative target of annual economic growth between 5.5 to 6.5 per cent until 2029. They aim to reach it through shared prosperity, wealth distribution, and social justice. Prabowo-Gibran’s target is 6-7 per cent with a vague, jargonistic strategy: “Jokowinomics”, interpreted as a version of a “Pancasila economy”. This is basically a system with a controlled market economy as a counterbalance against neoclassical economic tenets like individualism and free markets. Ganjar-Mahfud has set an ambitious 7 per cent growth target with a “we have all” (semua ada di kita) strategy.

From the three teams’ vision and mission documents and campaigns, there are a few similarities in their policy platforms. On promoting growth, all candidates aim to accelerate it to improve living standards and reduce poverty. On enhancing industrial development, all candidates recognise the importance of strengthening the country’s industrial base to reduce reliance on imports and strengthen export competitiveness. Last, they all agree to improve physical infrastructure to support economic activity and facilitate trade and investment.

However, the teams differ in the following ways. First, on the role of government, Team AMIN advocate limited government and greater reliance on private sector initiatives. This is likely due to the influence of their campaign advisor, former finance minister Tom Lembong, who also headed Indonesia’s national investment agency. This is in contrast to Prabowo-Gibran, who favour a more active state role in directing economic policy despite big businesses’ support. Ganjar-Mahfud takes the middle ground: in their platform, the government is the regulator and facilitator in guiding development, not an active player.

Second, on trade and liberalisation, Prabowo-Gibran’s focus on protectionism contrasts with Team AMIN’s emphasis on liberalisation and market-based solutions. Again, taking the middle stance, Ganjar-Mahfud seeks to balance the protection of domestic industries with fostering foreign direct investment-based innovation.

On social equity and environmental sustainability, Team AMIN and Ganjar-Mahfud emphasise tackling social inequality and environmental concerns, while Prabowo-Gibran’s primary focus is on growth and national self-sufficiency.

Many investors are waiting to see if Jokowi’s signature policies – including downstreaming, the proposed shift of Indonesia’s capital to Nusantara (IKN), East Kalimantan, and infrastructural development – will continue.

The answer is clearly yes. The signature policies can be grouped into three broad types, the first of which is infrastructure, particularly for connectivity, like ports, roads, and industrial complexes. All the candidates recognise that infrastructural development is crucial and have pledged to continue upholding this policy.

Second, Jokowi has emphasised social protection, particularly social assistance. All candidates understand that this is a populist vote-winner that they must continue, even if they differ on how it is delivered. Third, all candidates will continue downstreaming (hilirisasi) as they know how important it is for Indonesia to move up the value chain. This is not limited to the mining/extractive sectors but extends to agriculture, fisheries, and even digital downstreaming. Team AMIN and Ganjar-Mahfud have declared that they will not stop at this but work towards “re-industrialisation”.

On the planned relocation of the new capital city, Prabowo-Gibran and Ganjar-Mahfud will continue this part of Jokowi’s legacy. The former pair strongly support IKN. Echoing Jokowi’s rhetoric and notwithstanding criticism from academia and civil society, Prabowo-Gibran emphasise the need to develop areas outside Java and has pledged to uphold sustainability and environmental responsibility in the IKN’s execution.

Ganjar-Mahfud has stated that they will study the project further, expressing concern about its potential impact on the local environment and livelihoods of affected communities. In their campaign, they have offered “corrective measures” for what might have been neglected in the developmental process so far, like considering the impact on indigenous groups and the mitigation of environmental problems.

Whoever wins, what is clear is that Indonesia must be prepared to fulfil different, creative development policy priorities to meet its challenges.

Team AMIN are the most critical; they omitted discussion of the IKN in their vision and mission document. They question its feasibility and high cost, arguing that the government should focus on addressing other issues such as poverty and inequality. In the less likely scenario (given Prabowo-Gibran’s high poll ratings) that they will win PE2024, Team AMIN is unlikely to stop the project outright, even though there is growing resistance to the shift to Nusantara from the public and civil servants. At most, the relocation can be delayed, as the IKN’s status is already enshrined in a national law.

The new president and his administration will determine Indonesia’s development trajectory for the next five or ten years. Whether and to what extent the next administration can realise the vision for Indonesia’s “Golden 2045” (Indonesia Emas) centennial remains open to scrutiny.

Whoever wins, what is clear is that Indonesia must be prepared to fulfil different, creative development policy priorities to meet its challenges. All things considered, the PE2024 candidates’ proposed policies are not far-reaching enough to address the multifaceted challenges awaiting Indonesia, especially as it has aspirations to reach advanced development. Excellent technocratic capacity and strong political support must sustain and surpass what President Jokowi has achieved.

Source: Fulcrum

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Chinese President Xi Jinping has called for the hardline approach to dealing with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang to continue, despite international criticisms.

Delivering a major speech on Saturday in Urumqi, the region’s capital city, Xi stressed that “social stability” remained the top priority there, as he highlighted the need for counterterrorism measures and further “Sinocizing” of Islam, the predominant religion for the Uyghurs who make up the majority of the indigenous population in the area.

China’s Xinjiang policies have come under international scrutiny in recent years, culminating in a U.N. human rights report that found Beijing to have potentially committed crimes against humanity. The U.S., which along with Europe has sanctioned some Xinjiang officials, has labeled the situation a genocide.

Xi, though, said he “recognizes” the Xinjiang policy in his Saturday speech.

“[We] have to combine the anti-terrorism and anti-secessionist struggle with the legalized and regularized efforts for stability maintenance,” Xi said during a surprise stopover on his way back from the BRICS summit in South Africa. “The Sinofication of Islam should be deepened in order to effectively handle all sorts of illegal religious activities.”

China will continue to teach Uyghurs the standard Chinese language, and to reallocate them for work outside the region, Xi said.

Activists have long said these policies are designed to dilute the ethnic identity, while Beijing says economic development is key to social stability.

“Xi stressed the need for more positive propaganda to show an open, confident Xinjiang,” according to state media CCTV. “Targeted efforts should be made to rebut any inaccurate and negative press.”

Source: Politico

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In recent months, anti-trade activists and a handful of members of Congress have ratcheted up their use of a familiar tactic: When you can’t win an argument, a good old ad hominem attack will at least feel good.

Their charge is that the business community dominates the official trade advisory committee system. Some questions arise: What are these committees, what is their objective, and are these charges true?

The advisory committee system “was created to ensure that U.S. trade policy and trade negotiating objectives adequately reflect U.S. public and private sector interests,” according to USTR. Congress created them in the Trade Act of 1974, which mandates that the president “shall seek … and take into account” advice from the private sector on trade negotiating objectives, the operation of trade agreements, and other international economic policy issues.

The system consists of 26 advisory committees, including the President’s Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN); committees focusing on agriculture, labor, the environment, and Africa; and 15 sectoral or functional Industry Trade Advisory Committees. The Commerce and Agriculture Departments co-manage some of these with USTR.

The committees play an important role in keeping U.S. trade policy tethered to the expertise of individuals and enterprises directly engaged in trade. As USTR negotiates complex rules with real-world impact, sector-specific knowledge from industry specialists is essential.

For example, consider the arcane trade rules used to determine origin for a brassiere. It turns out that all U.S. free-trade agreements negotiated over the past 30 years (except the U.S.-Korea FTA) “include a special [rule of origin] for brassieres, a garment of complicated construction where the application of a yarn- or fabric-forward tariff shift rule to an essential character component is difficult if not impossible,” according to the U.S. International Trade Commission.

This is a good example of the specialized knowledge useful to the work of the trade advisory committees. If trade rules for a piece of clothing can be this complex, imagine the case for high-tech products made using global supply chains, trade secrets and forced technology transfer, and “behind the border” barriers to trade that discriminate against U.S. companies and workers.

U.S. trade negotiators with USTR or the Commerce Department should be able to call on the expertise of people who actually know how to make stuff and have experience in international trade. It makes sense for these people to serve on these committees.

Do these business voices dominate the trade advisory committees, as charged? Hardly. Consider the ACTPN, the most senior committee. Its charter states that the committee “will be broadly representative of the key sectors and groups of the economy affected by trade.” This calls for strong business representation on the committee.

However, a glance at the ACTPN’s 14 members reveals that a small minority are drawn from business and agriculture, and most of its members are representatives of academia, organized labor, and NGOs. The charge that “big business” is calling the shots could hardly be more off base.

The Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACs) advise both USTR and the Commerce Department on sector-specific trade issues. They are required to incorporate “balanced industry representation” with respect to size and perspective. The ITACs open application process helps achieve this goal and draws in needed expertise. A glance at the membership of the 15 ITACs shows small and large companies, with different sectoral niches, participating together.

Good trade policy also requires effective interagency coordination and, perhaps most of all, congressional leadership. The Constitution gives Congress the authority to regulate foreign commerce and to levy tariffs, though a partnership with the executive branch—which has the authority to negotiate with foreign governments—is imperative. Executive-legislative engagement on trade mustn’t be limited to ad hoc engagement with select groups of members of Congress from a single party.

In sum, ensuring that individuals with expertise in making goods, producing food, and providing services—and trading them internationally—is essential to good trade policy. It makes a world of sense for the U.S. business and agriculture community to have a strong voice on the U.S. trade advisory committees. It’s that simple.

Source: U.S. Chamber of Commerce

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Lambert will likely be named as the deputy assistant secretary for China and Taiwan, the sources said, filling the post left in June by Rick Waters.

Waters had also served as the head of the Office of China Coordination – informally known as ‘China House’ – a unit the department created late last year to meld China policies across regions and issues. Whether Lambert will assume the China House coordinator title is still being discussed, sources said.

Lambert’s appointment is unlikely to change the tone of Washington’s China policy, which President Joe Biden’s administration says is one of “intense competition” while trying to increase engagement with Beijing to stabilize ties.

But Lambert, a well-regarded diplomat with experience in East Asia, is certain to influence China House, which has been criticized for adding layers of bureaucracy to an already complex decision-making process.

It was unclear when the State Department will formally announce the appointment.

“We have no personnel announcements to make at this time, but the Office of China Coordination remains an integral piece of the U.S. governments efforts to responsibly manage our competition with the People’s Republic of China and advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system,” a State Department spokesperson said in an emailed response to a request for comment.

The State Department pushed back on criticism about China House, saying it was one if its highest-functioning teams.

“It has improved coordination and facilitated senior leaders’ diplomacy and policymaking, with results including enabling the Department’s response to the PRC surveillance balloon and rapid briefing of allies and partners around the world to expose the PRC’s global program,” a State Department official said.

Senate Confirmation

The U.S. and China are at odds over issues from Taiwan to trade, fentanyl and human rights, but Washington has sought to keep communication channels open ahead of a possible meeting later this year between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

An Asia expert who did two stints at the U.S. embassy in Beijing, Lambert most recently served as a deputy assistant secretary focused on Japanese, Korean and Mongolian affairs, and on relations with Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands.

In the new role, he will continue to report to Assistant Secretary Daniel Kritenbrink who leads the department’s East Asian and Pacific Affairs bureau.

Reuters reported in May that the State Department delayed sensitive actions toward China to try to limit damage to bilateral relations after an alleged Chinese spy balloon crossed U.S. airspace in February.

Senior officials have acknowledged morale and staffing problems at China House, but denied they were linked to how the State department carries out China policy.

Republicans in Congress have questioned whether the Biden administration’s effort to engage with senior Chinese officials has led to watered-down measures toward Beijing, an idea the department rejects.

Republican concerns about China House have led to questions about whether the Senate, which has the power to confirm senior appointments, might insist on reviewing any nominee to run the unit.

If so, two of the sources said that rather than nominate Lambert to be China House coordinator the State Department might simply appoint an already confirmed official, such as Kritenbrink.

But two people familiar with Senate thinking told Reuters that for now, senators have no plans to force a confirmation process.

“(China House) is still a new experiment and we must wait to see how effective it is before we take steps to make it more permanent,” said one of the people.

Source: Reuters

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Indonesia might seem like a natural fit to join an expanded BRICS, the group of emerging economies made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

The Southeast Asian nation of more than 270 million people is a major emerging economy that by some estimates could rank among the world’s top five economies by the middle of the century.

But when South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa announced the expanded BRICS membership in Johannesburg last week, Indonesia was not on the list, which includes Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Indonesia’s decision to stay out of BRICS despite its similarities with other emerging economies reflects longstanding wariness of being entangled in geopolitical alliances as well as uncertainty about the economic benefits membership would bring, analysts say.

“It is not really surprising, since many analysts and former diplomats had already warned against joining BRICS and the economic benefits are not clear and apparent, while the political and economic cost due to the backlash from the West are quite certain,” Radityo Dharmaputra, a lecturer at the Department of International Relations at Universitas Airlangga, told Al Jazeera.

‘Bebas-aktif’

Ahead of the BRICS summit in South Africa last week, some 40 countries had apparently expressed interest in joining the grouping, including Indonesia.

Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo said, after attending the gathering in Johannesburg on Thursday, that he was considering membership but did not want to “rush into it”.

Speaking of Indonesia’s membership, Anil Sookal, South Africa’s ambassador to BRICS, said Jakarta had asked for a delay to consult with its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) counterparts about the move.

Universitas Airlangga’s Dharmaputra said that one of Indonesia’s concerns could be the optics of entering into a grouping with countries such as China and Russia.

“The image of Indonesia being seen as part of the China-Russia world would be a problem,” he said.

“Especially since Indonesia really emphasises its independent and active foreign policy. How can you sell that to the other countries, while being in the same group with China and Russia?”

Indonesia was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War and for decades has held to a “bebas-aktif”, or independent and active, approach to foreign policy, including taking a role in brokering peace around the world, such as when Widodo visited Russia and Ukraine in June last year.

Yohanes Sulaiman, a lecturer in international relations at Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani in Bandung, said there was “no benefit” for Indonesia to join BRICS.

“We have yet to see any real results from BRICS other than as a grouping to counter the United States and there doesn’t seem to be any concrete progress being made,” he told Al Jazeera.

While BRICS has fashioned itself as a bloc to champion the Global South – establishing the New Development Bank (NBD) as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and even floating the possibility of a new currency – perceptions that the grouping is a burgeoning anti-Western alliance could complicate Indonesia’s ties with the United States.

Last week, the Indonesian government and US aircraft maker Boeing agreed to finalise the sale of 24 F-15EX fighter jets to Jakarta following a visit by Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto to Washington, DC.

Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani’s Sulaiman said that it made more sense for Indonesia to be part of groups like ASEAN with its neighbours, instead of arbitrary groupings of countries with which Indonesia has few historical or trade links.

“Indonesia already has ties with China, and Russia is now the subject of an international boycott, so there is no benefit there,” he said. “South Africa is facing a financial crisis and we can also work directly with other countries like India.”

Under Widodo’s presidency, Indonesia has set ambitious development targets, including relocating its capital city to Eastern Borneo and building capacity to process commodities into finished products at home, which is a cornerstone of Jakarta’s efforts to reach $25,000 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by 2045.

Dharmaputra said that Indonesia has its sights on other global groupings that offer more obvious benefits in areas such as trade, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has 38 member countries.

“Indonesia wants to join the OECD and joining BRICS would be seen as an obstacle to this,” he said.

Sulaiman said efforts by BRICS to challenge the dominance of the US dollar would also likely be seen as unattractive to Indonesia.

“This was a highly rational decision,” he said. “Things would be the same whether we joined or not.”

Source: Aljazeera

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The possible lapse comes after U.S. Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., led a congressional group warning the U.S. State Department in July 2023 to beware of cooperation with China. This group recommended to let the agreement expire without renewal, claiming China has gained a military advantage through its scientific and technological ties with the U.S.

The State Department has dragged its feet on renewing the agreement, only requesting an extension at the last moment to “amend and strengthen” the agreement.

The U.S. is an active international research collaborator, and since 2011 China has been its top scientific partner, displacing the United Kingdom, which had been the U.S.‘s most frequent collaborator for decades. China’s domestic research and development spending is closing in on parity with that of the United States. Its scholastic output is growing in both number and quality. According to recent studies, China’s science is becoming increasingly creative, breaking new ground.

As a policy analyst and public affairs professor, I research international collaboration in science and technology and its implications for public policy. Relations between countries are often enhanced by negotiating and signing agreements, and this agreement is no different. The U.S.’s science and technology agreement with China successfully built joint research projects and shared research centers between the two nations.

U.S. scientists can typically work with foreign counterparts without a political agreement. Most aren’t even aware of diplomatic agreements, which are signed long after researchers have worked together. But this is not the case with China, where the 1979 agreement became a prerequisite for and the initiator of cooperation.

A 40-year diplomatic investment

The U.S.-China science and technology agreement was part of a historic opening of relations between the two countries, following decades of antagonism and estrangement. U.S. President Richard Nixon set in motion the process of normalizing relations with China in the early 1970s. President Jimmy Carter continued to seek an improved relationship with China.

China had announced reforms, modernizations and a global opening after an intense period of isolation from the time of the Cultural Revolution from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. Among its “four modernizations” was science and technology, in addition to agriculture, defense and industry.

While China is historically known for inventing gunpowder, paper and the compass, China was not a scientific power in the 1970s. American and Chinese diplomats viewed science as a low-conflict activity, comparable to cultural exchange. They figured starting with a nonthreatening scientific agreement could pave the way for later discussions on more politically sensitive issues.

On July 28, 1979, Carter and Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping signed an “umbrella agreement” that contained a general statement of intent to cooperate in science and technology, with specifics to be worked out later.

In the years that followed, China’s economy flourished, as did its scientific output. As China’s economy expanded, so did its investment in domestic research and development. This all boosted China’s ability to collaborate in science – aiding their own economy.

Early collaboration under the 1979 umbrella agreement was mostly symbolic and based upon information exchange, but substantive collaborations grew over time.

A major early achievement came when the two countries published research showing mothers could ingest folic acid to prevent birth defects like spina bifida in developing embryos. Other successful partnerships developed renewable energy, rapid diagnostic tests for the SARS virus and a solar-driven method for producing hydrogen fuel.

Joint projects then began to emerge independent of government agreements or aid. Researchers linked up around common interests – this is how nation-to-nation scientific collaboration thrives.

Many of these projects were initiated by Chinese Americans or Chinese nationals working in the United States who cooperated with researchers back home. In the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic, these strong ties led to rapid, increased Chinese-U.S. cooperation in response to the crisis.

Time of conflict

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, scientific collaboration between the two countries increased dramatically – joint research projects expanded, visiting students in science and engineering skyrocketed in number and collaborative publications received more recognition.

As China’s economy and technological success grew, however, U.S. government agencies and Congress began to scrutinize the agreement and its output. Chinese know-how began to build military strength and, with China’s military and political influence growing, they worried about intellectual property theft, trade secret violations and national security vulnerabilities coming from connections with the U.S.

Recent U.S. legislation, such as the CHIPS and Science Act, is a direct response to China’s stunning expansion. Through the CHIPS and Science Act, the U.S. will boost its semiconductor industry, seen as the platform for building future industries, while seeking to limit China’s access to advances in AI and electronics.

A victim of success?

Some politicians believe this bilateral science and technology agreement, negotiated in the 1970s as the least contentious form of cooperation – and one renewed many times – may now threaten the United States’ dominance in science and technology. As political and military tensions grow, both countries are wary of renewal of the agreement, even as China has signed similar agreements with over 100 nations.

The United States is stuck in a world that no longer exists – one where it dominates science and technology. China now leads the world in research publications recognized as high quality work, and it produces many more engineers than the U.S. By all measures, China’s research spending is soaring.

Even if the recent extension results in a renegotiated agreement, the U.S. has signaled to China a reluctance to cooperate. Since 2018, joint publications have dropped in number. Chinese researchers are less willing to come to the U.S. Meanwhile, Chinese researchers who are in the U.S. are increasingly likely to return home taking valuable knowledge with them.

The U.S. risks being cut off from top know-how as China forges ahead. Perhaps looking at science as a globally shared resource could help both parties craft a truly “win-win” agreement.

Source: The Conversation

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The bank’s governing council decided to increase the policy rate again, reflecting its view that monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive to bring supply and demand back into balance and return inflation sustainably to the 2 percent target, the central bank said in a press release.

The bank conducted eight consecutive interest rate hikes since March 2022, adding 425 basis points in total to tackle inflation. However, it maintained the policy rate at 4.5 percent in March and April this year.

According to the bank, consumer price index (CPI) inflation ticked up in April to 4.4 percent, the first increase in 10 months, with prices for a broad range of goods and services coming in higher than expected. Goods price inflation increased, despite lower energy costs. Services price inflation remained elevated, reflecting strong demand and a tight labour market.

The bank continued to expect CPI inflation to ease to around 3 percent in the summer, as lower energy prices feed through and last year’s large price gains fall out of the yearly data.

However, with three-month measures of core inflation running in the range from 3.5 percent to 4 percent for several months and excess demand persisting, concerns have increased that CPI inflation could get stuck materially above the 2 percent target, the bank said.

The governing council will in particular be evaluating whether the evolution of excess demand, inflation expectations, wage growth and corporate pricing behaviour are consistent with achieving the inflation target before announcing the rate target next month, the bank said.

The bank added it is also continuing its policy of quantitative tightening to complement its restrictive stance of monetary policy and normalizing its balance sheet. 

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The 225-issue Nikkei Stock Average added 289.35 points, or 0.90 percent, from Monday to close the day at 32,506.78, marking its highest closing level since July 19, 1990.

The broader Topix index, meanwhile, gained 16.49 points, or 0.74 percent, to finish at 2,236.28, to book its highest finish since Aug. 1, 1990.

Dealers said that data released Tuesday showing that along with household spending in Japan dropping 4.4 percent in April from a year earlier, wages were also on a downtrend.

They highlighted data showing wages slumped 3.0 percent in April, extending declines for the 13th consecutive month and noted that wages remain behind price rises for commodities and energy prices, with inflation forcing households to make some significant cuts in spending, like outlays for education.

As a result of the downbeat data, market strategists said the likelihood remained that the Bank of Japan would stay pat on its ultra-easy monetary policy, which bolstered buying confidence, despite the BOJ’s stance being in stark contrast to other major global central banks, which have tightened policies to combat oppressive inflation.

Brokers here also pointed to a growing view the U.S. Federal Reserve may forego a rate hike at the conclusion of its next policy-setting meeting, as some data, such as employment figures, have supported the view the U.S. economy may be improving.

But concerns remained, they said, as recent U.S. economic data has been choppy, with the Institute for Supply Management’s non-manufacturing data for May missing median market expectations, for example.

“A big reason why Japanese stocks are sought by global investors is because the improving situation in the United States has reduced downside risks in the world’s largest economy,” Koichi Fujishiro, a senior economist at Dai-ichi Life Research Institute, was quoted as saying.

Heavily weighted components reversed earlier losses and helped prop up the broader market, with Uniqlo clothing chain operator Fast Retailing gaining 1.7 percent.

Trading company Mitsui & Co. climbed 3.9 percent and was another notable winner, while Seven & i Holdings jumped 2.6 percent, following news it will revamp its delivery service to its stores to make it more efficient and profitable.

Banking shares lost ground, however, on reports regulators in the U.S. may increase capital requirements for lenders, in the wake of a number of U.S. bank failures.

Mizuho Financial Group lost 0.5 percent, while Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group dropped 0.6 percent. Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, meanwhile, ended 0.7 percent lower.

By the close of play, wholesale trade, mining and iron and steel-linked issues comprised those that gained the most.

The turnover on the Prime Market on the second trading day of the week came to 3,450.13 billion yen (24.78 billion U.S. dollars). 

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Nasser Kanaani made the remarks in a post on his Twitter page in response to a Saturday statement by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry, in which it said Azerbaijani citizens “are strongly recommended” not to visit Iran without necessity.

Kanaani emphasized that pursuing a neighbor-oriented policy based on mutual respect and good-neighborliness manners is Iran’s priority and on its agenda.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said in its statement that “citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan are strongly recommended not to visit the Islamic Republic of Iran without necessity, and those entering this country should remain as vigilant as possible.”

It also advised that Azerbaijani citizens currently in Iran should observe “the safety rules.”

The statement was issued after Azerbaijan sent on Friday a note of protest to the Iranian side in relation to the arrest of Azerbaijani citizen Farid Safarli, whom the Iranian authorities accuse of espionage.

Safarli, a university student based in Germany, arrived in Iran in early March. Since then, the contact with him has been lost.

Azerbaijan has demanded Iranian authorities determine his fate. 

The post Iran To Continue “Open Arms” Policy Toward Azerbaijanis appeared first on Policy Print.

The three documents bring the total number of policy briefs to seven under Our Common Agenda. Four other briefs will follow.

In his policy brief on reforming the international financial architecture, Guterres stressed the need for structural reforms in addition to immediate measures to relieve the burden on developing and emerging economies.

The Bretton Woods system was established in 1945, when many of today’s developing and emerging economies were under colonial rule. It is supposed to serve the world but does not represent the world, he said.

The COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath were a stress test for that system, but it largely failed and did not fulfill its core mandate as a financial global safety net. It did not provide enough of the financing needed to support a recovery in developing countries, many of which are now in the throes of a deep financial crisis, said Guterres.

Fifty-two developing countries are in, or near, debt distress, while debt relief is at a standstill. Inflation and rising interest rates are adding to the unsustainable financial pressure on developing countries. Some governments are being forced to choose between making debt repayments or defaulting in order to pay public sector workers — possibly ruining their credit rating for years to come. Africa now spends more on debt service costs than on health care, he noted.

In the short term, the international community needs to take urgent steps under current arrangements to relieve the burden on developing and emerging economies, said Guterres. “But beyond emergency measures, we need a structural response. The international community must reform the international financial architecture to make it resilient, equitable, and accessible to all.”

The policy brief sets out ambitious, concrete proposals in six areas to address historic injustices and systemic bias: global economic governance, debt relief and the cost of sovereign borrowing, international public finance, the global financial safety net, addressing short-termism in capital markets and sustainable finance, and a global tax architecture.

The brief proposes strengthening the voice and representation of developing countries on the boards of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); proposes reforms to IMF quotas, which should be delinked from access to resources; suggests changes to IMF voting rights and decision-making rules; and proposes a representative apex body overseeing the entire system, to enhance its coherence and align its priorities with the 2030 Agenda.

Overall, the proposals in the brief are aimed at moving away from a system that benefits the rich and prioritizes short-term gains, toward one that is equitable, and invests up-front in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), climate action, and future generations, said Guterres.

In the policy brief concerning GDP, he urged member states to move toward universal and comprehensive measurements to complement GDP as a metric for economic progress.

GDP “will continue to be an important metric. But there is a growing recognition that GDP overlooks human activities that sustain life and contribute to well-being, while placing disproportionate value on those that damage us and deplete our planet,” said the UN chief.

According to Guterres, GDP ignores or obscures the complexity of sustainable development, as deforestation, overfishing and the mining and burning of fossil fuels all increase GDP, while GDP takes no account of environmental sustainability, unpaid care work, and the negative impact on people and societies of many economic activities.

Some countries may have a relatively high GDP, but due to special circumstances, they may be at increased risk from economic shocks. Conversely, some countries with lower GDP may be more resilient to shocks because of a strong social contract, or a geographic location that protects them from the worst impacts of climate chaos, he said.

This policy brief proposes a path toward complementary metrics that more accurately reflect what humans value, said Guterres.

First, it proposes that member states make a political commitment to a conceptual framework that accurately values what matters for people, the planet, and the future.

Second, the brief calls for a technical process to develop metrics to inform this framework. It proposes that an independent high-level expert group should produce a dashboard of key alternative indicators by March 2024.

Third, the brief calls for a massive upgrading of support to countries so that they can develop the data capacity needed to make new metrics operational.

In the policy brief on the Global Digital Compact, Guterres said there is an urgent need for governments to come together in such a compact to mitigate the risks of digital technologies and identify ways to harness their benefits for the good of humanity.

Artificial intelligence (AI), deep fakes, and bio-engineering are just three areas of latest technological progress that are testing governance capacities beyond their limits. This exponential acceleration makes cooperation on technology even more important, he said.

Generative AI will have a huge impact on education, communication, the world of work and far more. But the future of that impact is not clear to anyone. Jobs will be both created and lost, and the world of work will change, he said.

While AI has the potential to turbocharge development and productivity, accelerating progress toward the SDGs, it also presents serious ethical challenges. The weaponization of AI is a huge concern, he warned.

The policy brief proposes a vision for digital cooperation that puts humanity at the core, with no one left behind: a digital future that is anchored in universal human rights; global cooperation that harnesses technology for human development and turbocharges progress on the SDGs; digital technologies that are governed by humans, for humans, said Guterres.

The Global Digital Compact is a unique opportunity to bring together governments, regional organizations, the private sector and civil society in a global approach to digital governance, he said. “The compact would provide a framework to align national, regional and industry approaches around global priorities, principles and objectives.”

The policy brief identifies areas for urgent action, from scaling up efforts to connect the unconnected, to building digital public infrastructure and supporting public administrations to regulate technology for everyone’s benefit.

The brief proposes steps to address gaps in the governance of AI. It reiterates Guterres’ proposal for a high-level advisory body for AI, which could meet regularly to review AI governance arrangements and offer recommendations on how they can be aligned with human rights, the rule of law and the common good.

“We will start work on this body by the end of this year, and task it to present options for the international governance of AI. This could include an AI Accord, connected to the Global Digital Compact process,” said Guterres.

The brief also proposes a Digital Cooperation Forum that would evaluate progress on digital governance and highlight gaps.

The series of policy briefs on Our Common Agenda provide insights for member states as they prepare for this year’s SDG Summit and next year’s Summit of the Future. 

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